Monday, September 1, 1997

U.S. AND IRAN: AN OFFER THEY CAN'T REFUSE?

FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE
Fall 1997 Issue 108

By Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash
Last May, Iranians went to the polls and elected a new president. In a stunning upset, former minister of culture Mohammed Khatami swept almost 70 percent of the vote in a poll that produced a 90 percent turnout, the highest since the Islamic Republic's earliest elections. He defeated front-runner and Speaker of Parliament Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, who had strong backing from the regime's top clergy. President Khatami campaigned on a platform stressing pluralism and the rule of law, and his victory represented an unmistakable and overwhelming mandate for change, underlining the desire of Iranians from all classes for an easing of state restrictions on social and cultural life, for a greater say in political affairs, and for a better economy.

Given the history of U.S.-Iran relations, the idea that Khatami's election might lead to a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran is understandably being treated with skepticism. The election of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as president in 1989 was greeted with similar expectations of improved relations. "Moderate is no longer a dirty word in Iran," declared a headline in Business Week, while the New York Times quoted a long list of experts who predicted that Tehran's new leader would pursue "more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies" and seek to "normalize Iran's relations with the West."

In fact, Rafsanjani succeeded in tempering Iran's policies both at home and abroad. But his success has been limited, and on the issues of greatest importance to the United States, he has little altered the course of Iranian policy. However, Khatami comes to office with a resounding public man' date. He has put together a team of advisers who understand that Iran needs to break out of its fitful isolation and attract foreign investment. In August, he convinced the Iranian parliament to approve all 22 of his cabinet ministers, including Ataollah Mohajerani, his choice for culture minister, who had provoked the wrath of hardliners when he proposed direct negotiations with Washington six years ago. Khatami's election provides a window of opportunity; the opening is not large, but it is worth pursuing.

Besides, Iran is a country that the United States can no longer afford to ignore. There are simply too many vital interests at stake. Economically, Iran's gas reserves are second in the world, and its significant oil resources make it a pivotal player in the energy markets. Before the 1979 revolution, the United States was one of the Islamic Republic's top three trading partners--a relationship that supported thousands of U.S. jobs and $2.7 billion in annual export revenues for America. Up until the early 1990s, the United States was still among the top five purchasers of Iranian oil. Today, Iran represents a potentially important market for American goods and technology, particularly in the oil, aviation, and computer industries, which could again produce billions of dollars of income. Iran also offers some of the most economically viable transit routes for oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and the Caucasus, now freed from Soviet control.

Strategically, Iran straddles the crossroads of three vital and often volatile regions--the Middle East, South Asia, and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Almost one-third of these countries have, or are developing, nuclear weapons. Outside of the Western powers, this arena accounts for the largest array of countries with weapons of mass destruction in the world. In more favorable circumstances, the Islamic Republic could help underwrite Persian Gulf security, as it did during the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and assist in advancing a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan conflict. It has already played a constructive role in containing Iraqi president Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, and it recently helped negotiate an end to the Tajik civil war.

Despite Khatami's election, obstacles to U.S.-Iran dialogue remain formidable. Both the new Khatami team and the Clinton administration face the common problem of conservative and recalcitrant legislatures. In Washington, Congress now sets the pace on Iran policy. President Bill Clinton sought to head off more extensive congressional measures when he imposed a comprehensive ban on all U.S. trade with Iran in May 1995. Last year, Congress passed and Clinton signed a bill requiring the president to impose secondary sanctions on foreign companies investing more than $40 million annually in Iran's oil and gas industry. Proof of Iranian involvement in the 1996 Khobar bombing in Saudi Arabia. which killed 19 Americans, could also preempt or destroy efforts to better relations, and could spark demands from Congress and other key quarters to retaliate either overtly or covertly.

In Tehran, a significant bloc of deputies in the unicameral Majlis is hostile to the "Great Satan" and is bound to try to stymie attempts to improve relations between the United States and Iran. Khatami has the added problem of not being Iran's highest authority, a role reserved for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. Khamenei, who believes his legitimacy derives in part from his anti-American stance, and who has often set the tone for Iran's anti-American rhetoric, is likely to be suspicious of U.S. motives. He has also taken the lead in opposing the Arab-Israeli peace process and in defining Israel as an "illegitimate" state. If there is to be any change in Iran's policy toward the United States, Khamenei must be brought on board.
Both countries are also prisoners of a generation of threatening rhetoric that has often been as useful for advancing domestic political purposes as it has been for confronting each other.

Undoing the damage will be difficult. Previous attempts have backfired, beginning with the disastrous 1985-86 arms-for-hostage swap that burned both sides. Tehran was also angered when two subsequent overtures--helping to free hostages in Lebanon in response to President George Bush's inaugural pledge that "goodwill begets goodwill") and a deal to allow the Texas-based company Conoco to develop offshore oil and gas fields--were spumed by Washington. In other words, for these two countries, changing minds at home could be as difficult as convincing each other that the moment has come for cooperation.

Yet Iran's election surprise comes at a time of the most extensive policy rethinking on both sides since the 1979-81 hostage crisis--an event that has subsequently clouded every aspect of U.S.-Iran relations. Several former senior U.S. officials--both Republican and Democrat--from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency have publicly urged Washington to test the waters of constructive engagement through either European allies or direct dialogue. A growing consensus now argues that containment of any nation, especially one with petrodollars, is increasingly difficult in an era of globalization when borders are more porous and competition for markets unprecedented. Sanctions have had limited success in blocking Tehran's access to foreign investment or technology: France's Total SA quickly agreed to develop the oil and gas fields that America's Conoco was forced by presidential order to refuse, and Russia and China both stepped in to develop nuclear reactors when Germany declined to finish a facility started during the reign of the shah. Meanwhile, containment has had no appreciable effect on Iranian behavior in the areas Washington deems most critical--weapons of mass destruction, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and support for extremist Islamic movements.

In a speech two weeks after his election, Khatami called for "removing tensions" with other countries and establishing relations of "peace and tranquillity" that safeguard the rights, interests, and independence of all nations. Khatami is expected to work closely with Rafsanjani, who in the past has appeared to favor dialogue with Washington. The outgoing president still retains considerable clout in Iranian politics, having been appointed to head the Expediency Council, which has been entrusted with the new responsibility of setting the broad policies of the Islamic Republic. In the meantime, officials from neighboring Arab states, who once felt more vulnerable to Iranian mischief, have launched their own rapprochement with Tehran. Saudi Arabia is high on the list. In May, Rafsanjani and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah agreed to exchange visits. In this context, a series of specific steps over the next four years--during Khatami's first four-year term and Clinton's final term--could begin the process of reengagement.

PHASE ONE: THE OPENING ROUND
Both parties in this impasse have indicated that they are waiting for the other side to make a meaningful first move. During his first postelection press conference, Khatami argued that when it came to improved relations with the United States, the "key to the problem is in their hands, not ours." And the State Department duly noted that now "the ball is in Iran's court."
For the process to work, both sides will have to take difficult steps that break down roughly into four phases. Simply laying out these measures underscores the enormity of the task. The first phase would almost certainly have to be informal, with the focus on building confidence and establishing bonafides to lay the groundwork for addressing more substantive issues. To get the process going, leaders on both sides should implement three steps:

Lower the decibel level and frequency of rhetoric.
Tehran should end references to the "Great Satan" and other cliched accusations about the United States that appear in the speeches of its top officials and its daily press. And in referring to Iran, Washington should stop using terms such as "outlaw" or "rogue" state and should also discourage the tendency to link acts of violence or even accidents, such as the explosion of TWA 800, to Iran before solid evidence is available.

Ease restrictions on travel and contacts.
Contacts between Iranians and Americans can help establish "track two" diplomacy to create an informal dialogue. Both sides could indirectly facilitate contacts by allowing visits or exchanges by scholars; representatives of cultural, professional, and nongovernmental organizations; and individuals with government contacts. American visa restrictions remain particularly severe, requiring a four-to-six-week waiting period and two trips to an American consulate abroad. "Track two" can never replace real talks, but such contacts could help change public opinion and improve the general atmosphere.

Differentiate between threats and unacceptable actions.
Both sides need to distinguish between actions that are genuinely threatening and policies that are merely uncomfortable or disagreeable. Iran may object to the American military presence in the Persian Gulf, but it must recognize that the United States has legitimate interests to protect--most notably, safeguarding the flow of oil and enforcing sanctions against Saddam Hussein. The United States may have just cause to be concerned about Iranian efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, but must acknowledge Iran's valid need for conventional weapons, especially after losing 40 percent of its war materiel in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. (Despite Iraq's subsequent conflict over Kuwait, it remains better armed today than Iran.)

