Sunday, March 2, 2008

Why I Have New Hope for The Mideast



March 2, 2008

By Robin Wright


In 2006, three years after the Iraq invasion, I got so tired of the divisive debate in Washington about the future of the Middle East that I went back to the region I've covered since 1973 and listened instead to the people who live there. After traveling for the better part of a year from Rabat to Tehran, I came away surprisingly buoyed.


Oh sure, the Middle East is more volatile than it was at the beginning of the Bush administration: The Arab-Israeli peace process isn't going anywhere. Iraq remains mired in ethnic tensions, religious rivalries and Islamic extremism -- and still has only limited electricity. Iran is angrily defiant toward the United Nations over its nuclear program. Lebanon teeters again.


Yet in the early 21st century, a budding culture of change is creatively challenging the status quo -- and the extremists. New public voices, daring publications and noisy protests across two dozen countries are giving shape to a vigorous, if disjointed, search for alternatives to the autocratic regimes and imperious monarchies that have proved they're out of sync with their people. Dissident judges in Cairo, rebel clerics in Tehran, satellite television station owners in Dubai, the first female parliamentary candidates in Kuwait, young techies in Jeddah, intrepid journalists in Beirut, and bold businessmen in Damascus are carving out new space for political action.


It's a hard slog for them all. Obstinate governments are ruthlessly repressing them; extremists are targeting them. Together, those forces cut short the Arab Spring three years ago, when millions of Iraqis voted in free elections, Lebanese protesters ended Syria's 29-year occupation and democracy movements such as Egypt's "Enough" challenged autocrats across the region. The Bush administration's bungling and backtracking on democracy hasn't helped much, either.
But societies have not gone back to square one. The issue in the Middle East is no longer whether to seek political change. It's how to make it happen.


"In the Arab world, the status quo is not sustainable," reflected Marwan Muasher, a former Jordanian foreign minister. "What worked 40 years ago -- when the state could decide things and expect people to follow -- does not work now. Unless the state is responsive and aware, it is in for major trouble."


That, I found, is only one of many lessons of the new Middle East.


* * *


Two decades ago when I roamed the region, I sought out clandestine cells as the barometer of opposition. Now I look for computer nerds -- the pajamahedeen, or pajama warriors, who wield computers instead of roadside bombs. They personify Lesson 1 in the changing Middle East: The opposition is more open, ambitious, imaginative and stubborn than ever. And the YouTube generation has become a whole new political class.


"Governments have a new kind of opponent," reflected 33-year-old Egyptian Wael Abbas. His blog has posted cellphone videos of police brutality -- including one of a detainee writhing in pain as police sodomized him with a broomstick -- to hold President Hosni Mubarak's government accountable for abuse. Started in 2004, Abbas's blog was garnering up to 30,000 hits a day, jumping to 45,000 daily during a crisis, by 2007.


"We are not bound by government rules, like political parties. We can use the language of freedom," he told me. "We offer an alternative voice, especially for the young." Abbas and his brethren in Iran, Lebanon, Morocco and elsewhere are forcing governments to respond to their complaints, even as they try to silence them. In Egypt, two police officers were prosecuted for abusing the detainee with the broomstick.


* * *


In countries long ruled by a single party or single family, I picked up Lesson 2: There is no longer a single truth, in either ideology or religion, and challenges to the status quo are coming from unlikely quarters.


Hadi Khamenei, a Shiite cleric, campaigned across Iran and in his newspaper against the idea of a supreme leader who has veto power over legislation, presidential decrees and judicial decisions and who can even run for office. "The most important thing we're looking for today in Iran is the rule of law," he told me. "And that means no one, whatever his position, is above it."


Because of his activism, Khamenei has been barred from running for office, his paper has been banned, and he was hospitalized after being attacked by religious vigilantes. "Unfortunately for the rest of us," he said, "there are still people at the top who don't accept that basic right."
Khamenei should know. His older brother just happens to be Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.


* * *


In countries where pro-Western activists were once the most outspoken, I found Lesson 3: Old Cold War enemies have become unexpected allies -- and the pluckiest agitators for change.


Decades ago, when the Middle East was a battlefield between U.S. and Soviet interests, the West encouraged Islamic movements to foil Moscow's influence. But with Islamic parties on the rise, the ultimate irony is that many of the secular activists now taking the biggest risks, organizing the boldest protests and penning the most scathing criticisms are reformed Marxists.


Riad al-Turk is the Nelson Mandela of Syria. He was locked in a windowless underground cell about the length of his body without furniture or a toilet for 18 years. He kept from going mad by using uncooked grains of rice from his evening soup to etch geometric designs on the floor. "You must accept hell as a price to pay for remaining faithful to your convictions," he later reflected.


After his release in 1998, Turk went at it again, lashing out at the Assad dynasty in Damascus for "relying on terror" and demanding that it move "from despotism to democracy." In 2001, he was arrested a fourth time. Freed in 2005 at age 75, the reformed Marxist refused to be silent, even while acknowledging that he was only a starting point.


"The regime will eventually collapse on its own, due to isolation internally and internationally," he told me. "That's what happened in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. That's what will happen here."


* * *


To understand political trends, I once turned to intellectuals and elites. Now I look to ordinary people galvanized out of apathy to fight for change. Lesson 4: Watch out for the soccer moms.


That's how I'd describe Ghada Shahbender in Egypt. A middle-aged mother of four athletic teenagers who was in the throes of a divorce, Shahbender had never joined a party or voted -- until May 2005, when she became infuriated by televised pictures of police watching as thugs beat women, old and young, on referendum day. A week later, she went to her first protest.


"An elderly woman turned to me and said she thought I was new and did I have 100 [Egyptian] pounds," Shahbender recalled. " 'Why 100 pounds?' I asked. She told me, 'That's what you need for bail.' "


Shahbender didn't flinch. With friends, she formed We're Watching You to monitor elections for president and parliament in 2005. The group chronicled more than 1,000 violations, complete with video of police firing tear gas and live ammunition at voters. With international observers barred, We're Watching You became the leading source for the media and foreign governments on the fraud in the contests, which were won, again, by Mubarak and his ruling party.


Shahbender has since been invited to monitor elections elsewhere in the region, has sued the government for not complying with an international treaty on corruption, and has started Kid-mocracy, a competition to help teenagers learn about constitutions. Last year she brought the winners to Washington.


* * *


While it's conventional wisdom to view political Islam as part of the problem in the Middle East, it may actually be part of the solution. Lesson 5: Pay attention to the moderate Islamists; many are seeking compromise.


Saadeddine Othmani, a psychiatrist-turned-politician, heads Morocco's Justice and Development Party, a movement he compares to Europe's Christian Democrats. Since it began competing in parliamentary elections in 1997, the party has adopted the earthly challenges of poverty, corruption and constitutional reform as its prime causes. There's no talk of imposing sharia, or Islamic law, or of overthrowing the government. Indeed, the only picture in its Rabat headquarters is of King Mohammed VI.


"Islam has no fixed form of governance. Instead this has been left for human creativity. . . . The people's will is the decisive factor," Othmani told me. "Our approach is to have gradual progress and avoid haste and shortcuts, which is the major mistake committed by many leftists, nationalists and Islamist movements." In elections last fall, amid a field of 33 parties, the Justice and Development Party officially became Morocco's second most popular party.


* * *


Not all of the Middle East's new actors will succeed. For all the signs of promise, the region is still full of shadows.


Democracy is about differences, which are bound to explode once disparate sides of society are free to speak and make demands. Opening new space also does not guarantee who or what will fill it. And all the factors contributing to change make the region susceptible to greater turmoil.


Yet what I found most inspiring in my travels was not the dreams that the outside world has for the people of the Middle East. It was the lofty goals they have set for themselves, and begun -- only begun -- to act on.

Sunday, July 29, 2007

U.S. vs. Iran: Cold War, Too

July 29, 2007

By Robin Wright


After three decades of festering tensions, the United States and Iran are now facing off in a full-fledged cold war.


When the first Cold War began, in 1946, Winston Churchill famously spoke of an Iron Curtain that had divided Europe. As Cold War II begins half a century later, the Bush administration is trying to drape a kind of Green Curtain dividing the Middle East between Iran's friends and foes. The new showdown may well prove to be the most enduring legacy of the Iraq conflict. The outcome will certainly shape the future of the Middle East -- not least because the administration's strategy seems so unlikely to work.


The new Cold War will take center stage this week, as President Bush dispatches Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to the Middle East for a last-ditch appeal to recalcitrant U.S. allies on Iraq. Their pitch to Sunni Arab regimes spooked by the bloc of countries and movements led by Shiite Persian Iran will be simple: Support Iraq as a buffer against Iran or face living under Tehran's growing shadow.


Although the United States and Iran have been adversaries since the 1979 Iranian revolution replaced a monarchy with a rigid theocracy, Washington has felt compelled to isolate Iran more aggressively over the past 18 months, as the Middle East's strategic balance has begun to tilt in Tehran's favor.


In the Palestinian territories, the Iranian-backed radicals of Hamas won the most democratic election ever held in the Arab world in January 2006, then militarily routed their secular, U.S.-backed rivals in Fatah to seize control of the Gaza Strip. In Lebanon last summer, the extremist Shiite militia Hezbollah used Iranian weaponry to engage Israel in the longest war since the Jewish state's creation -- and fought to a draw, despite Israel's vastly superior U.S. weaponry. In Syria, Iran's closest ally lets foreign jihadists cross into neighboring Iraq, funnels Iranian arms to Hezbollah and supports radical Palestinian groups opposed to peace -- undermining Washington's top strategic goals in the region. And in Iraq, Shiite militias armed and trained by Iran have made Baghdad's streets and the fortified Green Zone unsafe, even for the U.S. military.


"The difference now is that Iran is feeling its oats because of the increase in oil prices, Iraq's weakness since the fall of Saddam, and the successes of Hezbollah and Hamas," noted Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, who ran the State Department's policy planning shop during Bush's first term. "In contrast, the U.S. is feeling stretched by the very same high oil prices and its difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan."


The roots of Cold War II lie in the Bush administration's decision to remove regimes it considered enemies after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The first two targets were the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- coincidentally, both foes of Iran that had served as important checks on Tehran's power. The United States has now taken on the role traditionally played by Iraq as the regional counterweight to Iran.


"The Iranian coalition has gotten immeasurably stronger in the last five years as its traditional enemies -- Saddam Hussein and the Taliban -- have been taken off the playing field," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA and National Security Council official who is now at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center. "With no buffer either east or west, Tehran's influence has naturally grown -- more because of the mistakes of the Americans than any brilliant strategy of the Iranians." Iranians, he noted, now believe that the tide of history is in their favor. "There's a cockiness there," he said.


And that's all before the question of Iran's nuclear intentions -- whether it is using a legal and peaceful nuclear-energy program as cover to develop the world's deadliest weapon -- is factored in.


