The
risk of taking on Syria
Quick
strikes rarely achieve enduring political goals — and often produce more costs
or unintended consequences than benefits.
By
Robin Wright August 28, 2013
So the
U.S. launches a military strike. Then what?
As the
Obama administration and the U.S. military plot military action against Syria,
they should be spending just as much time — and arguably more — considering
what happens next. Once Washington crosses the threshold of action, there's no
retreating from blame for anything that follows, whether through action or
inaction. And in the weeks and months to come, dangers will only deepen.
First,
quick hits rarely achieve enduring political goals — and often produce more
costs or unintended consequences than benefits. I've seen it so often before.
I lived
in Lebanon in the fall of 1983 when the Reagan administration ordered the
Marine peacekeepers deployed in Beirut to open fire on a Muslim militia. The
commander bluntly warned Washington that a strike would have dire consequences
for U.S. policy and his troops. "We'll get slaughtered down here," he
predicted. Nonetheless, the cruiser Virginia stationed offshore fired 70
deafening rounds on the Lebanese fighters.
It was
supposed to be a quick hit. It was supposed to send a warning.
But 34
days later, on Oct. 23, a yellow Mercedes truck carrying the equivalent of 6
tons of explosives drove into the Marine barracks as the peacekeepers slept. In
my head, I can still hear the thundering bomb blast. It was the single largest
nonnuclear explosion anywhere since World War II. It produced the largest loss
of American military life in a single incident since Iwo Jima.
Four
months later, the world's mightiest military was ordered to leave Lebanon, its
mission incomplete. The embryo of what became Hezbollah, backed by Iran and
Syria, had forced the retreat of American, French, Italian and British troops.
This
time in Syria, Washington may again consider its action limited and
specifically targeted. But Syria and its allies, notably Hezbollah, surely
won't. And they can respond in many ways.
The
last five presidents have tried limited strikes with specific messages in
various crisis spots, many in the Middle East. The track record is pretty sorry
for both Republican and Democratic administrations.
Again
during the Reagan administration, I reported on the 1986 U.S. airstrikes
against Libya for bombing a Berlin disco, a hangout for American troops. Three
had been killed and more than 200 injured in the blast, not all Americans. Ten
days later, U.S. airstrikes sent a kinetic message to Moammar Kadafi about the
costs of terrorism.
Operation
El Dorado Canyon hit Kadafi's military headquarters and other military targets
in Tripoli and Benghazi, although several bombs missed their targets and hit
civilian areas. The strikes did little to end the outrages. Two years later,
Libya masterminded the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 that killed 270 people. And
Kadafi remained in power another quarter-century.
In
1998, I covered Operation Desert Fox, when the Clinton administration launched
four days of cruise missile and bombing strikes against Iraq. Saddam Hussein's
regime had failed to comply with United Nations resolutions and weapons
inspectors for a year. The goal was to "degrade" Baghdad's ability to
manufacture weapons of mass destruction and to destabilize Hussein's hold on
power.
The
impact was negligible. Hussein held on for five more years, until the George W.
Bush administration launched a ground invasion that cost hundreds of billions
of dollars and nearly 4,500 American lives over the next eight years.
And in
the end, the United States discovered that Iraq had no weapons of mass
destruction anymore.
I also
covered Operation Infinite Reach, when the Clinton administration ordered
cruise missile strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998. It was a response to twin bombings of
the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Twelve Americans had been among
the 224 killed.
But a
year later, I was in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden's camps were still
thriving. The U.S. strikes had made him even more popular and powerful on the
terrorist circuit. And he skillfully adapted Al Qaeda's tactics. In 2000, a
suicide dinghy struck the U.S. destroyer Cole docked in Yemen, killing 17
sailors. And then the 9/11 suicide planes, the most successful attack against
the United States since Pearl Harbor. Bin Laden may be dead, but the franchises
born of his movement are thriving from North Africa to the Persian Gulf.
So the
idea of quick hits or short campaigns is often an illusion. The one notable
success was the 2011 air campaign that helped oust Kadafi. But it had the full
endorsement of the Arab League, the United Nations and , NATO, which ran the
international mission. Thousands of Libyans actually did the fighting, while
the Transitional National Council provided a viable alternative government from
inside the country. And still Operation Unified Protector lasted 222 days.
In the
case of Syria, a few days of strikes against military targets may assuage moral
outrage over its heinous use of chemical weapons. But they also carry the
danger of widening the war by legitimizing or deepening involvement by other
foreign powers, notably Iranian and Russian support for Damascus.
I lived
in Beirut during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon to evict the Palestine
Liberation Organization. It achieved the immediate goal, yet Operation Peace
for Galilee also backfired: Iran deployed Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon and
created Hezbollah, which ultimately drove out both Israeli troops and American
peacekeepers. It was Israel's first retreat — made voluntarily due to
inexorable costs — in the long Arab-Israeli dispute.
So, as
the U.S. and its allies take on Syria, they need to ensure that the costs do
not ultimately outweigh the benefits, and that another military mission doesn't
backfire.