PHASE TWO: THE HURDLES
A second phase should begin with an agreement--negotiated either through third parties or directly--on a structure that encompasses a series of steps and countersteps to deal with the practices and policies most offensive to the other country. The Clinton administration has stated that it would enter into direct talks with Iran, so long as the Islamic Republic is prepared to address three "areas of concern": the development of weapons of mass destruction, the sponsorship of terrorism, and the sabotage of the Arab-Israeli peace process. But so far the United States has offered little in return, other than a vague promise to restore diplomatic and economic relations. The U.S. approach is all stick but no carrot. Moreover, linking these issues together and seeking to address them simultaneously allows little room for maneuverability on either side. Iran has not indicated that it will respond in a meaningful way to engagement or to easing of sanctions, for which Europe has repeatedly lobbied Washington.

A framework of reciprocal measures would provide a road map, however roughly sketched, of engagement's ultimate goals. It would allow each side to test the other's good intentions before proceeding and would provide incentives to continue. Such an approach would embody a valuable lesson learned from the Oslo peace process--if both parties are truly committed to rapprochement, then implementing gradual confidence-building measures offers a better chance of success than tackling difficult, divisive issues all at once. This strategy would avoid the kind of confusion generated by Iran's proposed Conoco deal, which Tehran did not describe as an overture to Washington until after the White House had rejected it. Both sides need to understand that these actions would be part of an ongoing process rather than isolated gestures. Phase two, which could stretch for as long as two years, would be the hardest phase, for neither side is likely to change easily. Yet nothing will happen unless these steps are taken.

Iran
End support and sponsorship of terrorism. Iran has long denied its involvement in extremist activities, despite the recent conviction in Thailand of an Iranian agent who intended to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, and strong intelligence data on other cases. The Khatami regime will have to erase even the perception that it is involved in targeting and sabotaging foreign governments and personnel. Tehran will also need to block terrorist acts by surrogates, stop training Arab dissidents who seek to harm the United States and Western allies, and bring its security agencies under control. Iran's behavior, in other words, should begin conforming to international standards and the rule of law. This process includes ending the assassination of its own dissidents abroad, the kind of act for which a German court recently implicated the regime's highest officials. Likewise, Tehran will have to do more than reassure European officials that it will not send a hit squad to murder novelist Salman Rushdie. It must also deal with a small religious foundation that has pledged a $2.5 million reward for his death.

Stop sabotaging the Arab-Israeli peace process. Tehran is unlikely to return to the kind of close cooperation with Israel that prevailed during the reign of the shah, nor is it likely to change its opposition to the current detente between Israel and the Arab world. But it must end attempts to undo the peace process by training, equipping, or financing--directly or indirectly--organizations such as Islamic Jihad, which has claimed responsibility for suicide bombings of Israeli civilian targets. Iran will also have to distance itself from extremist groups targeting Arab governments that have begun to engage with Israel.

The United States
In exchange for these steps by Iran, the United States will need to take simultaneous actions. These will be the incentives for Iran to continue the process, although the Islamic Republic will not be rewarded for its actions until U.S. intelligence can verify that Tehran's behavior has changed significantly.

Expedite closure on Iran's frozen assets. Returning assets frozen by the United States since the hostage crisis has long been a key Iranian condition for bettering relations and a yardstick by which Tehran says it will judge American intentions. A joint U.S.-Iran tribunal that meets in the Hague has resolved most of the 4,000 financial claims and counterclaims, but a major, multibillion-dollar dispute remains over the value and billing of arms that Tehran paid for before the revolution, most of which were never delivered.

Support a European Union offer to promote constructive engagement. Washington should accept a bid by its European allies to prove that constructive engagement is a more effective tool for changing Iranian behavior. The initiative should be tied to a specified time frame, perhaps coinciding with Khatami's consolidation of his government. As progress is made during this roughly two-year period, the United States should suspend pressure on Europe and Japan to isolate Iran, and it should at least temporarily end opposition to Western economic credits designed to boost Iranian development. Washington should also promote diplomatic ministerial contact between its allies and Tehran. In exchange, the European Union should meet Washington halfway. The EU could be urged to respond to verified acts of Iranian misbehavior by implementing limited, punitive sanctions. Europe might favor such an approach for two reasons. First, it is part of a broad, earnest campaign to engage Iran. Second, it represents a strategy of "proportional response," which would involve limited and selective sanctions as opposed to the comprehensive penalties that U.S. policymakers advocate.

Regain control of U.S. policy on Iran. To have any flexibility in dealing with Tehran, the administration needs to bring Congress and public opinion along from an early stage. Clinton could build bipartisan consensus for these policies by mustering the public support of Republican heavy-hitters like former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, who recently pushed for a new approach to U.S.-Iran relations. Such a tactic served the president well during his tough battle with Senate hardliners over ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, the growing backlash against sanctions by American business leaders could give the administration considerable clout when dealing with Congress, as was made apparent during the recent debate over granting most-favored-nation trading status to China. Whenever possible, the administration should emphasize that America stands to reap substantial benefits from engagement, both in terms of creating jobs at home and guaranteeing security abroad.

PHASE THREE: DIRECT ENGAGEMENT
The third stage would allow a series of contacts on issues of mutual concern over perhaps a year or two. It would amount to phased engagement.

Direct contact on neutral turf. American and Iranian officials should make a concerted effort to discuss and emphasize areas of common ground at international forums and at meetings with representatives of financial institutions and regional bodies. Many issues, from regional environmental problems and drug proliferation, to Afghanistan's instability and Bosnia's future, would benefit from direct U.S.-Iran contact. Some of these problems are becoming increasingly urgent. With NATO troops expected to withdraw from Bosnia in less than a year, the United States can no longer ignore the fact that Tehran's ties to Bosnian Muslims will make it a long-term player in the politics of that troubled region. The United States and Iran could design engagement so as to address less problematic issues first and more contentious ones later. Despite the enormous changes in Iran's political system, many of its foreign policy goals have not changed since the era of the shah. Defusing regional conflicts, attracting foreign investment, and gaining access to Western markets are as much priorities today as they were 20 years ago.

Tentative commercial contacts. As contacts expand, commercial links between Iran and the United States could begin again, albeit gradually. For example, the U.S. government could lift legal restraints to allow U.S. companies to transship Iranian oil to Europe, help to develop Iran's oil and gas facilities, or sell oil-drilling equipment to Iran--projects that generate jobs and income for Americans. Other constraints on importing handicrafts and rugs, which primarily helps Iran's economy, could also be lifted eventually. But restoration of full U.S.-Iran commercial ties would need to await more significant diplomatic progress.

Opening talks on security issues. Last but not least, Iranian and U.S. Officials will need to address in bilateral talks a range of security concerns, from broad issues in the Pesian Gulf to arms proliferation throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Iran will not even discuss its conventional arms buildup or its pursuit of unconventional weapons unless its own legitimate defense and security concerns--including endemic instability along several borders, regional arms proliferation, and America's significant military presence in the Gulf--are also addressed. At this stage, both sides should strive for common ground, such as containing Saddam Hussein or securing the free flow of oil. The two sides could reassure each other about their long-term intentions and craft a broader context for eventually resolving their differences on, for instance, the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Tehran would be more likely to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear capability if it felt secure about the United States, Iraq, and other neighbors. Washington, in turn, might find Iran's conventional weapons acquisition more tolerable if it felt more confident that Iran did not intend to use them against the United States or its allies.

THE ENDGAME
Given the history of tensions between Iran and the United States, this deliberately paced sequence of steps may be the best that either side can hope to achieve over the next four years. Yet the current confluence of factors--Iran's pivotal election, growing American skepticism about U.S. policy on Iran, the Gulf monarchies' rapprochement with Tehran, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's declaration this year that Washington will not deal with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein stays in power--offers the best opportunity for a major policy change by both sides in many years. Clinton is also the first U.S. president since Iran's revolution not to have American hostages held either by Iranians or pro-Iranian extremists in Lebanon. In the past, the two governments were generally out of sync on everything from regional goals to leadership cycles. The next four years, in contrast, represent a unique juncture.