The Bush administration is now adapting the tactics of the last Cold War to the new one. In the 1940s, the Soviet Union lowered its Iron Curtain to shore up communism in Eastern Europe and prevent penetration from the West. The former Kremlinologists now running U.S. foreign policy, such as Rice and Gates, are trying their own version, with a Green Curtain designed to cut off the bloc of Iranian-linked radicals and protect U.S. allies in the Middle East.


In the new Cold War, the United States and Iran are using eerily familiar tools to undermine each other. Over the past 18 months, Washington has deployed a second carrier battleship group off Iran's coast; orchestrated two U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iranian financial institutions and military officials; arrested Iranian operatives in Iraq; allocated $75 million for this year and $108 million for next year to promote democracy in Iran; and reportedly begun covert operations that included disinformation campaigns and currency manipulation.


Tehran, in turn, has allegedly increased supplies of roadside bombs, mortars and even 240-mm rockets to Iraqi militias; resupplied Hezbollah after its war with Israel; given Hamas tens of millions of dollars when international aid was cut off after its election; arrested Americans in Iran on charges of undermining Iran's national security; and reportedly provided small arms to its old Taliban enemies to use against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.


But the new Cold War won't be as clear-cut as the last one. This time, the issues are not so straightforward, and the proxies don't easily line up. "Unlike the Cold War, when there was a common frame of reference, when we and the Soviets and the residents of the Third World saw the lines drawn in the same way, we don't see the divide today in the same way as many in the Middle East," said Paul Pillar, a former senior Middle East analyst at the National Intelligence Council who is now at Georgetown University.


Added Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: "Where that Green Curtain goes is at the heart of the problem."


In the Palestinian territories, Washington hopes to bolster President Mahmoud Abbas and isolate the Iranian-backed Hamas. Pro-U.S. Arab regimes also want to bolster Abbas -- but so that he can reconcile with Hamas.


In Lebanon, the United States wants to see Hezbollah defanged so that it can no longer threaten Israel or pro-U.S. factions in the Lebanese government. But public opinion polls show that most Lebanese see Hezbollah as a legitimate force defending their country from Israel.


On Iraq, Rice and Gates will have a hard sell, particularly with Saudi Arabia. "Iranophobia will not be enough to get the Saudis to back Iraq," said Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service. "We're saying they need to support Iraq's unity government as a brake on Iran," but the Saudis think the U.S.-backed government of Nouri al-Maliki is helping Iran's fellow Shiites in Iraq while hurting the Saudis' Sunni brethren.


The basic U.S. premise -- isolating regional foes behind the Green Curtain -- is in trouble even among Washington's closest allies. "The United States is trying to define the main line of confrontation as the extremist camp versus the camp of moderation, a division which does not exist," Pillar said. "It may be reflective of our rhetoric and the way Americans see the world, but it is not reflective of the realities in the Middle East."


The geography of Cold War II is also not as neat as that of Cold War I. Some of Iran's proxies (such as Hezbollah) operate in pockets within countries (such as Lebanon) whose governments are aligned with the United States. "The problem with the administration's portrait," Riedel said, "is that it would take multiple Green Curtains."


Those differences aside, there may be at least one striking similarity between Cold War I and Cold War II: the long-haul time frame required to get results. "The idea that it's a Cold War means that the U.S. can't and won't win anytime soon," reflected Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Beirut office. "It involves a long-term policy of containing or undermining enemies -- the model that held between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for 40 years."

Sunday, September 12, 2004

After Grief, The Fear We Won't Admit



By Robin Wright
September 12, 2004


Psychologists say the most intense period of mourning lasts three years. Since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have indeed passed through several stages of grief, from disbelief to anger to a degree of acceptance. Yet, there's still a gnawing fear in our bellies that prevents full recovery. It's a fear that extends, I believe, well beyond Osama bin Laden and the prospects of another attack, and centers instead on our relationship with Islam itself.


Once familiar to most Americans mainly from seventh grade social studies, Islam has now become synonymous in the minds of many with the biggest post-Cold War threat. Even as we struggle to understand it, we're afraid of it. And because of that fear, we're drawing a Green Curtain around the Muslim world, creating an enduring divide.


Figuring out Islam's role in the 21st century is an existential challenge, but one many of us are emotionally unprepared to face. We pretend that we're not prejudiced, that we understand that most Muslims don't support the horrific bloodshed of bin Ladenism. Yet we still view 1.2 billion Muslim people spread throughout 53 countries as a threatening monolith. As long as we make that mistake, America and its allies won't feel safe, no matter how many billions of dollars are poured into security precautions.


Aside from the vital mission of tracking down bin Ladenists, military muscle is not always an effective instrument for moving forward. Nor are tepid diplomatic initiatives aimed at coaxing authoritarian governments into adopting change at a pace and in a manner that they control. There's another strategy that's gaining favor among Mideast experts: Bring Islamic movements and groups into the political process. Give Islamist parties new political space -- wide open space -- to absorb passions and sap anger.


That means accepting, even embracing, the idea that Islam is not the problem, but the way out of a political predicament that has been building quietly for decades. It means not only supporting nationalists, liberals and nascent democrats already on our side in the quest to transform the Middle East but also encouraging Islamists and their parties to participate. Basically, it means differentiating between Islamists and jihadists, and accepting anyone willing to work within a system to change it rather than work from outside to destroy it.


"It's hard to imagine political evolution in the next 20 years that does not include the Islamists," says Ellen Laipson, president of the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank that studies international security issues. "They have established legitimacy and a following and you won't make them disappear overnight by supporting the activities of a small elite of secular modernists. . . . You have to imagine a political space that has both."


Mideast scholars say it's too late to do anything less. The alternative is alienating even more Muslims by excluding them. And alienation -- from closed political systems and corrupt economies -- is what originally drove many Muslims to seek refuge in their mosques.


Including Islamists in government is an uncomfortable idea for those of us in secular societies. It summons up haunting images of Iranian clerics and American hostages, oppressed women and antiquated laws. That's why for years, U.S. governments have accepted Algeria's military, which voided free elections won by Islamic parties, and Hosni Mubarak's suppression of Egypt's Muslim groups. That's shortsighted because perpetuating the status quo will be worse. Now that Islamists have moved from the fringe to the center of political activity, a trend that has accelerated since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, they can no longer be excluded.


We have to think outside the prism of the war on terrorism. "Even as it wages a resolute campaign against international terrorism, America should not believe that it is engaged in a fight to the finish with radical Islam," Robert Hutchings, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wrote in a recent issue of Foreign Policy magazine. "This conflict is not a clash of civilizations, but rather a defense of our shared humanity and a search for common ground, however implausible that may seem now."


One of the hopeful signs on this third anniversary of 9/11 is the way Americans are emerging from their grief to discuss a more creative course for the future and to more effectively answer the lingering question: What can America do? A growing number of voices on both the right and the left have been emboldened to shape proposals in a broader context.


The United States has tipped its hat to political change with initiatives to promote democracy. As President Bush said in a June speech in Istanbul, "Democratic societies should welcome, not fear, the participation of the faithful."


Yet in practice, the United States still veers away from Islamists. In Iraq, which Washington seeks to turn into a model for the region, U.N. and U.S. envoys deliberately picked politicians mainly from secular parties to assume power after the formal end of the U.S.-led occupation. Despite strong support in opinion polls, Islamist parties were marginalized. Analysts now predict they'll make a comeback in next year's elections and the United States would be wise not to try to prevent it.


"Political debate must encompass Islam if the debate is to be meaningful. Exclusion of the Islamic factor in Arab politics will simply be one-sided and unrealistic in its exclusion of the single greatest force within politics," writes Graham Fuller, a former senior intelligence analyst, in a paper released this month by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The same applies to the wider Islamic world that constitutes 18 percent of the world's people.


In the race to capture the imagination of the vast, alienated middle, hard-line groups need to be operating under the same legal umbrella as more moderate groups -- or they will try to lure the faithful through other means. "It's hard to hand over individual authority to people who are illiberal. What you have to realize is that the objective is to defeat bin Ladenism and you have to start the evolution. Moderate Muslims are not the answer. Shiite clerics and Sunni fundamentalists are our salvation from future 9/11s," says Reuel Marc Gerecht, a Middle East expert and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.


Transitions away from authoritarian regimes may be messier and more volatile than political transformations elsewhere over the past quarter century. But "Let it roll," Gerecht advises. "Don't walk away. It's part of the process. It's trying to ensure the system is sufficiently open that fundamentalists burn themselves out. You have to rob bin Ladenism of that virulent elixir. If we don't go in that direction, we know all other roads go back to 9/11."


"You want in a Machiavellian way to have fundamentalists do the dirty work," he says. "You want them to take care of the people who slaughtered the children [in Beslan, Russia]. The only way to do that is to have them compete in the political system. It may come off the rails for a while in some places, but even if it does, you will be better off. You don't want fundamentalists to take states by coups d'etat."


The premise behind the new ideas is that activists inspired or protected by religion have stood in for jailed or exiled secular opposition figures in many societies. "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God," Benjamin Franklin once said. And more recently, liberation theologians in Latin America, Jewish refuseniks in the Soviet Union, South Africa's Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Catholic priests in Poland and the Philippines have played pivotal roles in political transformations.


"Conservative and even fundamentalist views of religion are manageable in a plural environment, as shown by a host of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish cases," wrote French scholar Olivier Roy in the new anthology "A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism." "A pluralist approach allows civil society to reach the cadres of youth who could be ideal targets for radicals and neo-fundamentalist groups."


Attempts to control the pace of change or choose the participants in the political process could invite an even deeper backlash than we face now. America cannot want less for Muslim countries than it wants for the rest of the world. And Muslims must not feel they are bystanders. "In the end, you have to treat Muslims as adults. They have to become responsible for their own fate," says Gerecht.


Based on conversations with Mideast experts, it appears that in the meantime, the United States could do three things. First, hold a genuine two-way dialogue. For all the hand-wringing about ending hatreds, that essential element is missing.


In a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace last month, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said that the United States must do more with the Islamic world to dispel "destructive myths" about America and to support "voices of moderation." The most striking thing about the speech was that she gave it to an American audience. Asked why no senior U.S. official had given a similar speech in any of the five largest Muslim countries in the three years since Sept. 11, she replied, "That's a good question. Maybe we should."


Dialogue must not just engage people listed in the local U.S. embassy's Rolodex. We need to listen to the bad guys too to understand where the fissures -- and opportunities -- might be.


"Even the hard-core jihadis are having big debates about who exactly the enemy is and . . . about their tactics," says Princeton University Mideast expert Michael Doran, who gets up early each morning to research Islamist and jihadi Web sites. When U.S. contractor Paul Johnson was beheaded in Saudi Arabia "some said it was wrong. Others said, 'Our violence makes us look bad.' One of the most important ideologues, Abu Baseer, a cleric who was an Afghan jihadist, said 'Westerners in our society have protection.' The radicals countered that an apostate state -- Saudi Arabia -- can't grant immunity. But Baseer said, 'That's not right, we haven't thrown traditions out.' Three years after Sept. 11 . . . the debate among them is totally unknown."