Tehran will have to launch the process. Khatami must create the conditions for change by performing these specific steps, by cleaning up Iran's human rights record, and by removing the perpetrators of Iranian mischief--a process he has begun by changing the ministers of intelligence and interior. Initially, he will almost certainly have to begin by taking small steps, but Washington will have to be alert to these shifts and help to accelerate them by responding appropriately. In the past the United States has failed to acknowledge such changes, as in the early 1990s when Rafsanjani squeezed from power several high-ranking radicals associated with hostage seizures and anti-American attacks. The United States may not be able to bend dramatically at first either, but it will need to extend a hand. Now in his final term, Clinton also has more leverage to act and perhaps even more interest as he seeks to create a legacy.
The final issues--restoring full commercial ties and diplomatic relations--will probably have to wait until Khatami's second term, pending his reelection, and a new U.S. administration. Somewhat like his counterpart in the Oval Office, Khatami's first order of business will be to build a viable political coalition that will allow him to implement the ambitious domestic platform upon which he was elected. Bringing Khamenei along, in particular, is likely to require time, heavy persuasion, and verification on the Iranian side that the cost-benefit ratio of a dramatic policy shift is worth the adjustment. Khatami will strengthen his argument if he can show the Supreme Leader that a shift in Iran's foreign policy will produce the desirable response, including the access to Western technology, credit, and investment that Tehran needs, particularly for its oil and gas industries.

During the endgame--which will also be the time to deal with the thorny problem of weapons of mass destruction--Iran and the United States should at least attempt to reach specific understandings over security issues so that there is no need or threat that leads to acquisition or use of the deadliest weapons. Throughout the engagement process, the obstacles are enormous; the chances of a new impasse or of the effort's collapse are high. But as daunting as the risks in changing course may seem, the bigger risk is to make no effort to defuse one of the world's most volatile relationships--or prevent it from getting worse.

Saturday, June 1, 1996

DATELINE TEHRAN: A REVOLUTION IMPLODES

FOREIGN POLICY
Summer 1996

By Robin Wright

Almost a generation after its Islamic revolution reshaped Middle Eastern politics, Iran has reached a critical juncture. At stake is its survival as the world's only modern theocracy. The odds are now almost decisively against Tehran--though not because of U.S. policy. Indeed, the latest congressional schemes and White House sanctions have once again provided rallying points around which to mobilize nationalist passions in a fiercely proud and millennia-old society.

Many of Iran's problems since the 1979 revolution have indeed centered on tensions with the outside world: Western economic sanctions after the 1979 American embassy seizure; Iraq's 1980 invasion and the subsequent eight-year war; widespread disdain by Arab world leaders of their militant Persian brethren; and isolation from the United States, the world's most important political power and, for an oil-producer, economic market. Many of these problems endure. Its rich natural resources and petrodollars continue to give Tehran access to most comers of the globe, but, because of Iran's record of extremist tactics and goals, it cannot count on a single country as a genuine ally.

But the real challenge facing the Islamic Republic in the mid-1990s is instead internal. The revolution is imploding.

The process is gradual, unlike the dramatic upheaval that forced Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from the Peacock Throne and ended a monarchical system dating back 2,500 years. The climax is not yet in sight, and it will not necessarily mean total collapse of the system. Nevertheless, the problems are now so fundamental and pervasive that the Islamic regime can no longer hope to survive over the long term under the economic and political system established after the 1979 revolution. Like the Soviet Union, Iran literally can no longer afford its ideology. It has reached a juncture where it must change, one way or another.

ANGER, DISSENT, AND NEW IDEAS

The signs of decay are multifaceted. In an era when power is increasingly based on financial strength rather than military might, the most fundamental problems Iran faces are economic.

The first challenge centers on oil, specifically plunging prices and rising operational costs.
The pivotal fact is that petrodollar income is down to almost one-third of what it was just before the revolution. Iran's oil industry, which has not been modernized in almost two decades, also badly needs an overhaul. If nothing is done over the next five years, Tehran faces the prospect of declining production. The worst-case scenario is that Iran, which is currently the second-largest producer among the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), could actually become a net oil-importer within the next quarter-century if it does not update its equipment soon. Though unlikely, this prediction by Western diplomats and oil analysts underscores the potential long-term vulnerability of Iran's leading source of income.

The oil crisis reflects the broader wear and tear on Iran's infrastructure. For the revolution's first 18 months, the regime used its oil wealth to bring some measure of modernity to the poor and to parts of the country unchanged for centuries. The "Construction Jihad" introduced electricity, running water, and schools to hundreds of thousands of Iranians. But the effort slowed abruptly when Iraq invaded. The Islamic Republic diverted billions into the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and into postwar rearming, as the military had lost nearly 40 per cent of the national arsenal to the war. Neighboring Iraq's military remains larger and better armed, even after the devastating punishment of Operation Desert Storm, and Baghdad has repeatedly balked at accepting a formal peace with Tehran, so the ruling theocrats still feel vulnerable. As oil wealth has gone toward defense over the past 17 years, industry and development have stagnated. Up to two-thirds of Iran's factories run at limited capacity due to the chronic shortage of raw materials and the need for spare parts and new equipment--or a total overhaul.

The downward spiral in oil prices since the mid-1980s has in turn led to repeated budget shortfalls--up to 20 per cent in the Islamic year ending in March 1994. Iran also faces a burgeoning debt since it went on an uncontrolled postwar shopping binge for billions of dollars worth of foreign consumer goods to placate a war-weary society. This strategy was costly. One of the revolution's proudest accomplishments, as the mullahs often boasted, was paying back the shah's $8.4 billion debt and freeing Iran from Western creditors. In 1990, Iran still owed virtually nothing, but estimates of Tehran's external debt in 1996 run as high as a record $33 billion. At least one-quarter of oil revenues this year will go into servicing the foreign debt.

A second problem centers on population and poverty. According to statistics in Iran, Iran's population has almost doubled in 17 years, from 34 million to 64.7 million. During the same period, oil income has fallen by almost two-thirds. The population growth rate is further sapping the resources of an already fragile infrastructure. The number of primary school students has nearly tripled, from 7 million to more than 19 million since the revolution, forcing schools to run double and triple shifts. Despite vast agricultural lands, Iran has increasingly had to import basic foodstuffs. Most costly are the direct and indirect subsidies for food and fuel that absorb more than $6 billion annually--or almost half of Iran's oil revenues.

The average Iranian has been particularly hard hit since Tehran floated its artificially overvalued currency after the war. The American dollar, stuck officially for a decade at around 70 rials, rose to more than 3,000 rials in the mid-1990s. As a result, the cost of most items soared, while incomes are less than half what they were before the revolution. And annual inflation on basic items now ranges from 40 to 200 per cent.

The economic system is generally stretched thin. Unemployment has climbed to 30 per cent or more; economists and diplomats in Tehran estimate that, of those who have work, underemployment has reached 75 per cent. In the early 1990s, rising business costs and declining revenues led professionals, from lawyers to architects, to close up shop and work at home. Many others were forced to take on second jobs. A 1993 Iran Air crash that killed 132 people elicited letters to Tehran newspapers blaming a troubled economy that forced air controllers to moonlight as cab drivers to make ends meet. By 1995, many Iranians felt compelled to take on third jobs. Iran's Chamber of Commerce admits that up to 40 per cent of Iranians live below the poverty line or barely above it; diplomats peg the figure closer to 60 per cent.

Tehran, teeming with more than 12 million residents by some estimates, is representative of the crisis. It has become one of the world's megacities--overpopulated, polluted, and, because of war refugees and rural migrants, increasingly poor. Despite the stiff Islamic penal code, crime has soared; even foreign diplomats have been victimized at their guarded residences.

A third problem is corruption and mismanagement of resources, which are difficult to estimate but widely considered to be rampant. Both have impeded efforts to liberalize and privatize the economy. Iranians at all levels complain that payoff demands are far larger and made by a wider array of personnel in both the public and private sectors than they were during the monarchy. A related problem is the network of foundations that actually hold the largest single share of Iran's wealth. Key foundations, which provide everything from food to college scholarships and which control large businesses and industries, have in effect become private fiefdoms often beyond government control.

The bottom line is that the vast majority of Iranians are much worse off after 17 years of theocratic rule than they were during the shah's era. Many of the regime's most ardent supporters believe the Islamic leadership has left them behind. Three groups vital to the regime's survival--the young, the middle class, and the mostazafin, the oppressed in whose name the revolution was undertaken--have soured on the revolution. Unemployment among those aged 15 to 24, for example, is double the national average--staggering in light of the fact that 70 per cent of Iran's population is under 25 and half is under 15. The mullahs may regret their decision to lower the voting age to 15.

Another increasingly alienated pillar of Iranian society is the bazaar, a term loosely applied to the traditional merchant class. The bazaar's decision to go on strike was a turning point in the shah's ouster. Relations between the bazaaris and the current regime are also rocky--for many of the same reasons: The mullahs may be profiting, but many bazaaris clearly are not. Bazaaris are traditionally religious, but the costs of the revolution have cut deeply into or impeded their profit margins. New restrictions in 1995 limiting access to foreign exchange to import raw materials and requiring that foreign profits from exports be remitted to Iran have heightened tensions.