A second course of U.S. action would be to use economic tools. Several Muslim countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Iran and Iraq, are seeking membership in the World Trade Organization. The United States could use WTO membership to induce change and force countries to embrace the rule of law.


Finally, we can embrace our own Islamic identity. Islam, the fastest-growing religion in the United States, is expected to become the second-largest faith in six years. Yet Muslims remain on the fringe. Just ask women who cover their heads or men with beards waiting in the boarding areas of airports.


Immediately after 9/11, Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington and said Islam was not the enemy. This is a noble sentiment, but Muslims must also become part of the mainstream -- a challenge faced throughout the West. For Europeans, the most important battle for Muslim hearts and minds over the next decade will not be fought in the Middle East but in European cities where the numbers of Muslims are growing, as Giles Kepel, a French expert on Islam, says in his new book "The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West." "If European societies are able to integrate these Muslim populations . . . this new generation of Muslims may become the Islamic vanguard of the next decade," he writes.


The unspoken undercurrent behind our failure to do more over the past three years is what former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski calls "a fear that periodically verges on panic that is in itself blind." As we look beyond our grief, we must also get beyond our prejudice and fear.

Saturday, January 1, 2000

Iran’s New Revolution

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
January/February 2000

PROMISES, PROMISES
By Robin Wright

A GENERATION after it seized power, Iran's revolutionary regime is deeply troubled: fractured by intense political divisions, endangered by economic disorder, discredited by rampant corruption, and smothered in social restrictions no longer acceptable to large sectors of its changing population. To the outside world the Islamic Republic of Iran often appears to be at a precipice, its unique theocratic government on the verge of imploding from internal tensions.

Over the past year, its domestic drama has played out visibly, and sometimes violently, in killings by a rogue death squad, newspaper closures, student unrest, political trials, local elections, charges of espionage against the Jewish minority, and as always, relations with the United States.

Yet Iran, often in spite of the theocrats, has begun to achieve one of the revolution's original goals: empowering the people. New social and political movements are blossoming defiantly in ways that put Iran on the cutting edge of the Islamic world on issues ranging from religious reform and cultural expression to women's rights. So, although the theocratic regime that seized power in 1979 is unlikely to survive in its current, austere form because of profound internal problems, the driving force behind the revolution has proven durable and, in the end, adaptable enough to allow Iranians to go out and get for themselves what the theocracy has failed to provide.

DARK HORSES

IRAN'S REVOLUTION was about more than getting rid of an unpopular king or ending 2,500 years of dynastic rule. In the quest for empowerment, the upheaval of 1979 was an extension of earlier challenges to the state's central power: the 1905-11 Constitutional
Revolution that diminished the monarchy's authority, and the nationalist rule between 1951 and 1953 that briefly forced the shah into exile. Both earlier attempts at evolutionary change were ultimately aborted. Thus the coalition of parties seeking a greater say in public life resorted to revolution. Iranians were not alone in trying to end autocratic rule. Iran’s upheaval was part of global change, including the demise of communism in Europe, white rule in Africa, and military dictatorships in Latin America.

But the process of empowerment was hijacked in the early days of the revolt by a clique of Shiite clerics who used their networks, legitimacy, and leadership to unite the disjointed opposition. After the shah's ouster, the coterie around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gradually purged its partners and crafted a theocracy instead of a democracy. Human rights were virtually ignored during the decade-long "First Republic," which lasted from 1979 until Khomeini’s death in 1989. With typical revolutionary excess, the regime's zealots became obsessed with deconstructing the past and winning converts to their cause, both at home and in the region. The fragile new state was also nearly overwhelmed by plummeting oil prices, economic sanctions, international isolation, and the region's bloodiest war in a century. It survived only by crushing dissent, spending its foreign exchange reserves, and tapping into fierce, age-old Persian nationalism.

Nonetheless, seeds of public empowerment were planted and grew. The Construction Jihad (teams of development experts and builders) brought progress in the form of schools, social services, clinics, electricity, television, and roads to the countryside. The revolution particularly excelled in education, in quantity if not always in quality. In the late 1970s, only half of Iran's youth between the ages of six and twenty-four were literate; two decades later, the number had grown to 93 percent—even though the population itself had doubled. Iran succeeded in part because traditional families trusted an Islamic government to educate their children, especially girls. Students also remained in school longer. The number of university graduates soared from 430,000 in the late 1970s to more than 4 million in the late 1990s. This success spurred expectations of a greater role in the system and access to new instruments of progress.

In the "Second Republic," from 1989 to 1997, Iran graduated from reacting against the past to realistically dealing with the present. During President Hashemi Rafsanjani's tenure, the government of God plummeted back to earth—with a thud. The new leadership initially promoted physical reconstruction, economic reform, and a diplomatic thaw. But without the ayatollah*s authority, longstanding political divisions deepened and paralysis set in. Despite a brief try at privatization, including reviving the monarchy's stock market, promises of change remained largely unfulfilled. In the end, the regime's blatantly manipulative tactics kept it from achieving its goals, instead spawning corruption, deepening debt, and social turmoil.

Paradoxically, the very policies that Rafsanjani introduced to win back the support of a war-weary public inadvertently jump-started the empowerment process. The regime sporadically tolerated cultural freedoms and relaxed some of its social restrictions. It also facilitated a consumer spending spree on imports by making credit available.
The outside world soon flooded back in, through satellite dishes, videos, computers, and even textbooks full of ideas. From that point on, the tide of information could no longer be controlled, however hard conservatives and clerics tried.

The Second Republic also overlapped with the end of the Cold War, which Iranians felt deeply because of their shared border with the Soviet Union. The collapse of Soviet rule—in a country with superpower resources—sent a powerful warning about the vulnerability of revolutionary regimes. Finally, Iran's return to peacetime pursuits, its flirtation with pragmatism, and the pressure of social problems all unleashed unusual initiatives, largely outside the government but also within the circles of power and even the clergy.

Iran's theocracy slowly came to recognize that it was endangering its own agenda by ignoring the state's real problems, such as its population policy. In the 1980s, millions of women complied with the theocrats' dictate to breed a new Islamic generation that would defend the revolution. Within seven years, Iran's population jumped from 34 million to more than 50 million; it is now 70 million. The clerics soon realized that soaring numbers were more likely to undo the revolution than to save it, and they introduced one of the world's most extensive family-planning programs. Every form of birth control, from condoms and pills to sterilization, became free. All couples now have to pass a family-planning course before obtaining a marriage license. Thousands of women mobilized by the Health Ministry have gone door-to-door to explain the necessity of birth control. Clerics, preaching the benefits of small family size, have issued fatwas approving everything from intrauterine devices to vasectomies.

Sensing a reluctant realism within the regime, Iran's increasingly savvy population began taking stands, making demands, and even defying the theocrats. In the 1997 presidential election, which had the highest turnout since the Iranian people endorsed revolution a generation earlier, 70 percent of Iran's voters spurned the theocrats' candidate of choice and instead elected a dark-horse cleric named Mohammad Khatami, a former minister of culture and Islamic guidance who was purged in 1992 for "liberalism" and "negligence." The election marked the onset of the "Third Republic" and the burgeoning of what is now a very public fight for empowerment. Its outcome will be determined partly by Khatami s success in restoring the rule of law, fostering a civil society (two of his campaign pledges), and wresting power from the religious superstructure—the theocratic part of Iran's system— that limits the government's powers. But more likely, Iran's future will be decided by the newly energized popular forces that made Khatami's election possible in the first place. Three movements reflect how the revolution is being redefined: daring Islamic reformers, an adventurous film industry, and spirited women’s groups.

BRAVE NEW WORLD

THE MOST INNOVATIVE MOVEMENT in Iran today is the Islamic reformation. Iranian thinkers have injected energy and ideas into a disparate movement, spreading from Egypt to India, that has been struggling for more than a century to reconcile a seventh-century religion with modernity. By using Islam as a popular political idiom, by weaving Islamic tenets into a modern. Western-style constitution, and by putting clerics in charge of the state, Iran became a live test and a venue for debate on the proper relationship between Islam and the modern world. Ironically, the failure of the world's only theocracy to empower its populace provided the biggest boost for new, progressive formulations about the modern Islamic state. Much of the most profound discourse within Islam today is taking place in Iran's newspapers, courtrooms, and classrooms. Even clerics who once held high office and intellectuals who were Khomeini's protégés are now challenging the religion's basic precepts as well as the specifics of theocratic rule.

Tehran was engrossed last autumn in the trial of Abdollah Nouri, a cleric, former Khomeini aide, and editor of the newspaper Khordad who served during the Third Republic as vice president, interior minister, and Tehran city councilor. The Special Court for the Clergy, which operates as an independent agency, charged him with multiple counts of "insulting" Islam, the prophet Muhammad, and Khomeini. Nouri's specific offense was running articles in Khordad that questioned everything from the Islamic concept of eye-for-eye justice to the clergy's automatic right to hold power. At his trial, Nouri, dressed in a white turban and clerical robes, astonished Iranians by taking the stand and denying the court's right to judge him: "I totally reject the court, its membership, and its competence to conduct this trial, and any verdict you reach will have no legitimacy." After his conviction he refused to appeal, on the same grounds. In late November, Nouri was sentenced to five years in prison and was also barred from political activity for five years, a punishment tacitly designed to prevent Khatami's closest ally from running for speaker of the parliament. And Nouri's newspaper was banned, although his staff defiantly pledged to launch another publication—the new way of getting around forced closures.

Six months earlier, Tehran had been absorbed in a similar trial— that of Mohsen Kadivar, a popular young cleric and seminary professor whose sister was an adviser to Khatami and another Tehran city councilor; his brother-in-law was Khatami's minister of culture and Islamic guidance. The Special Court for the Clergy charged him with "disseminating lies and disturbing public opinion" for writing articles advocating the separation of political and religious institutions. Kadivar also dared to compare practices in the Islamic republic with the shah's repressive controls on the freedom of expression and questioned the powers and righteousness of the theocracy. "From both a legal and religious point of view, it's quite permissible to criticize the Supreme Leader or the ruling establishment," he argued. Like Nouri, Kadivar rejected the clergy's right to judge: "Investigation into political and press offenses must be carried out in the presence of a jury and by a qualified court of the judiciary," he told the court. He was convicted and received an eighteen-month sentence.

Kadivar's case gained him celebrity status. Posters of the young cleric, who came from a noted religious family in the city of Shiraz, were plastered all over Tehran. Students held a candlelight vigil in the hills near Evin prison, where he was being held without bail. Chanting "freedom of thought, forever, forever," they released doves as a symbol of liberty. More than 200 journalists also signed a petition that condemned Kadivar's arrest as unconstitutional and called it an "offense" against Iran's writers and intellectuals. These responses to Kadivar's imprisonment reflected a newly emboldened population.

Both trials involved an issue more fundamental than the freedom of expression: the separation of religion and government. In an Islamic society, who has the ultimate power—the elected officials or the clergy? Since Islam is a monotheistic religion that offers not only spiritual values but also a set of rules to govern society, sorting out the allocation of power is critical to any genuine reform. Hence political change and religious reform are often intertwined in Muslim societies.

Over the past five years, Iran's leading philosopher, Abdul Karim Soroush, has fueled public debate by offering a framework—on the basis of faith—to blend Islam and democracy. He argues that to be a true believer, one must come to the faith without coercion or pressure— in other words, freely. That principle is the origin of all other freedoms. He never abandoned the tenets of his faith; he believes that sharia (Islamic law) can be a basis for modern legislation. But he breaks from Iran's theocrats in his declaration that Islamic law is not static, but is flexible and adaptable because it has only begun to be understood by imperfect human beings.

Soroush was a long-time follower of Khomeini, who appointed him to the Committee of the Cultural Revolution to conform university curricula to Islam. But a decade after the revolution, Soroush began to see the Ayatollahs as an instrument of transition, not as the goal. In books, magazine columns, and lectures at the three universities where he taught, Soroush warned that Islam, like any other religion, should never be used to rule a state, because it opens the door to totalitarianism. Often called the Martin Luther of Islam by students, Soroush is also widely popular among intellectuals, reformers, and the clergy. Many of his former students and followers launched new, reformist newspapers—most notably Jameh, Tous, Neshat, and Asr-e Azadegan, or "Era of the emancipators"—all of which were closed down by the judiciary.

The goal of Soroush, Kadivar, Nouri, and other reformers is to be Muslim without being fundamentalist, to be reverent but free, and to find a world-view that is both Islamic and modern. As the only Shiite ruled country, Iran is unique in the Muslim world. Yet the work of Iran's reformers is nonetheless spreading throughout the 53-nation Islamic bloc, the last group of countries to hold out against the wave of democratization that has swept the rest of the world.

CINEMA VERITE

THE FRONTLINE in the conflict over Iran's identity and its future is between artistic freedom and Islamic correctness. Some of the earliest and boldest challenges to the Second Republic came from artists. In a 1994 open letter titled "We Are Writers," 134 writers, poets, journalists, and scholars, including many who had once rallied around the regime, demanded the freedom to associate in a writers' union, noninterference in their personal lives, and an end to censorship. Within months, more than 200 film directors and actors petitioned for an end to the "straitjacket regulations and complicated methods of supervision" of Iran's movie industry, including everything from script approval to the distribution of raw film stock.

Iranian cinema has led a major countercultural revolution since the early 1990s. Despite often ridiculous restrictions, filmmakers have been able to exploit the subtleties of their medium to make bold statements about sensitive political and social issues. Characters are challenging the status quo; plots focus on the shortcomings of the Islamic system; dialogue is extending the boundaries of public discussion. Indeed, few subjects are now off-limits. The White Balloon, one of Iran's most famous post revolution films, jabs at the country's failures to address poverty, racial bias, and child exploitation. Dariush Mehrjui, the father of modern Iranian cinema, wrote a quartet of films—Banoo (1992), Sara (1993), Pari (1995), and Leila (1997)— about the professional and personal plight of women in Islamic society. Each ended with the lead female character defying convention or leaving her husband to head out on her own—a radical move in a society where women must get written permission to leave the country. Mehrjui's Hamoon, ranked the best movie in Iranian history in a 1997 poll of Iranian film critics and audiences, was a dark comedy about modern Iranian life that examined people's fixations with Islamic religious figures. Today's increasingly independent film industry is thoroughly undermining the theocrats' draconian effort to create a new society centered around the devout Shiite. Indeed, the change in the social climate is stark.

In the 1980s, the regime had forced artists and writers into silence or exile. Bookstore shelves were emptied and state-controlled television and radio were limited to religious programs, children's shows, sports, news programs, and staid documentaries. In the 1990s, a bookstore was firebombed for publishing an "un-Islamic" book. Theaters were attacked for showing films accused of religious insensitivity. One leading writer died mysteriously in prison; three others were murdered by a death squad tied to the intelligence ministry. Nothing was too trivial: the theocrats even endorsed new, Islamically correct dolls— Sara and her brother Dara—to supplant the influence of Mattel's Barbie and her boyfriend Ken.

But Iran's isolation proved to be a boon to the movie industry. The theocrats' ban on most foreign films in public theaters created a captive audience for Iranian cinema at a time when other countries were dominated by American movies. For the first time, Iran developed its own artistic Today, few subjects mm busmess. And like religious reformers, film directors with reformist views enjoyed a certain legitimacy, since many of them were once the regime's closest allies. Mohsen Makhmalbaf, who spent five years in the shah's jails, was known in the 1980s for ardently religious and pro-revolution films. But in the 1990s, his films shifted to secular stories that coyly challenged revolutionary truths. Makhmalbaf's fifth film was blatantly antiwar, and two were banned by the government. His seventh film, A Time to Love, was a controversial tale—with three endings based on three perspectives—about a married woman who pursues a younger man. But critics were concerned less with the illicit affair than with the films message: Perception varies, and so can the truth.

In 1998, Makhmalbaf's teenage daughter Samira made her film debut with The Apple, the true story of an illiterate man who had locked his twelve-year-old twin daughters at home since infancy, for fear that the girls' purity would be spoiled by strange men's gazes. The movie revolved around the gradual exposure of the girls—almost mute, unschooled, and both physically and mentally disabled—to the outside world. "I wanted the film to make this point: All it takes to imprison many, many women is one man," Samira told reporters when the film opened in New York in 1999. "What I noticed ahout those two girls is that the more they came into contact wdth society, the more complete they became as human beings. For me, that became a metaphor for all women. Women in Iran are like springs. If they want to be free, and if they try, they burst out with a lot of energy."

Iran's countercultural revolution has had a major boost since Khatami took office. During his 1997 confirmation hearings. Minister of Culture Aytollah Mohajerani described his ministry as the "laughing stock" of the government. "Islam is not a dark alley. Everyone can walk freely in the path of Islam," he told parliament. "We must create an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in all centers of culture, where all citizens can express their ideas and where the seeds of creativity can blossom." Iran's filmmakers are several steps ahead of the bureaucrats-—and are gaining international attention. Children of Heaven was one of five films nominated for the 1999 Academy Award for best foreign film. The White Balloon won the 1995 Cannes Camera d'Or prize for best first feature film and the 1997 New York Film Critics award for best foreign film. Taste of Cherry won the Palme d'Or at Cannes in 1997. Other films have won festival prizes in six continents for best picture, best foreign film, best director, best script, best actor, best documentary, best short film, and best jury. In defining the modern Islamic agenda, Iran's cinema is proving to be more appealing—and effective—than the theocrats' campaign to export religious militancy.

FROM UNDER THE CHADOR

THE MOST ENERGETIC MOVEMENT to emerge since 1979 is the women's movement, which is shattering the starkest stereotype of the Islamic republic: the chador-clad female. A generation after the revolution, Iranian women are by far the most politically active in the Persian Gulf and are among the most empowered in the Islamic world. In 1996, 200 women ran for the 270-seat parliament, and 14 won. In 1997, four women registered to run for the presidency. Although all were disqualified by the Council of Guardians that vets candidates, the decision was not based on gender. Five months later, Khatami appointed a female vice president. And in 1999, 5,000 women ran in local elections, and 300 won.

Today, more than 40 percent of university students are female, as are one-third of faculty members. Thousands of women educated after the revolution work as engineers, doctors, scientists, lawyers, and even clerics. More than 340 directors-general in government ministries are female. Iran has 140 female publishers, enough to hold an exhibition of books and magazines published by women only. Women have become painters, authors, designers, photographers, movie producers, directors, stars, and sculptors crafting "anatomically correct" female figures (otherwise known as nudes).

A fierce women's movement was not what the theocrats intended. Their original goal was more akin to gender apartheid. After the revolution, the regime dismissed almost all women who had risen to positions of importance. A former female education minister was executed for promoting "prostitution" among girls. The revolution's severe intentions were reflected in the new Islamic dress code and the lowering of the minimum age at which women could be married to
nine. The new constitution also removed critical women's rights in divorce and child custody battles.

A generation later, restrictions still border on the bizarre. A woman may have an equal vote in parliament or equal powers among the vice presidents, but her testimony in court carries only half the weight of a man's. Women can head universities and publish newspapers but cannot leave the country without their husbands' written permission. They can act in plays and movies alongside men, but they cannot sing in public or ride in the same section of a public bus.

Iranian women, however, have proven irrepressible. In defiance of the theocracy, they are putting their imprints on diverse aspects of Iranian life. Beginning in the mid-1990s, pressure from women changed laws on employment, divorce, and maternity leave. Women packed a courtroom to protest child-custody laws after the brutal death of an eight-year-old girl—weighing only 35 pounds, with a fractured skull, two broken arms, and burn marks covering her body—at the hands of her father, a drug addict with a criminal record and a documented history of child abuse. Islamic tradition allows a mother to keep a daughter until the age of seven and a son until the age of two; full custody then switches to the father. Parliament subsequently revised the law in 1998 to stipulate that a child could no longer be awarded to an unfit father, defining the custody qualifications in a way that could often disqualify men.

Women have challenged other male bastions as well. Thousands of women broke a long-time barrier preventing females from attending male sporting events when they poured into Tehran's stadium to greet the Iranian soccer team after it qualified for the 1998 World Cup.
Women are also playing sports. Tehran alone has eighty-five women's basketball teams in five leagues. Only ten thousand women engaged in intramural sports on the eve of the revolution; today, two million participate in soccer, basketball, swimming, tennis, handball, skiing, aerobics, fencing, judo, shooting, volleyball, rowing, horseback riding, gymnastics, golf, table tennis, karate, tae kwon do, and even waterskiing— despite the slightly absurd waterproof coats and scarves women must wear to demonstrate modesty. And women have forced the theocrats to acknowledge their participation officially; at the 1996 Olympics, for the first time, a female athlete led the Iranian team onto the field.

The new activists are as distinct as their political environment. The most outspoken women are no longer Westernized or upper-class elites, but have emerged from within the revolution. Many are from traditional families, clerical circles, and rural areas—none of which had previously produced female activists. Some women would continue wearing conservative dress, even if it were not required. But all dare to challenge the regime on far more critical issues, from centuries-old Islamic traditions to recent clerical interpretations of Islam.