Public disillusionment is visible in several ways. Since 1992, sporadic riots have erupted in major cities such as Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Qazvin, and Arak. Thousands have been involved in pockets of unrest over prices and housing shortages--flash points still not defused. Violence, however, remains unusual.

More telling over the past two years has been the daring and stinging criticism from a cross section of highly placed or respected public figures in fields ranging from the arts to the military. Azizollah Amir Rahimi, a former general who firmly backed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and headed the military police after the revolution, for example, charged in a privately circulated letter (which later made its way back into Iran via foreign radio broadcasts) that the clerics are responsible for the misery in Iran. "The nation is in poverty and the country is on the verge of explosion," he wrote in 1994. At the same time, a group of 134 writers and publishers issued an open letter calling for an end to intimidation and censorship. In June 1995, 214 actors and directors petitioned the regime to end "straitjacket regulations and complicated methods of supervision" over everything from plots to production.

In this climate of criticism, new ideas have emerged to further challenge the regime. Abdol Karim Soroush, Iran's leading philosopher and one of the revolution's early supporters, has become the focal point of a new movement trying to reconcile Islam and democracy. In a series of magazine essays and books since 1991, Soroush has argued that Islam should not be used as a modem ideology, for it is too likely to become totalitarian. The alternative is an Islamic democracy not imposed from the top but chosen by the majority of the people, both believers and nonbelievers. He has also argued that the rights of the clergy should be no greater than the privileges of anyone else and that the mullahs have no a priori right to role. He argues further that secularism is not the enemy or rival of religion, but its complement. Soroush has such a large following that leading Iranian officials now openly attack his ideas in public speeches. At last year's annual commemoration of the American embassy seizure, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme jurisprudent and successor to Khomeini, devoted as much time condemning Soroush's writing as he did the United States and Israel.

The anger, dissent, and new ideas are not, however, limited to elites or intellectuals. Tehran taxi drivers often refuse rides to the clergy, and some even run fingers across their throats to show contempt. Jokes about the mullahs are rampant and irreverent. In 1994, the master of ceremonies at a Tehran wedding did a lengthy routine ridiculing the clergy--in the presence of several clerics.

FROM DECONSTRUCTION TO RECONSTRUCTION

The regime is not unaware of the mounting backlash. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in particular has attempted to deal with economic problems and societal malaise. Indeed, his leadership has differed significantly from the Khomeini decade. The period between the imam's triumphant return in 1979 and his sudden death in 1989 represented deconstruction--of the monarchy, of the "Westoxic" influences that flavored everything from education and business priorities to fashion, of the regional balance of power, and of long-standing diplomatic and economic alliances.

The Rafsanjani era, by contrast, has been marked by a rush to reconstruct everything from the physical and psychological damage of the war with Iraq to the tattered economy. When he was elected president a month after Khomeini's death in mid-1989, Rafsanjani wanted not only to move on; in key areas, he actually tried to reverse course. He recognized that the original passions fueling the revolution died long before the imam's passing.

In his first term, Rafsanjani's boldest moves were economic. As the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the ex-dictatorships of Latin America and Africa moved to liberalize their markets, Iran also launched major reforms. Rafsanjani, son of a pistachio farmer and entrepreneur, is a free market mullah who pushed private ownership of business and subsidy cutbacks.

Under his direction, several companies that were nationalized after the revolution were again privatized. The stock market launched by the shah was revived; several clerics even became investors. Foreign investment laws were gradually amended until they actually became more favorable to foreigners than they were during the monarchy. In top economic jobs, Rafsanjani replaced clergy or their followers with Western-educated technocrats. Tehran even began obtaining credits and borrowing millions again from the West, including countries it once condemned, and from the World Bank.

The dramatic shift was best reflected in policy on population growth. In the early 1980s, the mullahs had called on Iranian women to breed an Islamic generation--and they complied. In the early 1990s, the government launched a massive campaign that mobilized thousands of women to go door-to-door to promote birth control. Clinics offered for free everything from tubal ligations and vasectomies to the pill, condoms, and Norplant. Food and other subsidies were cut after the third child. A leading mullah even issued a fatwa, or religious decree, calling for limiting the number of children per family. Iran brought the fertility rate down from an average of seven births per woman in 1986 to 3.6 births in 1993--almost half the rate before the revolution. Iran's progress in family planning was even recognized by the U.S.-based organization Population Action International.

At the onset of Rafsanjani's first four-year presidential term, the tenor inside the country relaxed significantly. The music of Beethoven and Mozart returned to Tehran concert halls and the plays of Anton Chekov and Arthur Miller to its theaters. Chess, banned as a form of gambling, became permissible, as did pale shades of nail polish and more fashionable Islamic dress. Iran's movie industry turned from themes of war and revolution to those of love and adventure. Magazines and newspapers, including publications critical of the government, proliferated. Many of the excesses synonymous with the revolution's early years were checked. Even the activities of the neighborhood komitehs were reined in when they were merged with the police force. The komitehs had monitored moral conduct through means ranging from observing public places and rifling through garbage in search of outlawed liquor bottles to checking cars for unmarried couples at impromptu roadblocks.

Rafsanjani also tried to relax tensions with the outside world. In fits and starts, he began patching up relations with the Gulf Arabs, notably Saudi Arabia, who had sided with Iraq during the 1980-88 war. After Baghdad's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Rafsanjani's government had a de facto understanding with the U.S.-led coalition that Iran would not meddle with Operation Desert Storm, and Tehran seized more than 100 Iraqi military and civilian aircraft dispatched to safer turf in Iran. Afterward, Rafsanjani intervened personally to help achieve the release of the last American and European hostages held by pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon.

By the early 1990s, the revolution appeared to be settling down. Rafsanjani was representative of the clerics who, never before having run a country during the 13 centuries of Islam, learned during the difficult Khomeini decade about the exigencies of a state. After the hostage release--a response to President George Bush's pledge that "good will begets good will"--many in Tehran, including officials, even thought rapprochement with the "Great Satan" was around the corner. They thought that renewing ties with the United States--even if by piecemeal--would be a psychological boon to the economy and public morale.

But some of Rafsanjani's steps in the direction of liberalization contributed to his undoing. In an attempt to rein in hardliners and develop new domestic and foreign policy options, he orchestrated what amounted to a purge. He manipulated the 1992 parliamentary elections so that the best-known extremists--including the mentor to the students who had seized the American embassy and a former ambassador to Syria tied to the bombings of U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in Lebanon--were either eliminated from candidates' lists or faced serious disadvantages in running for office. A new vetting system found many candidates, including incumbents, unqualified to run for office. The most militant revolutionaries were swept from power.

But Rafsanjani's attempts to marginalize the radicals only produced another challenge. In their place came a new group of social conservatives who reined in the president's reform efforts. Iran's version of shock therapy was put on hold, and many subsidies were restored. The new parliament, or Majlis, led by Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, changed direction.

Once the heart of the revolution, especially when Rafsanjani was its speaker in the 1980s, Iran's Majlis passed no major or defining legislation between 1992 and 1996. It was diverted instead by secondary issues such as the impact of satellite dishes and videos on social mores. In 1995, despite Rafsanjani's opposition, the Majlis outlawed satellite dishes that had brought everything from CNN to "The Oprah Winfrey Show" into Iran. In 1993, the Majlis agreed to allow the import and distribution of "Islamically correct" videos, but the statute also made distributors of pornographic videos liable for the death penalty after repeated convictions.

THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE

The various splits reflect the growing fragmentation within the Islamic government. Despite outside skepticism about moderates or militants, a full spectrum of beliefs has emerged in Iranian politics over the past decade. It has also led to serious stalemates. Ironically, over the past three years, Rafsanjani, Iran's shrewdest politician, has faced challenges similar to those faced by President Bill Clinton: His reformist agenda and themes of change have been obstructed by a conservative and feisty parliament that has forced him to fight for his political life. As a result, his second term has seen little movement, and the Rafsanjani presidency generally has not ushered in the anticipated era of normalcy or progress in the regime's relations with its own constituents or with the outside world.

The voices of the revolution are also changing as Rafsanjani has increasingly been drowned out by others who have their own agendas. Three are particularly prominent. Ayatollah Khamenei is a former president (before an executive presidency was introduced in 1989) whose status was quickly elevated in 1989 so he could succeed the Ayatollah Khomeini. He has been struggling ever since to prove his widely questioned credentials as both Iran's "supreme guide" and a leader of the Shiite world. Although he is a less-adept politician who traditionally took a backseat to Rafsanjani, Khamenei has in recent years staked out bold and hard-line positions to establish his own identity and power base. Parliamentary speaker Nateq-Nouri is an ambitious, xenophobic conservative who still uses the revolution's early rhetoric. He is already campaigning hard to succeed Rafsanjani when the president's second and final term expires next year. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati is a senior and outspoken member of the Council of Guardians whose angry militancy seems determined to keep the clergy in control of government and to prevent any compromising of the revolution.