Women's publications have been brazen on reform issues. Zan (Woman), the newspaper published by Faezeh Hashemi, a member of parliament and the daughter of former President Rafsanjani, editorialized against child-custody laws, the use of stoning as a punishment, and "temporary marriage"—the practice of contracting a short-term wife. It ran an expose on the return of prostitution and reported on a New Year's message sent to Iran by the former empress. The theocrats banned Zan in 1999. Another publication, Farzanehj is trying to reconcile more robust women's rights with the Islamic faith; its articles have included "Human Rights of Women in Islam," "A History of Silence and Debates Today," "How to Proceed," and "The Long Way Ahead."

Iran's women still face serious discrimination. But their participation in society has already helped to reshape the political scene. In a country where women have the franchise from the age of 15, Khatami's stunning upset victory would not have happened without the female vote.

Like the world around it, Iran is still undergoing a profound transformation. More internal turmoil lies ahead, as the revolution's early passions are replaced by hard-earned pragmatism, and as arrogance gives way to realism among many sectors of Iranian society. Gradually, the government of God is being forced to cede to secular statecraft—and to empower Iranians. In the process, Iran has begun contributing to the spread of public empowerment around
the world.

Monday, November 8, 1999

WE INVITE THEHOSTAGES TO RETURN

THE NEW YORKER
November 8 1999

The extraordinary changing voices of Iran's revolution.
BY ROBIN WRIGHT

TEHRAN is a busy place on Thurs­day nights, the eve of the Mus­lim Sabbath, On Africa Boule­vard, a street lined with boutiques and fast-food joints, teen-agers and twenty-somethings in colorful Japanese and Korean compacts drive slowly back and Barth for hours. Car radios blare the Backstreet Boys, Ricky Martin, and a rhapsodic Iranian version of New Age. A young man in a Nissan sport-utility vehicle entertains two male passengers by repeatedly gunning the engine, only to squeal to a halt after a few feet, be­cause of bumper-to-bumper traffic. And everyone seems to be talking, if not to other passengers, then on cell phones, and often—to judge by sonic of the glances exchanged across the lanes—to other motorists cruising the strip. Around the city, ads for Cartier watches and Nokia mobile phones flank billboards heralding the hundredth birthday of Ayatollah Khomeini. In movie theatres, boys dare to put their arms around their girlfriends. "Bay-watch" and American soap operas come in over illegal satellite. Chicago Bulls T-shirts are a commonplace. Leonardo DiCaprio is a heartthrob.

THE REVOLUTIONARY

IBRAHLM ASGHARZADEH is, at forty-four, a man with a sense of style—something rare since the 1979 revolu­tion covered women from head to toe in mournful black, condemned the neck-- tie as a symbol of Western cultural dominance, and, because centuries ago some clerics discouraged shaving, made beards a statement of support for the world's only modern theocracy. At a re­cent dinner party, given by husband­-and-wife professors at Teheran Uni­versity, Asgharzadeh was discordantly fashionable. Fie wore a blue checked shirt, a sports coat of muted cream‑and-brown checks, and deep-brown trousers and deep-brown socks. (Shoes had been left at the door—the practice in traditional Iranian homes.) His thick silver hair was impeccably cut, and his designer eyeglasses shone like crystal. He didn't wear a tie—only doctors, and waiters at certain new restaurants, wear ties—but he was clean-shaven.

I'd wanted to meet Asgharzadeh since 1981, when I stood on the tarmac of the Algiers international airport and watched fifty-two exhausted American hostages disembark from an Air Al-Ole plane. Throughout the hostage crisis—which lasted more than four hundred days, introduced the yellow ribbon as a national symbol, cost eight American lives in a failed rescue at­tempt, ostracized one of the world's largest oil producers, redefined both diplomacy and terrorism, ended an American Presidency, and gave us "Nightline"—Asgharzadeh had been the primary spokesman for Students Following the Imam's Line. Twenty years ago, the once obscure group be­came the world's most famous student body when four hundred of its young members scrambled over a brick wall and stormed the American Embassy in Teheran. At the time, Asgharzadeh was a scruffy student of industrial engineer­ing at Iran's top technical university--his most distinguishing feature was a heavy beard—and he was full of fury. "This takeover is not a game!" he told reporters massed outside the Embassy on the day of the takeover. "This is a den of spies." The term stuck. For years, the American Embassy was popularly known as the "den of spies."

A couple of Iranian papers once hinted that it was Asgharzadeh who had actu­ally conceived the notion of taking over the Embassy, so at the dinner I asked him if it was true that he was the mas­termind. He paused, and confessed that he’d been on of three students, all engineering majors at Teheran universi• ties, who'd originally made the decision to attack the Embassy. "But we pro­mised each other that we'd never pub­licly disclose which one of us first pro­posed it," he said. "Probably it's better not to say too much." Then a smile broke across his face.

Asgharzadeh did admit to coining the name Students Following the Imam's Line. "We were trying to catch the Imam's attention," he explained, refer­ring to Ayatollah Khomeini, the reli­gious leader who guided the revolution. Asgharzadeh was also candid about the planning. "The critical phase was getting three pieces of information," he recalled. "The most important was an inside plan of the Embassy. Two student apartments were across the street, so we used different rooms to draw maps."

The sprawling American compound, occupying twenty-seven acres of prime property on Taleghani Street, in down­town Teheran, included an imposing brick diplomatic chancery, a separate consulate to process the thousands of visas that were issued to Iranians each year, the Ambassador's residence, sev­eral staff homes, and a massive ware­house, whose dark, windowless cellar was later nicknamed the Mushroom Inn by hostages who were confined there. The Embassy symbolized not only the American presence but also Iran's importance to the United States—as a buffer to the Soviet Union, a pillar of Mideast policy, a frontier on both Turkey and turbulent South Asia, and the longest coast on the Persian Gulf, through which forty per cent of the West's oil was shipped.

"We also had to find out about the staff, so we kept a log on the person­nel," Asgharzadeh continued. "Stu­dents were posted around the clock to watch how many there were and who went in and out. We wanted all the Americans inside when we took it.

"Finally, we had to know the secu­rity situation inside. We had to do this all ourselves, and we were just students. But, in the end, we had really good in­formation on the Marine guards."

Looking back, Asgharzadeh recalled that little had gone as the students had expected. "We didn't intend to keep the Americans for a long time—maybe three to five days," he told me. "We went inside the com­pound just as a protest. Then we did get the Imam's attention—and his blessing. The masses demanded that we continue, something we didn't antici­pate. It became a very complicated situation, one that was out of our hands."

The impact of the Embassy take­over was, in fact, more profound on Iran than on the United States, for it forced a denouement in a debate over the revolution's future; namely; the role of the clergy. The first provisional gov­ernment that had been set up after the Shah fled was led by secular tech­nocrats who favored a strong President as the ultimate power, the revolutionary, mullahs wanted a religious Supreme Leader. Angered by the clergy's endorsement of the takeover, the members of the provisional government re­signed, and the clerics took their place and engineered a constitution that cre­ated a theocracy. Today, all branches of the Islamic Republic of Iran's govern­ment are shadowed, and sometimes su­perseded, by religious institutions. The two-hundred-and-seventy-person Par­liament is shadowed by the twelve-man Council of Guardians, which has veto power over legislation and over political. candidates. The civil and criminal courts are shadowed by Revolutionary Courts, which can summon any person or institution for "un-Islamic activities," and which hold in-camera trials and admit no appeal. And the President is shadowed by the Supreme Leader, who is commander-in-chief, and who appoints the three critical chiefs—of intelligence, the judiciary, and the military and has the last word on any subject. Khomeini was Iran's first un­challenged Supreme Leader. Since his death, in 1989, the job has been held by Ali Khamenei, a staunch traditionalist who lacks Khomeini's stature and in­fluence. The President is limited to two four-year terms, but the Supreme Leader, who is chosen by an assembly of clerics, rules for life.

The dual power structure has lately led to increasingly raucous political turmoil. It pits a new generation of de­mocratic reformers, who want elected officials to have primary power, against the theocrats, who want the clerics to remain guardians of the state—and, in some cases, above the state. This fall, that rivalry is playing out over issues ranging from the closure of four news­papers to the fate of thirteen Iranian Jews charged with espionage, and, es­pecially, over the question of who will be allowed to run in next February's Parliamentary elections—a contest that will he pivotal in determining the outcome of the power struggle.

Asgharzadeh is now making something of a political comeback. Earlier this year, Iran held its first city-council elections. The first four Presidents had never got around to them, despite a constitutional mandate, because the clerics and the conservative elite objected. But the upset election of President Mohammad Khatami, in 1997, opened a new chapter in Iran’s political life. Khatami wewars the black turban of descendants of the Prophet, and he is the son and grandson of ayatollahs, but he is a reformer. He was named Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1982, but resigned a decade later, after being acused of “negligence” and “liberalism.” In 1997, he ran as a dark horse, and the conservative theocrats who controlled the main levers of power openly opposed him, but seventy percent of the voters endorsed his agenda of reform. Since Khatami took office, the local elections have been his biggest accomplishment – again in defiance of the theocrats. Overnight, Iran went from having fewer than four hundred elected officials, all concentrated in the capital, to having almost two hundred thousand, dispersed throughout the country. Asgharzadeh won a seat on Teheran’s fifteen-member city council. Conservatives fought to have him disqualified, for “unrevolutionary behavior.” At a rally last year at the American Embassy, which has been used as a vocational school for the Revolutionary Guards since the hostages were freed, Asgharzadeh told the crowd, “Our dealings with the hostages were not directed against the American people, and not even against the hostages themselves. Today, we invite all the hostages to return to Iran, as our guests. We have a new language for the the new world. We defend human rights. And we’ll try to make Islam such that it won’t contradict democracy.”

Asgharzadch has paid a price for his change in rhetoric. Throughout his speech, a vigilante group of young conservatives calling themselves the Helpers of the Party of God taunted him by shouting "Mary beer Amrika," or "Death to America," the slogan that he had shouted twenty years before. Last December, he was so badly beaten that he was hospitalized.

Because of his new position, As­gharzadeh thinks the Council of Guardians will disqualify him from numing in the February Parliamen­tary elections. With another coy smile, however, he told me that he still hoped to have influence. His wife, Tahereh Rezazadeh, who is also a reformer, will run instead. The couple met during the hostage crisis. She was one of the female students who stormed the Embassy.

“Asgharzadeh looks quite Presidential, doesn't he?" Hadi Semati, an American-educated political-science professor, remarked to me at the dinner party "You know, it could he. Someday,. Strange things happen here."

Since his election to the city council, though, the former revolutionary has been preoccupied with other matters. Over dinner, he dutifully recounted the hostage history as a courtesy to a curi­ous guest, but he became animated only when the conversation turned to his re­cent municipal duties, which he attends to with the diligence of a burgher. "The first issue that attracted me was traffic," he said. "This city put a lot of money into highways, but they didn't turn out to be all that helpful, because most people don't use them. For example, when young couples want to get mar­ried, there's a tradition that they have two candelabra and a mirror. Well, peo­ple believe they have to go to the bazaar downtown to get them, even though candelabras and mirrors are now available all over the city. The new chain stores haven't solved this problem—simply because of habit. Iran is full of traditions like this. So we have to understand and deal with these traditions in order to make people change. Another example—the military barracks!"

Asgharzadeh was clearly excited, and his fists punched the air for em­phasis. "The Shah thought he'd protect himself by putting the barracks all around him. But the barracks are in the city center and in the way of construc­tion. Plus, they don't pay taxes! One of my campaign slogans was to get rid of them and put them outside the city. I'm now more worried about the impact of high-rises that might replace them, which would bring more traffic and more pollution to the city."
Both are already almost unmanage­able. Pollution produced by traffic and local industries has recently forced the government to close schools and urge old people and the ailing to leave the capital, for days at a time. As a public service, new billboards around Teheran provide hourly readings on six different pollutant gases.

"Traffic, pollution, sewage—ninety-­five per cent of my time is now spent trying to solve the issues of ordinary people's lives," Asgharzadeh said. "I've learned that people's world view is changed more by dealing with the small problems of life—the issues they care about. And, unfortunately, ideol­ogy can't solve them."

THE KIDS

IN the revolution's early years, the clerics called on Iranian women to breed an Islamic generation. They did. The theocracy's decision, early on, to lower the age of maturity for females, from fifteen to nine, contributed might­ily. Between 1980 and 1985, the average Iranian woman had more than six preg­nancies. By 1999, Iran's population had soared to seventy million--more than double the thirty-four million at the time of the revolution.

Eventually, however, the mullahs recognized the staggering costs of their dictates, and in the early nineties they launched one of the most extensive birth-control programs in the world.

Today, no one can get a marriage license in Iran without passing a family-planning course, and everything from condoms to Norplant to vasectomies is free—no questions asked about marital status.

Yet Iran is stuck with a massive de­mographic bulge: sixty per cent of the population is under twenty-five. With the voting age at fifteen, the revolution's second generation is transforming Ira­nian society—in potentially more dra­matic ways than the impact of the first generation. The youth vote was the biggest single factor in President Kha­tami's election, and in the birth of a re­form movement. Within a decade, vot­ers under thirty will be the majority.

The revolution's successes have added to the challenge. Over the past twenty years, the Islamic Republic has produced the largest educated class of young people in Iranian history. De­spite shortcomings, such as double-shift schools, literacy has shot up from fifty-eight per cent to eighty-two per cent, according to government statis­tics. The number of university gradu­ates has soared from four hundred and thirty thousand to more than four mil­lion. All of them feel entitled to good jobs and material comforts.

The result is overwhelming the sys­tem. Eight hundred thousand young people are entering the job market every year—in an economy that can produce fewer than three hundred thousand jobs. This fall, a staggering seventy per cent of Iran's unemployed were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. And those lucky enough to find employment face the prospect of a per-capita income that is only a quarter of what it was on the eve of the revolution. Not surpris­ingly, unrest among today's generation of students is growing.

The Office to Foster Islamic Unity, a coalition representing Iranian univer­sity students that is the descendant of Students Following the Imam's Line, has its headquarters in a rundown house on Shahid Rajab Begi Street. Shahid means "martyr," and, like everything front highways to health clinics in Iran, the street was named for a soldier killed in the 1980-88 war with Iraq, in which more than -a hundred thousand Iranian lives were lost. The office is furnished with desks, chairs, filing cabinets, and other equipment, all now somewhat worn, from the American Embassy.

"They're still quite serviceable," said Farhad, a slightly built, amiable stu­dent in his twenties who gave me a brief tour of the American inventory one afternoon this fall, and, like most students I spoke with, asked that I not use his surname. "The file cabinets are particularly good," he told me. The Embassy must have been well stocked, because the students are still using its stationery, with a bald-eagle water­mark, in their copier.
The house was donated by Ayatol­lah Ali Fdlamenei, Khomeini's succes­sor, in order to revive a student move­ment that had been dormant during the war years. In the nineties, the new Supreme Leader apparently viewed stu­dents as a way to widen his power base and keep the original vision of the rev­olution on course. He seems to have miscalculated.
"Students today are pressing hard for individual rights, an open press, freedom to form parties and run for office, and a civil society," Farhad ex­plained. "We're now on the front line of the struggle for democracy These are critical times for Iran."

Last July, the worst unrest since the revolution erupted. Thousands of stu­dents, Farhad among them, started demonstrating at Teheran University after a Revolutionary Court banned a reformist newspaper, on charges of "at­tempting to create turmoil and insta­bility." Over the next five days, the protests escalated into violent clashes with police and, more important to the theocrats, a humiliating public heckling of the system. "The demonstrations let people say things that they didn't dare say for twenty years," Farhad recalled, smiling with excitement. "And it was real democracy! No one was exempt from criticism."

The students even dared to taunt the Supreme Leader. An attempt to read a statement from his office was greeted by shouts of "Down with the religious dictator!" and "Commander­in-chief, resign!" By the time the trou­ble was over, students reported that five youths had been killed and hun­dreds injured. Police said that more than fourteen hundred had been ar­rested. Four have since been sentenced to death by Revolutionary Courts. Further trials are pending.

This fall, Iran had a bad case of the jitters when school resumed. But on the day that I visited the university's down­town campus the only rumblings were beneath the surface. Like the revolu­tion's first generation of young activists, including many of the hostage-takers, the most politically engaged students today are engineers. They're also the most fashionable. A noticeable number at the Engineering College either were clean-shaven or had neatly trimmed mustaches and goatees.

"Everything in Iran is political," ex­plained a senior named Mehdi, who wore a goatee and chuckled when I asked him why the young are shaving again. "Beards were the way of the revolution. Shaving is the way of the reformers. We're showing that we've moved on—and that we don't follow limitations imposed on society."

The new generation's challenge to the regime had a particular claim to le­gitimacy, because many of the protest­ers were the offspring of the original revolutionaries. Iran's higher-education system gives preference to applicants with Islamic credentials—the children of revolutionaries, civil servants, clerics, and the poor. These students don't nec­essarily want to abandon the Islamic system; they just want Iran to be more of a republic.

Outside the Amirabad dormitories, where the July unrest began, I met a muscular third-year premed student named Mohammad, who was wearing jeans. "1 come from a traditional reli­gious family," he told me. "My father demonstrated during the revolution, and he worked for the government, in the Agriculture Ministry, for many years. But students on this campus are familiar with George Orwell's 'Animal Farm,' and we know revolutions don't give you everything you want. So I demonstrated in July to demand re­forms. So did all my friends."

The new generation sees the chal­lenge not from beyond Iran's borders but from within. The previous genera­tion attacked the American Embassy; as an outpost of the Great Satan; this one feels that it is a victim of its own system. Nowhere is that more conspic­uous than at the Office to Foster Islamic Unity, where I asked the students how they felt about the United States and about its critics.

"These people abuse the anti-American slogans of the past," Behrooz, a twenty­five-year-old industrial-management major with an unusually square face and a short haircut, told me. "They're hypocrites. Most of them are like every­one else. They're ready for relations with America again. America may have cre­ated some of our problems in the past. But dealing with America again is one way to get out of our problems today On different terms than before, of course—this time as equals. But if a candidate says something against Amer­ica, he won't get the students' voter

THE PHILOSOPHER

ADULKARLM SOROOSH is a diminu­tive, almost meek, man. He speaks in a slow, deliberate whisper, and in a land of raven-haired people his most dis­tinguishing feature is a neat, soft-brown beard. Often, just before embarking on an important point, he pulls off his wire-rimmed glasses and cleans them with a handkerchief, or pushes them up on his forehead and rubs his eyes.

"I'm just a writer and a thinker," he told me five years ago, with a self-deprecating laugh. "I'm not such an im­portant man." Soroosh has emerged, however, as Iran's boldest contemporary philosopher, a man increasingly described, by both supporters and critics, as the Martin Luther of Islam. I visited him this fall at the Serat Institute, an ad­junct of the Institute for Epistemologi­cal Research, a think tank that Soroosh directs. The Serat occupies a few small whitewashed rooms near a dusty back alley not far from Teheran University; and it publishes most of his work.

For a long time, Soroosh was one of the revolution's own. lie was born Hossein Dabbagh, in 1945. A follower of Ayatollah Khomeini from child­hood—since an uncle took him to see the Imam on the day of his release from the Shah's jail, in 1963—Soroosh was horn to the kind of family that formed the revolution's backbone. His mother, Batoul, who was named after one of the Prophet's daughters, never abandoned the chador, even when the monarchy banned it. His father, a grocer, refused to buy a radio to listen to the Shah's state-controlled news. Soroosh and his three siblings grew up in the old part of Teheran, where the mud-brick homes usually had one or two large rooms, little furniture, and no bathroom. Soroosh was the first in his family to go to the university and live in the West. When he was a student in London, he visited Khomeini in Paris during the last phase of the Ayatollah's exile. After the revolution, the Imam appointed him to the Committee of the Cultural Revolution, whose purpose was to make university curriculums consistent with the teachings of Islam. Soroosh still comes under bitter criti­cism today from exiles and others who were purged during those years. But in the late eighties Soroosh began to view the Imam as an instrument of transi­tion rather than as the personification of the revolution's ultimate goal.

Of the many challenges Iran's theo­crats face on the revolution's twentieth anniversary; Soroosh may well represent the most profound. At a critical junc­ture for Iran's unique political system, he has provided a philosophical frame­work for reconciling Islam with de­mocracy. In the broader Islamic world, he has helped popularize an Islamic Reformation—with repercussions as sweeping as the Christian Reformation. Soroosh's achievements may be the Is­lamic Republic's most enduring lega­cies—far more so than its theocratic form of government, which is now struggling to survive.

"There are two pillars," Soroosh once explained to me. "First, in order to be a true believer one must be free. To become a believer under pressure or co­ercion isn't true belief. This basic free­dom to believe is also the basis of de­mocracy. It's the seed from which all other freedoms grow."

The second pillar, he said, is based on human imperfection. "The essence of religion will always be sacred, but its interpretation by fallible human beings is not sacred—and therefore it can be criticized, modified, refined, and rede­fined. What single person can say what God meant? Any fixed version would effectively smother religion. It would block the rich exploration of the sacred texts. Interpretations are also influenced by the age you live in, by the conditions and mores of the era, and by other branches of knowledge. So there's no single, inflexible, infallible, or absolute interpretation of Islam for all time.” In other words, it's O.K. to alter, or even abandon, practices that have prevailed for centuries.

"Islam is organic and dynamic, and can easily be adapted to present con­ditions," Soroosh said, with a trace of excitement in his voice. `And Islamic law is expandable. You can't imagine the extent of its flexibility! In an Is­lamic democracy, you can realize all its potential."