The tension among various government branches and personnel reflects the broader political challenge to the Islamic Republic. For all its shortcomings, Iran's revolution did begin with a democratic veneer--with the emphasis on veneer. Disparate elements from the Islamic Right to the socialist Left and many groups in between banded together to end more than two millennia of dynastic rule; in no small part, they wanted a greater say in controlling their lives. Even after the revolution was commandeered by Khomeini's followers, the new constitution was republican. All major religious groups--including Jews, assorted Christian sects, and Zoroastrians--are represented proportionately in parliament. The one exception has been the Baha'i faith, which is excluded and whose members are often persecuted because they are viewed as heretics and because many were employed by the monarchy (due to their high levels of education). As hard as it may be to believe, history one day may look back on Iran's revolution as a harbinger of the struggle to reconcile democracy and Islam in the Middle East.

Over the past 17 years, however, Tehran's Islamic system has been manipulated and corrupted so that it deviates dangerously from its original form--and from any semblance of democracy. For the first round of parliamentary elections in March 1996, for example, 44 per cent of the 5,121 candidates who registered to run were disqualified by a religious council. Officials claim that only those linked to outlawed opposition groups or who are illiterate or drug addicts were barred, but in reality the system is driven by politics.

Iran's constitution provides for political parties, but the government effectively excludes them. This year, election officials barred most of the 15 members of a coalition made up of the Freedom Movement, a group of liberal Islamists headed by a former foreign minister who quit after the American embassy was seized, nationalists from the National Front, and independents. Rejection letters never specified why they were barred. Security forces broke up a press conference the coalition had organized to announce its withdrawal. "Parliamentary elections could represent a real contest for power in Iran's political system--but only if arbitrary bans on candidates and other constraints on political life are lifted," Human Rights Watch/Middle East reported after an unprecedented tour of Iran in early 1996.

Other constitutional guarantees have been flagrantly ignored, violated, or rewritten. The right of free expression was undermined by a subsequent law requiring the press "to enjoin the good and forbid the evil." Repressive conduct through subtle harassment or overt action has also returned. At least seven publications have been ordered to close down since January 1995; others stopped publication after government subsidies for paper were revoked. Several journalists have been charged with or imprisoned for actions that boil down to offending Islam.

In recent years, vigilantes linked to political or religious factions have attacked individuals or groups who dare to question the regime. Twice last year, Soroush was beaten up in university lecture halls by hizbollahi (or pro-regime) vigilantes, forcing him to flee. Many of the 134 writers who asked for an end to censorship received death threats. In 1994, noted writer Ali Akbar Saidi Sirjani died mysteriously in detention, where he had been placed after writing satirical and questioning essays about the regime; his widow is reportedly destitute, because the government froze their bank accounts. Rahimi was detained after his letter was broadcast on the BBC and Voice of America, although the pretext for his detention was alleged opium addiction. The government of God has effectively declared its monopoly on the truth. And the tentative openings of the late 1980s and carry 1990s have ended.

The growing repression and brutality mixed with the pervasive sense of lost mission have cost the regime much of its legitimacy. Hardships and clampdowns during the revolution's first decade had the cover of a hard-fought war; now there are no credible excuses. Some Iranians who once staunchly opposed the monarchy now talk longingly of the days of the shah--though not of the Pahlavi dynasty. They instead want a return to a multifaceted society and a respected state; proud Iranians hate being considered pariahs and terrorists by the outside world.

Such sentiments extend beyond the lay public. The Islamic Republic never had the support of many mullahs; as the failure of the system threatens to taint Islam, discontent and dissidence among mullahs appear to be growing. The most dynamic--and controversial--debate in Tehran today centers on whether or not the clerics should basically go back to the seminaries and their original roles as interpreters of God's word. The other side of the coin is whether the running of the state should be turned over to the technocrats. Although there are no opinion surveys, several indicators--from debates among young clerics and in seminaries to discussions among members of parliament--suggest that large numbers of clerics think it is time to get out of government.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR AMERICA

In some ways, Iran's Islamic revolution was virtually destined for a big fall from the outset. The regime's use of religion as a political idiom elevated expectations to utopian heights that no state, much less a developing nation, even if it does have oil, could ever hope to achieve. Besides its inherent vulnerability, the revolution's various constituencies had independent visions of Iran after the shah. Iranian unity has been an illusion ever since just one of those visions strong-armed its way to the top. And since then, the inner circle of mullahs who once rallied together around Khomeini has deeply divided; clerical politicians turn out to be no different from their secular counterparts. Any semblance of solidarity is largely a byproduct of challenges from regional and international parties that allowed the theocrats to lay blame elsewhere or to appeal to national pride. The latest such challenge is House speaker Newt Gingrich's call for a $20 million U.S. intelligence program to overthrow the regime--an idea doomed from the outset anyway. Virtually no overt or covert action short of a full-scale military invasion has any chance of succeeding. Even Iranians who dislike this regime do not want foreigners influencing or dictating their future. So the odds are against the success of any military actions.

For several reasons, there are no easy options in dealing with Iran. First, the international community has been just as fragmented as Tehran's leadership. A case in point was the Clinton administration's decision in 1995 to impose new sanctions eliminating the last vestiges of U.S. trade with or investment in Iran--at a cost of millions in income and thousands of American jobs. The threat of even stiffer congressional action--because Iran is usually an easy political target on the Hill--had forced the administration's hand, but the move generally fit in with U.S. strategy to "contain" Iran and neighboring Iraq. The American action pushed U.S. allies to make a choice: work with Washington to squeeze Tehran to stop its nuclear programs and end its alleged terrorism or continue to trade with Iran. Not a single government was willing to cut economic links with Iran to side with the United States. Each opted to follow a carrot-and-stick approach that amounts to constructive engagement.

Second, rapprochement between the United States and Iran is not an option anytime soon. Both have repeatedly and stubbornly resisted opportunities to repair relations. As a Western ambassador in Tehran noted recently, Americans play football while Iranians play chess, a difference that also plays out diplomatically. For the time being, the two states are destined to be locked into conflict, because they have different visions of how to conduct the business of state and more fundamentally how to enact priorities. The United States holds Iran accountable for aiding and abetting Hamas and Islamic Ji-had in the occupied territories as well as having ties with Damascus-based rejectionist groups, plus assorted attacks on Iranian dissidents abroad. Tehran has also been the most outspoken critic of the U.S.-brokered Mideast peace process. Iran, in turn, holds the United States responsible for offering refuge to its main rivals, including the shah's son and the Mujahadeen-e Khalq, or People's Holy Warriors, who are held responsible for assassinating a former president, prime minister, several members of the Majlis, and many civilians during the early 1980s. The CIA has reportedly funded broadcasts by the shah's son into Iran, and the Mujahadeen runs a large lobbying effort out of its Washington office.

Third, and despite all its problems, the regime still faces no external opposition force capable of ousting it. The Mujahadeen-e Khalq, which has an agenda best described as Islamic socialism, lacks domestic support even among the regime's toughest opponents, in no small part because it is based in rival Iraq. The group now amounts to little more than an irregular irritant. A return to the monarchy also has no significant support. To succeed and have legitimacy, change must come from within--either by the regime's actions or by inaction that offers opportunities to others. But aiding or intervening on behalf of the new internal forces could well undermine or taint these forces rather than encouraging evolutionary change.

An activist American foreign policy--bailing out Haiti and Bosnia, trying to bring peace to the Middle East and Northern Ireland--can be both effective and healthy. But with a host of economic and political sanctions already in place in Iran, it may be time for Washington to step back. For one thing, the American record of intervention in Iran to prop up or bring down leaders, in 1953 and 1979, respectively, ought to offer a potent lesson: The United States has little hope of determining who rules Iran. Trying to dictate the course of history too often backfires--there and elsewhere. With a boost from freely flowing information, which has penetrated Iran even more pervasively than it did communist Eastern Europe or Latin America's military dictatorships, the better way to undermine those responsible for repression at home and extremism abroad may be to let them do it to themselves. They are already well on their way.
~~~~~~~~

ROBIN WRIGHT, a former Middle East correspondent for the Sunday Times of London, is the author of Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (Simon and Schuster, 1985) and In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (Simon and Schuster, 1989). She covers global issues for the Los Angeles Times and travels frequently to Iran.

Friday, July 1, 1994

What Would the World Be Like Without Him?

The Atlantic
Pope John Paul II helped to free Eastern Europe from communism—a historic achievement for the man and his Church. Now he has turned his moral scrutiny on capitalism.
July 1994

by Robin Wright

As always, Papa boarded last. While his entourage headed to Rome's international airport, Pope John Paul II was still at the Vatican, finishing mass in his private chapel. This time, as he prepared to set foot in the remnants of the Soviet Union, mass was in Lithuanian—his fourteenth language.

After conferring with aides about last-minute trip details and work to be done in his absence, he boarded a helicopter for the ride across town to join the cardinals and bishops, Vatican staff, and press traveling with him to the three Baltic states. Most of us were already on board the plane by the time he arrived. It is protocol for the Pontiff to board last. But since the early 1980s the Holy See has relied heavily on a helipad in the farthest corner behind Saint Peter's Basilica and its manicured gardens, as a concession to the Pope's incessant globe-trotting, for security reasons after two assassination attempts, and because the Holy Father tends to run late.

"It's not that he's a poor planner—he's very organized," a Vatican official had told me a few days before the trip. "It's just that he uses every minute to the maximum. And sometimes one minute spills over into the next."

After he arrived, Papa Wojtyla—as he is known around Rome, papa being the Italian word for Pope—came back to wish the accompanying press a good trip. Now seventy-four, the Pope has visibly aged since I first traveled with him, early in his papacy. The firm skin around his chiseled Slavic face has softened, and the gray hair has turned white. His stoop is more pronounced, and the talk around the Vatican is that life would probably be easier for him—and his staff—if he tried glasses and a hearing aid. Members of his inner circle used to boast that the Pope got up at 5:00 A.M., said first mass at seven, hosted guests at all three meals, read the last briefing paper from his Secretary of State late into the night and on weekends walked, skied, hiked, or swam. Now the same hours and habits worry them. John Paul's one concession to age has been to add a papal afternoon nap to the Holy See schedule, even during his trips. Health setbacks—two bullets in the 1981 assassination attempt, pre-cancerous colon surgery in 1992, a broken arm and dislocated shoulder in 1993, and a broken leg and hip surgery this year—haven't helped. He has been to Rome's Gemelli Hospital so often that when he arrived by ambulance after his latest injury, from a fall in the bathroom, he reportedly joked to the medical staff, "You have to admire my loyalty." His aides vaguely, and inadequately, refer to the Pontiff's medical history when pressed about his left arm, which now often visibly shakes. Sometimes the Pope holds the arm with his other hand, although that rarely suffices anymore.

Yet John Paul, who has surely been seen by more people than anyone else in history, is still a magnet. Like many otherwise irreverent journalists assigned to the Holy See, I found that my initial lack of interest eventually gave way to a certain fascination. The real interest wasn't in the endearing persona—giving his papal ring to the Brazilian poor, or wearing white sneakers with yellow laces (the Holy See's colors), a gift from the kids at Denver's World Youth Day. And it wasn't in the controversial moral writings from history's most prolific Pontiff—the latest, last October, banning not only abortion, contraception, divorce, and homosexuality but also the mere questioning of those bans. What fascinated me was instead the way that this obscure Pole, elected on the eighth ballot to head the world's smallest state, has gone on, with a mixture of cunning and daring, to become a global leader—and not just among the Catholic faithful. Although John Paul II vehemently eschews political involvement, his reign—already almost twice as long as the papal average of eight years—is likely to be remembered most for the way he has helped reshape the world.

I had been told that John Paul had never worked harder or waited longer for any other of his sixty-one trips, which together have accounted for more than a year away from the Vatican, than he had for this Baltic tour. The only place he wanted to go to more was Moscow. The Vatican had historically acted most often in behalf of the Baltics among all the former Soviet republics—particularly Lithuania, which was a Catholic bastion in the Russian empire and is the Church's northern most stronghold in Europe. Lithuania's Church was the only institution to challenge Communist rule consistently after the Baltics were annexed by Stalin in 1940. For their efforts hundreds of priests and thousands of the faithful were deported to Siberia. After John Paul's election, in 1978, the Holy See's interest increased. The Pope once disclosed that immediately after his selection he had gone to Saint Peter's crypt, around which the Vatican was built, to pray for Lithuania.

His interest, and the trip, had a personal angle. John Paul's mother was of Lithuanian descent. She died when he was nine—an event that some papophiles contend contributed to his devotion to the Virgin Mary, whose initial is on the lower right quadrant of his coat of arms and who is a constant theme of this papacy.

But papal interest and pressure seemed to avail little. At least twice in the 1980s Soviet authorities formally denied the Pontiff permission to visit Lithuania. Several informal feelers were rebuffed too. Throughout its rule of the Baltics, Moscow rarely acknowledged, much less acceded to, requests, appeals, or protests from the Holy See. Stalin once mockingly commented, "How many divisions does the Pope have?"

On this trip, a half century later, the papacy replied.

In keeping with Northern European reserve, John Paul's reception in Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, was decidedly low-key by comparison with the fanfare and the high-tech, televised glitz surrounding his Denver trip. Despite the blustery cold already settling over Lithuania in September, a time when Rome is still balmy, Vilnius, a city of 600,000, had no heat. Because the country couldn't afford the foreign exchange required by Russia to pay for oil, Lithuanians had hot water only one week a month. The average monthly salary was then only $35, but in the new free markets prices have soared. The price of bread had quadrupled in a year. Whether it involved leaving work, traveling, or spending limited income, going to see the Pope ranked almost as a luxury.

Yet the people came, by the tens of thousands. In just over three days at least 10 percent of Lithuania's population of 3.7 million turned out for the masses and meetings John Paul held in four cities. In Vilnius a frigid, pelting rain fell during his open-air mass, yet I met people who said they had begun assembling on the dark, muddy field as early as 2:00 A M About 100,000 stuck it out for the three hour service, which included token baptisms and confirmations as well as communion for all assembled, many of them served by the Pope.

Two people were particularly helpful to me in understanding John Paul's impact in Lithuania. The first was Nijole Sadunaite, an effusively energetic woman of fifty-five with an unadorned face, blue eyes, and big, active hands. She is well known in Lithuania as one of the heroes of the anti-Soviet resistance. In 1975 she was sentenced to three years at hard labor and three in exile in Siberia, for "duplicating and disseminating" the Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania. The Chronicle, which recipients with access to a typewriter would retype, with up to ten carbons at a time, for wider distribution, recorded human rights abuses and acts of defiance. It was the longest-running underground publication in any of the fifteen Soviet republics. "I had typed six pages when I was caught, so I effectively got one year for every page," Sadunaite told me, laughing at the absurdities of the Soviet system.

Sadunaite's imprisonment included a stay at a psychiatric hospital, torture, and prolonged solitary confinement. Two years after her release, in 1980, the Soviet secret police began looking for her again, and she went underground for five years. During that period, in disguise, she took a train to Moscow to deliver a memoir detailing her secret life and the trials and imprisonment of other prisoners of conscience she had known in the Soviet gulag, to be smuggled out of the Soviet Union. In 1987 A Radiance in the Gulag was published in the United States.

Yet for three decades—while Sadunaite worked in factories, with abandoned children, and then, while she was in exile, as a charwoman—only a few family members and friends knew her real secret. In 1956, at the age of eighteen, she had entered a clandestine convent and secretly become a nun. In the late 1980s she finally emerged from the underground as a leader in two demonstrations. Both were turning points for Lithuania, the first and most active republic in trying to break away from the Soviet empire.

On August 23, 1987, about a thousand Lithuanians turned out to protest the 1939 treaty between Stalin and Hitler which ultimately allowed Moscow to absorb the Baltic states. The KGB quickly broke up the demonstration, and again Sadunaite came under surveillance. Six months later she and other former political prisoners organized a second demonstration, on the seventieth anniversary of Lithuania's declaration of independence from Russia, in 1918. After services at two Catholic churches, protesters were supposed to march quietly through Vilnius to the main cathedral, then being used as an art gallery. Once again the secret police interfered, this time more brutally. Sadunaite didn't make it to her own demonstration; the KGB had arrested her that morning.