Soroosh had originally been some­thing of a recluse, shying away from the press and allowing other intellectuals and clergymen sympathetic to his ideas to apply them to the specifics of Iran's labyrinthine political scene. Eventually, to protect his family from sporadic physical attacks and anonymous death threats, he permanently adopted a pseudonym that he once used only for writing poetry "Soroosh" means "angel of revelation."

Today, Soroosh has a huge following among Iran's students. When we first met, he taught at three universities, and he invited me to attend one of his classes. Students acted starstruck when he showed up for a seminar at Teheran University's School of Theology: they stood in the hallway just to watch him walk to class. The theocrats have since forced him out of all three posts, but his influence has only increased. This fall, students at the Office to Foster Is­lamic Unity told me that they looked to two leaders as their models—President Klatami and Soroosh. Many of the re­formist newspapers and magazines are published or edited by Soroosh follow­ers. Then-agers, businessmen, and house­wives pack the Wednesday-evening lec­tures he now gives in a private home. And in the theological center of (.29m, an hour and a half's drive from Tehe­ran, Soroosh's work is one of the hot­test topics among young clerics. His in­fluence, Iranians tell me, has only begun to be felt.

Since the mid-nineties, Iran's clerical establishment has made Soroosh a tar­get. In 1995, during a speech commem­orating the American Embassy seizure, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned, "Inter­preting religion isn't something that can be carried out by just anyone. If some­one confronts the clergy, he gladdens the Zionists and the Americans more than anything else… because they’ve set their heart on destruction of the clergy. Well, the Islamic system will slap these people hard in the face!"

Over the past year, however, Soroosh has become bolder, as if he senses that the Islamic Republic has reached a precipice. "This is totalitarian rule," he said to me this fall. "And they are total­itarian rulers. That is a harsh thing to say, but it's the truth. The regime can't survive the way it is."

Soroosh paused. "You know," he said a moment later, "our revolution was a haphazard, chaotic, and theoryless rev­olution, in the sense that it really wasn't well thought out—not by the Leader, not by the people. For the Imam, Islam was everything. He wanted everyone to topple the Shah in order to apply Islam. But he didn't elaborate on any of these points. So now it's the intellectu­als' job to provide a theory for the revo­lution, to rethink it and to offer a new logic for it. And the outcome will be not another revolution but reform. Be­cause—two revolutions in one genera­tion? Well, really! It's too much!" He laughed softly.

Soroosh's most recent views have a potentially far-reaching impact on. Iran's place in the world—even on its relations with the United States. Soroosh se­lected the name Serat for his institute because it means "path," and he believes that there is more than one path.

"Every day, Muslims recite a prayer ten times entreating God to guide us to the right path," he explained. "Some say the only right path is Islam, and the rest stray or are on a deviant path. But I argue that there are many right paths. I try to justify a pluralistic view of religions—the internal sects of Sunni, Shia, and others, and also the great religions, like Christianity, Ju­daism, and the rest.

"We think they go to Hell, and they think we go to Hell," he said, a smile crossing his face, as if the idea were amusing in its smallness. "But I'm trying to say that Christians and members of other religions are well guided and good servants of God. All are equally rightful in what they believe. To some, this sounds like heresy," he said, the smile widening. "But this, too, has found listening cars in our society."

_____

Monday, September 1, 1997

U.S. AND IRAN: AN OFFER THEY CAN'T REFUSE?

FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE
Fall 1997 Issue 108

By Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash
Last May, Iranians went to the polls and elected a new president. In a stunning upset, former minister of culture Mohammed Khatami swept almost 70 percent of the vote in a poll that produced a 90 percent turnout, the highest since the Islamic Republic's earliest elections. He defeated front-runner and Speaker of Parliament Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, who had strong backing from the regime's top clergy. President Khatami campaigned on a platform stressing pluralism and the rule of law, and his victory represented an unmistakable and overwhelming mandate for change, underlining the desire of Iranians from all classes for an easing of state restrictions on social and cultural life, for a greater say in political affairs, and for a better economy.

Given the history of U.S.-Iran relations, the idea that Khatami's election might lead to a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran is understandably being treated with skepticism. The election of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president in 1989 was greeted with similar expectations of improved relations. "Moderate is no longer a dirty word in Iran," declared a headline in Business Week, while the New York Times quoted a long list of experts who predicted that Tehran's new leader would pursue "more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies" and seek to "normalize Iran's relations with the West."

In fact, Rafsanjani succeeded in tempering Iran's policies both at home and abroad. But his success has been limited, and on the issues of greatest importance to the United States, he has little altered the course of Iranian policy. However, Khatami comes to office with a resounding public man' date. He has put together a team of advisers who understand that Iran needs to break out of its fitful isolation and attract foreign investment. In August, he convinced the Iranian parliament to approve all 22 of his cabinet ministers, including Ataollah Mohajerani, his choice for culture minister, who had provoked the wrath of hardliners when he proposed direct negotiations with Washington six years ago. Khatami's election provides a window of opportunity; the opening is not large, but it is worth pursuing.

Besides, Iran is a country that the United States can no longer afford to ignore. There are simply too many vital interests at stake. Economically, Iran's gas reserves are second in the world, and its significant oil resources make it a pivotal player in the energy markets. Before the 1979 revolution, the United States was one of the Islamic Republic's top three trading partners--a relationship that supported thousands of U.S. jobs and $2.7 billion in annual export revenues for America. Up until the early 1990s, the United States was still among the top five purchasers of Iranian oil. Today, Iran represents a potentially important market for American goods and technology, particularly in the oil, aviation, and computer industries, which could again produce billions of dollars of income. Iran also offers some of the most economically viable transit routes for oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and the Caucasus, now freed from Soviet control.

Strategically, Iran straddles the crossroads of three vital and often volatile regions--the Middle East, South Asia, and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Almost one-third of these countries have, or are developing, nuclear weapons. Outside of the Western powers, this arena accounts for the largest array of countries with weapons of mass destruction in the world. In more favorable circumstances, the Islamic Republic could help underwrite Persian Gulf security, as it did during the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and assist in advancing a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan conflict. It has already played a constructive role in containing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, and it recently helped negotiate an end to the Tajik civil war.

Despite Khatami's election, obstacles to U.S.-Iran dialogue remain formidable. Both the new Khatami team and the Clinton administration face the common problem of conservative and recalcitrant legislatures. In Washington, Congress now sets the pace on Iran policy. President Bill Clinton sought to head off more extensive congressional measures when he imposed a comprehensive ban on all U.S. trade with Iran in May 1995. Last year, Congress passed and Clinton signed a bill requiring the president to impose secondary sanctions on foreign companies investing more than $40 million annually in Iran's oil and gas industry. Proof of Iranian involvement in the 1996 Khobar bombing in Saudi Arabia. which killed 19 Americans, could also preempt or destroy efforts to better relations, and could spark demands from Congress and other key quarters to retaliate either overtly or covertly.

In Tehran, a significant bloc of deputies in the unicameral Majlis is hostile to the "Great Satan" and is bound to try to stymie attempts to improve relations between the United States and Iran. Khatami has the added problem of not being Iran's highest authority, a role reserved for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. Khamenei, who believes his legitimacy derives in part from his anti-American stance, and who has often set the tone for Iran's anti-American rhetoric, is likely to be suspicious of U.S. motives. He has also taken the lead in opposing the Arab-Israeli peace process and in defining Israel as an "illegitimate" state. If there is to be any change in Iran's policy toward the United States, Khamenei must be brought on board.
Both countries are also prisoners of a generation of threatening rhetoric that has often been as useful for advancing domestic political purposes as it has been for confronting each other.

Undoing the damage will be difficult. Previous attempts have backfired, beginning with the disastrous 1985-86 arms-for-hostage swap that burned both sides. Tehran was also angered when two subsequent overtures--helping to free hostages in Lebanon in response to President George Bush's inaugural pledge that "goodwill begets goodwill") and a deal to allow the Texas-based company Conoco to develop offshore oil and gas fields--were spumed by Washington. In other words, for these two countries, changing minds at home could be as difficult as convincing each other that the moment has come for cooperation.

Yet Iran's election surprise comes at a time of the most extensive policy rethinking on both sides since the 1979-81 hostage crisis--an event that has subsequently clouded every aspect of U.S.-Iran relations. Several former senior U.S. officials--both Republican and Democrat--from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency have publicly urged Washington to test the waters of constructive engagement through either European allies or direct dialogue. A growing consensus now argues that containment of any nation, especially one with petrodollars, is increasingly difficult in an era of globalization when borders are more porous and competition for markets unprecedented. Sanctions have had limited success in blocking Tehran's access to foreign investment or technology: France's Total SA quickly agreed to develop the oil and gas fields that America's Conoco was forced by presidential order to refuse, and Russia and China both stepped in to develop nuclear reactors when Germany declined to finish a facility started during the reign of the shah. Meanwhile, containment has had no appreciable effect on Iranian behavior in the areas Washington deems most critical--weapons of mass destruction, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and support for extremist Islamic movements.

In a speech two weeks after his election, Khatami called for "removing tensions" with other countries and establishing relations of "peace and tranquillity" that safeguard the rights, interests, and independence of all nations. Khatami is expected to work closely with Rafsanjani, who in the past has appeared to favor dialogue with Washington. The outgoing president still retains considerable clout in Iranian politics, having been appointed to head the Expediency Council, which has been entrusted with the new responsibility of setting the broad policies of the Islamic Republic. In the meantime, officials from neighboring Arab states, who once felt more vulnerable to Iranian mischief, have launched their own rapprochement with Tehran. Saudi Arabia is high on the list. In May, Rafsanjani and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah agreed to exchange visits. In this context, a series of specific steps over the next four years--during Khatami's first four-year term and Clinton's final term--could begin the process of reengagement.

PHASE ONE: THE OPENING ROUND
Both parties in this impasse have indicated that they are waiting for the other side to make a meaningful first move. During his first postelection press conference, Khatami argued that when it came to improved relations with the United States, the "key to the problem is in their hands, not ours." And the State Department duly noted that now "the ball is in Iran's court."
For the process to work, both sides will have to take difficult steps that break down roughly into four phases. Simply laying out these measures underscores the enormity of the task. The first phase would almost certainly have to be informal, with the focus on building confidence and establishing bonafides to lay the groundwork for addressing more substantive issues. To get the process going, leaders on both sides should implement three steps:

Lower the decibel level and frequency of rhetoric.
Tehran should end references to the "Great Satan" and other cliched accusations about the United States that appear in the speeches of its top officials and its daily press. And in referring to Iran, Washington should stop using terms such as "outlaw" or "rogue" state and should also discourage the tendency to link acts of violence or even accidents, such as the explosion of TWA 800, to Iran before solid evidence is available.