But the public resistance emboldened others, particularly the founders of Sajudis, the first mass pro-democracy movement, which emerged over the six months following. By the time the next anniversary of the Stalin-Hitler accord rolled around, in 1988, at least 250,000 people were willing to march in public. A year later two million Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians formed a human chain from Vilnius to Tallinn, the Estonian capital, to protest the pact. It was the largest outpouring in Baltic history. In early 1990 Lithuania held the first democratic elections to take place in any Soviet republic, and then unilaterally declared its independence.

I asked Sadunaite what had motivated her to come out in the open, especially after all she'd been through.

"The Holy Father was always an inspiration for me to be more active. I knew he had attended an underground seminary in Poland, which encouraged many of us not to be afraid to be active and to work in our own underground, whatever the dangers or hardships. We were also inspired because the Pope was someone who had escaped from the same system that was oppressing us.
"Even a person who has the greatest good will but hasn't lived under that system can't understand its nuances or what we went through. But this Pope did. He knew what kind of things we were being told. The State kept telling us, for example, that only insane people went to prison for resisting the system. But the Pope contradicted that message. He kept telling us that it was good to resist, that those who resisted represented the future of the nation and the Church.

"I remember hearing one sermon he gave on Easter, sometime in the mid-1980s, when I was underground. He said that people who fight and die for their country are not only martyrs but may be holy. We took that to mean that the Pope understood what we were doing, and that we should do whatever it took to free our land. He said it again and again. He made me want to be strong and courageous too, even when I was afraid."

During one of the breaks in the papal schedule, I stopped by the old KGB headquarters, an imposing four-story stone building, where Sadunaite had frequently been confined. It's now a museum, and the director took me on a tour of its underground prison: through the tiny green cells that once held up to twenty prisoners each and still had reeking urination pails in the corner; through the dark and dank isolation chamber; through the KGB officers' room, still stocked with books on Marxist theory and venereal disease; through the guardroom, with its sprawling map of the entire Soviet prison network; and, finally, through the torture chamber, still covered with dried blood and thickly padded to stifle sound, a black straitjacket hanging on its wall. Over half a century, the director told me, thousands had been executed in this facility. Most were shot; some were hanged. But he was reluctant even to guess how many had been imprisoned here or had passed through en route to the gulag.

Only one thing had been added since the prison was closed down, in 1991. Above the old KGB computer in the director's office was a poster of John Paul.

The other person who offered me perspective was Vytautas Landsbergis, the musicologist and Sajudis leader who became independent Lithuania's first President, in 1990. He lost the job last year, after the former local Communist Party leader was elected President, largely in reaction to economic hardships. Landsbergis now leads the opposition. Although he invited John Paul to Lithuania, he is not Catholic. We met in Vilnius's modern glass-and-concrete Parliament, where I asked him about the Pope's impact.

"I can say that the liberation of Lithuania and the other Baltic countries is a result in great part of the policy of the Pope," he replied, in measured, deliberate English. "The policy of the Holy See was very subtle in methods and levels. His policy was very, very important in the scale of mankind, and especially, of course, for these captive nations."

But on the same level as the United States?

"Perhaps not less," he said, and chuckled. "Perhaps not less."

The United States represented the physical power challenging Moscow, but the Vatican was the only European capital that continued to recognize Lithuania's independent diplomatic representation, he explained. The rest of Europe accepted the Baltics as part of the Soviet Union. And internally the Catholic underground, supported by the Pope and the Holy See, was the primary instrument of defiance.

I reminded Landsbergis of Stalin's sardonic comment about the Pope's divisions.

"The Pope has no armies, of course, but he has the greatest spiritual army," Landsbergis replied, stroking his dark blonde moustache and short goatee. "And our liberation was based on spiritual values and virtues. We had no arms, only this support and the feeling we have of this great European Christian culture."

Landsbergis also said that the Pope's visit played a critical role in the crisis over lingering Russian troops, a key issue for all former Soviet republics. After pledging, shortly before the Pope's arrival, to withdraw the final contingent, Moscow had balked at the last minute. The United States called on Russia to pull out and on both sides to renew talk—and said that $700 million in aid was at stake if the troops stayed too long. Yet when the dispute was settled, Lithuanians widely credited the Pope.

"In the end Moscow realized it would be worse for them," Landsbergis said, chuckling again, "especially since the Pope was coming. I'm sure it helped Russian leaders decide to finish this withdrawal process."

Four days before John Paul arrived, the last Russian troops had left Vilnius. Lithuania became the first of the fifteen former Soviet republics to be free of Stalin's divisions.

In the 1 990s the question for John Paul is not how many divisions he has but whether he can still make much of a difference. The first Slavic Pope—and the first non-Italian one in almost half a millennium—was elected in the context of the Cold War, and his first decade in office coincided with rhetoric about the "evil empire." His personal background —fighting first fascism and then communism—no longer seems as relevant as it once did.

But in the Baltics, John Paul attempted to address the post-Cold War world. The next stop on the papal tour was Latvia, a country that appeared during the Pontiff's visit to be doing far better than poor Lithuania. Since independence, in 1991, Riga's quaint old downtown had been revived, courtesy of capitalism. The brick alleys and streets were lined with newly privatized antique and handicraft shops, chic boutiques, and open-air art stalls. Drivers could shop at Fiat and Mercedes dealerships, and diners had a range of quality European restaurants and new fast-food joints from which to choose. But as dusk set in, hookers with peroxided hair and thigh-high leather boots turned out on many corners, while young Russians peddled everything from Soviet military caps and medals to handpainted wooden nesting dolls from their backpacks. For the first time beggars, including tiny children, were on the streets, often late into the night and often hanging out near flashy casinos reputed to have links to a new Baltic mafia. And for everyone crime had become a chronic problem. Although a few are prospering economically, the vast majority of Latvians are now worse off than they were under Soviet rule. It was an appropriate setting for the Pope's message.

In Riga, John Paul took on capitalism. The Church, he pronounced, regarded the system now dominant in the world as responsible for "grave social injustices." In its worst form it was ultimately responsible for creating the totalitarian and authoritarian alternatives that had divided the world for most of the twentieth century.

"The needs from which [socialism] had historically arisen were real and serious," he said. "The situation of exploitation to which an inhumane capitalism had subjected the proletariat since the beginning of industrialized society was indeed an evil. This, basically, was Marxism's kernel of truth, which enabled it to present itself as an attractive reality to Western society."


The implication, of course, was that it could happen again in fragile and volatile new democracies. Perhaps ironically, two weeks after the Baltic tour the Pontiff's native Poland elected a new parliament. Having pledged to slow the rapid and inequitable transformation brought on by free markets, former Communists won. Just as the first decade of John Paul's papacy was synonymous with an unrelenting confrontation of Eastern communism, so the second decade is shaping up as an equally bold challenge to the inequities and excesses of capitalism, the abuses of liberty, and what the Pope sees as a return to the law of the jungle. Though John Paul had issued similar warnings on earlier trips, the Cold War's end had brought this theme to the top of his agenda. He has warned the new democracies of the world about catching "the virus" of Western consumerism. In a 1990 visit to Czechoslovakia he warned against replacing communism with "secularism, indifference, hedonistic consumerism, [and] practical materialism."

"The dangers that regaining contacts with the West can bring," he told the Czechoslovakian clergy, "must not be underestimated." John Paul went even further with a sweeping statement that he made in his last Latvian speech. He gave this speech to one of the smallest crowds, composed mainly of writers, thinkers, professors, and cultural leaders, dressed in gowns and draped with academic colors, at the University of Riga. In contrast to the passions displayed in other settings, the atmosphere was scholarly. In an elegant auditorium with gray-white stone walls and lofty ceilings, the Pope gave a landmark address outlining his vision of an ideal society. Although he kept denying that he was defining the long-elusive "third way" between the twentieth century's two dominant ideologies, he presented six principles that were effectively a model, even the basis of a manifesto, for a new era.

The ideal state, he declared, is based on law that guarantees everyone an orderly existence and assures the most vulnerable of enough support to avoid falling prey to "the arrogance and indifference of the powerful." The ideal democracy is always in the service of the common good. But, above and beyond its rules, it also has "a soul made up of the fundamental values without which it easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism."

Within this ideal democratic state the distribution of goods is "universal" and based on "solidarity." Private property is recognized, but in the context of its social rather than its economic purpose. Work, critical to human dignity, must never reduce the individual "to a commodity or a mere cog in the machinery of production." And all systems must promote "human ecology, implying respect for every person from conception to natural death."