Ease restrictions on travel and contacts.
Contacts between Iranians and Americans can help establish "track two" diplomacy to create an informal dialogue. Both sides could indirectly facilitate contacts by allowing visits or exchanges by scholars; representatives of cultural, professional, and nongovernmental organizations; and individuals with government contacts. American visa restrictions remain particularly severe, requiring a four-to-six-week waiting period and two trips to an American consulate abroad. "Track two" can never replace real talks, but such contacts could help change public opinion and improve the general atmosphere.

Differentiate between threats and unacceptable actions.
Both sides need to distinguish between actions that are genuinely threatening and policies that are merely uncomfortable or disagreeable. Iran may object to the American military presence in the Persian Gulf, but it must recognize that the United States has legitimate interests to protect--most notably, safeguarding the flow of oil and enforcing sanctions against Saddam Hussein. The United States may have just cause to be concerned about Iranian efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, but must acknowledge Iran's valid need for conventional weapons, especially after losing 40 percent of its war materiel in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. (Despite Iraq's subsequent conflict over Kuwait, it remains better armed today than Iran.)

PHASE TWO: THE HURDLES
A second phase should begin with an agreement--negotiated either through third parties or directly--on a structure that encompasses a series of steps and countersteps to deal with the practices and policies most offensive to the other country. The Clinton administration has stated that it would enter into direct talks with Iran, so long as the Islamic Republic is prepared to address three "areas of concern": the development of weapons of mass destruction, the sponsorship of terrorism, and the sabotage of the Arab-Israeli peace process. But so far the United States has offered little in return, other than a vague promise to restore diplomatic and economic relations. The U.S. approach is all stick but no carrot. Moreover, linking these issues together and seeking to address them simultaneously allows little room for maneuverability on either side. Iran has not indicated that it will respond in a meaningful way to engagement or to easing of sanctions, for which Europe has repeatedly lobbied Washington.

A framework of reciprocal measures would provide a road map, however roughly sketched, of engagement's ultimate goals. It would allow each side to test the other's good intentions before proceeding and would provide incentives to continue. Such an approach would embody a valuable lesson learned from the Oslo peace process--if both parties are truly committed to rapprochement, then implementing gradual confidence-building measures offers a better chance of success than tackling difficult, divisive issues all at once. This strategy would avoid the kind of confusion generated by Iran's proposed Conoco deal, which Tehran did not describe as an overture to Washington until after the White House had rejected it. Both sides need to understand that these actions would be part of an ongoing process rather than isolated gestures. Phase two, which could stretch for as long as two years, would be the hardest phase, for neither side is likely to change easily. Yet nothing will happen unless these steps are taken.

Iran
End support and sponsorship of terrorism. Iran has long denied its involvement in extremist activities, despite the recent conviction in Thailand of an Iranian agent who intended to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, and strong intelligence data on other cases. The Khatami regime will have to erase even the perception that it is involved in targeting and sabotaging foreign governments and personnel. Tehran will also need to block terrorist acts by surrogates, stop training Arab dissidents who seek to harm the United States and Western allies, and bring its security agencies under control. Iran's behavior, in other words, should begin conforming to international standards and the rule of law. This process includes ending the assassination of its own dissidents abroad, the kind of act for which a German court recently implicated the regime's highest officials. Likewise, Tehran will have to do more than reassure European officials that it will not send a hit squad to murder novelist Salman Rushdie. It must also deal with a small religious foundation that has pledged a $2.5 million reward for his death.

Stop sabotaging the Arab-Israeli peace process. Tehran is unlikely to return to the kind of close cooperation with Israel that prevailed during the reign of the shah, nor is it likely to change its opposition to the current detente between Israel and the Arab world. But it must end attempts to undo the peace process by training, equipping, or financing--directly or indirectly--organizations such as Islamic Jihad, which has claimed responsibility for suicide bombings of Israeli civilian targets. Iran will also have to distance itself from extremist groups targeting Arab governments that have begun to engage with Israel.

The United States
In exchange for these steps by Iran, the United States will need to take simultaneous actions. These will be the incentives for Iran to continue the process, although the Islamic Republic will not be rewarded for its actions until U.S. intelligence can verify that Tehran's behavior has changed significantly.

Expedite closure on Iran's frozen assets. Returning assets frozen by the United States since the hostage crisis has long been a key Iranian condition for bettering relations and a yardstick by which Tehran says it will judge American intentions. A joint U.S.-Iran tribunal that meets in the Hague has resolved most of the 4,000 financial claims and counterclaims, but a major, multibillion-dollar dispute remains over the value and billing of arms that Tehran paid for before the revolution, most of which were never delivered.

Support a European Union offer to promote constructive engagement. Washington should accept a bid by its European allies to prove that constructive engagement is a more effective tool for changing Iranian behavior. The initiative should be tied to a specified time frame, perhaps coinciding with Khatami's consolidation of his government. As progress is made during this roughly two-year period, the United States should suspend pressure on Europe and Japan to isolate Iran, and it should at least temporarily end opposition to Western economic credits designed to boost Iranian development. Washington should also promote diplomatic ministerial contact between its allies and Tehran. In exchange, the European Union should meet Washington halfway. The EU could be urged to respond to verified acts of Iranian misbehavior by implementing limited, punitive sanctions. Europe might favor such an approach for two reasons. First, it is part of a broad, earnest campaign to engage Iran. Second, it represents a strategy of "proportional response," which would involve limited and selective sanctions as opposed to the comprehensive penalties that U.S. policymakers advocate.

Regain control of U.S. policy on Iran. To have any flexibility in dealing with Tehran, the administration needs to bring Congress and public opinion along from an early stage. Clinton could build bipartisan consensus for these policies by mustering the public support of Republican heavy-hitters like former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, who recently pushed for a new approach to U.S.-Iran relations. Such a tactic served the president well during his tough battle with Senate hardliners over ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, the growing backlash against sanctions by American business leaders could give the administration considerable clout when dealing with Congress, as was made apparent during the recent debate over granting most-favored-nation trading status to China. Whenever possible, the administration should emphasize that America stands to reap substantial benefits from engagement, both in terms of creating jobs at home and guaranteeing security abroad.

PHASE THREE: DIRECT ENGAGEMENT
The third stage would allow a series of contacts on issues of mutual concern over perhaps a year or two. It would amount to phased engagement.

Direct contact on neutral turf. American and Iranian officials should make a concerted effort to discuss and emphasize areas of common ground at international forums and at meetings with representatives of financial institutions and regional bodies. Many issues, from regional environmental problems and drug proliferation, to Afghanistan's instability and Bosnia's future, would benefit from direct U.S.-Iran contact. Some of these problems are becoming increasingly urgent. With NATO troops expected to withdraw from Bosnia in less than a year, the United States can no longer ignore the fact that Tehran's ties to Bosnian Muslims will make it a long-term player in the politics of that troubled region. The United States and Iran could design engagement so as to address less problematic issues first and more contentious ones later. Despite the enormous changes in Iran's political system, many of its foreign policy goals have not changed since the era of the shah. Defusing regional conflicts, attracting foreign investment, and gaining access to Western markets are as much priorities today as they were 20 years ago.

Tentative commercial contacts. As contacts expand, commercial links between Iran and the United States could begin again, albeit gradually. For example, the U.S. government could lift legal restraints to allow U.S. companies to transship Iranian oil to Europe, help to develop Iran's oil and gas facilities, or sell oil-drilling equipment to Iran--projects that generate jobs and income for Americans. Other constraints on importing handicrafts and rugs, which primarily helps Iran's economy, could also be lifted eventually. But restoration of full U.S.-Iran commercial ties would need to await more significant diplomatic progress.

Opening talks on security issues. Last but not least, Iranian and U.S. Officials will need to address in bilateral talks a range of security concerns, from broad issues in the Pesian Gulf to arms proliferation throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Iran will not even discuss its conventional arms buildup or its pursuit of unconventional weapons unless its own legitimate defense and security concerns--including endemic instability along several borders, regional arms proliferation, and America's significant military presence in the Gulf--are also addressed. At this stage, both sides should strive for common ground, such as containing Saddam Hussein or securing the free flow of oil. The two sides could reassure each other about their long-term intentions and craft a broader context for eventually resolving their differences on, for instance, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Tehran would be more likely to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear capability if it felt secure about the United States, Iraq, and other neighbors. Washington, in turn, might find Iran's conventional weapons acquisition more tolerable if it felt more confident that Iran did not intend to use them against the United States or its allies.

THE ENDGAME
Given the history of tensions between Iran and the United States, this deliberately paced sequence of steps may be the best that either side can hope to achieve over the next four years. Yet the current confluence of factors--Iran's pivotal election, growing American skepticism about U.S. policy on Iran, the Gulf monarchies' rapprochement with Tehran, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's declaration this year that Washington will not deal with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein stays in power--offers the best opportunity for a major policy change by both sides in many years. Clinton is also the first U.S. president since Iran's revolution not to have American hostages held either by Iranians or pro-Iranian extremists in Lebanon. In the past, the two governments were generally out of sync on everything from regional goals to leadership cycles. The next four years, in contrast, represent a unique juncture.

Tehran will have to launch the process. Khatami must create the conditions for change by performing these specific steps, by cleaning up Iran's human rights record, and by removing the perpetrators of Iranian mischief--a process he has begun by changing the ministers of intelligence and interior. Initially, he will almost certainly have to begin by taking small steps, but Washington will have to be alert to these shifts and help to accelerate them by responding appropriately. In the past the United States has failed to acknowledge such changes, as in the early 1990s when Rafsanjani squeezed from power several high-ranking radicals associated with hostage seizures and anti-American attacks. The United States may not be able to bend dramatically at first either, but it will need to extend a hand. Now in his final term, Clinton also has more leverage to act and perhaps even more interest as he seeks to create a legacy.
The final issues--restoring full commercial ties and diplomatic relations--will probably have to wait until Khatami's second term, pending his reelection, and a new U.S. administration. Somewhat like his counterpart in the Oval Office, Khatami's first order of business will be to build a viable political coalition that will allow him to implement the ambitious domestic platform upon which he was elected. Bringing Khamenei along, in particular, is likely to require time, heavy persuasion, and verification on the Iranian side that the cost-benefit ratio of a dramatic policy shift is worth the adjustment. Khatami will strengthen his argument if he can show the Supreme Leader that a shift in Iran's foreign policy will produce the desirable response, including the access to Western technology, credit, and investment that Tehran needs, particularly for its oil and gas industries.

During the endgame--which will also be the time to deal with the thorny problem of weapons of mass destruction--Iran and the United States should at least attempt to reach specific understandings over security issues so that there is no need or threat that leads to acquisition or use of the deadliest weapons. Throughout the engagement process, the obstacles are enormous; the chances of a new impasse or of the effort's collapse are high. But as daunting as the risks in changing course may seem, the bigger risk is to make no effort to defuse one of the world's most volatile relationships--or prevent it from getting worse.