Although John Paul's utopia is enlightened, bold, and ambitious, understanding, let alone
achieving, it is probably beyond the reach of most of the nearly one billion Catholic faithful. The largest segment of the Church is now in Latin America, and the fastest-growing segment is in Africa. Neither region has sufficient goods to distribute, much less the resources to support the weak or vulnerable. Nor do they have enough menial jobs, much less dignifying employment, to offer. At one point, as the Pope sat on a green leather chair, looking a bit tired, I wondered how far beyond this cavernous auditorium in northern Europe his message would even be heard.
During my conversation with former President Landsbergis, I asked about the Pope's role in the post-Cold War world. Like the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev—with whom the Pontiff began a regular correspondence after their first meeting, in 1989—hadn't John Paul been relegated to the sidelines of history by his successes and the proliferation of political and economic freedoms?

"Oh, no," Landsbergis replied. "First, I don't think communism is finished. Communism is merely changing its face. You know that Satan or evil can have many faces. This evil could be named something else, like 'fascism.' It's the same hatred of human beings. It's the worship of force and violence, not of love and brotherhood. Then the names, such as 'communism,' are not so important. This name could also be 'New World Order.' And we must look what is this New World Order? What is coming by this name?"

Second, he said, eliminating communism was only part of the job. The harder part, building new societies, has just begun.

"I have said sometimes that it seems all Western leaders are Marxists," Landsbergis said, with his ironic chuckle. "No one, with very small exception, is speaking about spiritual problems, about spiritual values. The only sphere of problems is economic effectiveness, zones of influence and control in a rather materialistic way of being."

But is there really a practical role for spirituality or religious values in a world of thoroughly secular ideologies?

"Spiritual values are basic to the restoration of democracy," Landsbergis protested. "The more important side of spiritual values or morality, of behavior, and of the attitudes of one human person to another, to society, to work, to responsibility—all of this must be restored now in post-communist countries."

So this Pope could still have an impact?

"What," he responded, "would the world be like without him?"

Monday, June 22, 1992

A Teheran Spring

The New Yorker
By Robin Wright
June 22 1992


THE dusty highway south from Teheran runs through barren countryside, until, some fifteen kilometres from the city's edge, an enormous gold dome looms on the horizon. Even in the spring, the heat rising off the surrounding desert makes it shiver like a mirage. Two spiny minarets quiver rhythmically alongside it. The route is among the most heavily travelled in Iran; Teheranis say that everyone has to make the trip at least once. The road leads to Behesht-e Zahra, or "Zahra's Paradise," the Muslim cemetery. The last time I took it, in the summer of 1988, the way was clogged with funeral processions -- busload after busload of families journeying to bury the latest "martyrs" in the costly eight-year war with Iraq. This April, however, traffic was light. The only splashes of color on the bleak road to the gold dome were small batches of the year's first flowers, sold along the roadside by young boys from Teheran's poor south¬ern suburbs, and green road signs, in Farsi and English, directing visitors to "Imam Khomeini's Holy Tomb."

Built by Iran's ruling mullahs after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's death, in June of 1989, the tomb is the largest and most ornate shrine to a Shiite leader anywhere in the world, and one of the largest to any Muslim leader since the faith was founded, in the seventh century. Disgruntled Iranians complain that its cost was greater than the annual budget of Teheran, a city of almost thirteen million people. De¬vout Iranians, however, boast that it is finer than either the Grand Mosque in Mecca or the Prophet Muhammad's tomb in Medina —Islam's holiest sites. Their message is implicit.

The entrance to the tomb is across a vast plaza, complete with a reflecting pool and taps at which the faithful dutifully wash before praying. Inside the entrance are two rooms, lined to the ceiling with gray cubbyholes, where visitors check their shoes. The main room, a vast space lined with pillars and lit by several chandeliers, is indeed magnificent. The floor and walls are polished marble, which reflects the sparkling light of the chandeliers and gives the interior an airy feeling. Persian carpets--of handwoven silks in richly textured designs from various Iranian provinces —adorn the floor. In the center, beneath the gold dome, is a cagelike glass-and-silvery-metal chamber, canopied in green, the color of Islam. Inside, the Ayatollah lies beneath a marble slab, which is also covered by a green cloth. The metal was used in part to prevent the large crowds that once assembled here from breaking through to the Imam; the faithful still shudder at the memory of the chaos at his funeral, when the shrouded body was uncovered and tossed around by mourners vying for a last look or touch. On each of the chamber's four sides, at eye level, is a slit through which to pass money. On the day I was there, rial notes were piled at least two feet high around the edges of the chamber. Stained-glass windows at the base of the gold dome depict giant red tulips with green leaves—in Iran, the red tulip is the symbol of martyrdom—incongru¬ously fashioned in the simple modernis¬tic style of New York City's Big Apple.

For all its splendor, the tomb is a place of unusual informality, and non-Muslims and foreigners are welcome. Out of either reverence or curiosity, almost everyone who enters heads immediately for Khomeini's chamber. As I peered inside it, a small middle-aged woman next to me wept softly, reciting a prayer and touching the metal with rough, henna-stained hands. Then, having paid her respects, she walked over to join a group having a picnic lunch. Throughout the tomb's cavernous interior, groups were spread out on the carpets, eating or chatting, while children played tag or raced to slide across the marble floor in their stocking feet; two boys were kicking around a small soccer ball. Families lined up to have their pictures taken against the backdrop of the burial chamber. Several loners—mainly, but not exclusively, men—were curled up against a wall, napping. The casualness does not indicate a lack of rever¬ence: death and mourning are cel¬ebrated among devout Shiite 'Muslims as a part of life. On my earlier visit to the cemetery, I had witnessed simi¬lar scenes at the graves of war martyrs and of ordinary Iranians in adjacent fields. Still, the informality was a con¬trast to the desperate throes of grief displayed three years ago, at the time of the Imam's death.

Outside, the atmosphere was almost festive. A row of outdoor cafes on the plaza offered an assortment of sweet delicacies. Across the plaza, souvenir kiosks sold T-shirts, beach towels, posters of Khomeini and other prominent mullahs, and cassette tapes—in Farsi, English, French, German, and Arabic--of the Ayatollah's last will and testament. Like the crumpled rials inside the burial chamber, the proceeds will be used to expand the complex. The government plans to construct a university for Islamic studies, a semi¬nary, hotels for pilgrims, and a shopping mall across some five thousand acres, at a projected cost of at least two and a half billion dollars. The tomb will eventually become the center of a suburb, with its own metro stop.
For a weekend afternoon, the tomb was lightly populated—roughly two hundred people in a place that could clearly hold thousands. The count went up when a class of pre-teen girls, just old enough to don the required head scarf and body covering of Islamic modesty, filed in with their teachers. Another hundred or so people were outside on the plaza. The tea-men at one of the cafes told me that the tomb was still swamped with visitors on holidays and revolutionary anniversaries, and during various pilgrimages. "Too many," one said proudly. But a young Iranian woman, overhearing our conversation, took me aside and said, in a hushed voice, "Believe me, the revolution is like this shrine. It's a luxury. And people in this country don't have time for luxuries anymore."

I visited Khomeini's resting place on the eve of Iran's pivotal election for the Majlis, its unicameral parliament – the fourth parliament since the country’s 1979 revolution. Parliamentary elections in Iran differ significantly from those in other parts of the world; in the Middle East, they are unique. All citizens fifteen years of age and older, including women, are eligible to vote. Fifty-six women—a record number—were among the candidates. This year's campaign lasted a mere eight days. In part because of the high number of candidates—more than two thousand ran for the parliament's two hundred and seventy seats—none were allowed to buy advertising on televi¬sion or radio. Posters for individual candidates were limited to a size slightly larger than a piece of legal paper. The standard format was a picture (all the female candidates wore the black chador, and thus looked alike) with a few lines about the candidate's educational and professional background, followed by endorsements from religious or cul¬tural groups. Campaigning was strictly on the issues; Teheran's public prosecutor sternly warned the press against writing about the candidates' personal lives.

As has become the norm since 1979, most campaigning was conducted at mosques or other Islamic gathering places; the candidates sat on the floor with their constituents, presented their platforms, and then answered questions. The religious minorities—Jews, Armenian Christians, Assyrian and Chal¬dean Christians, and Zoroastrians, whose faith prevailed in Iran before Islam---are represented proportionately in the Majlis, and their candidates campaigned at synagogues, churches, and temples. (The Baha'i, who broke away. from Shiite Islam in the nine¬teenth century and are persecuted as heretics, are the only minority ex¬cluded from Majlis representation; at least two hundred Baha'i have been executed since 1979, most of them in the revolution's early years.)

But this spring's election —the first since the war's end, in August of 1988, and the death of the Ayatollah---was unlike any earlier contest. Since the mid¬nineteen-eighties, the ruling mullahs have been increasingly divided over the future of the revolution. The rift briefly became visible to the outside world during the disastrous 1985-86 arms-for-hostages swap with the United States, when one group of clerics dealt secretly with the Great Satan and the other exposed them. By 1987, the in-house squabbling had grown so serious that the Ayatollah finally agreed to dissolve the Islamic Republic Party, under whose banner the mullahs had united to purge their leftist and centrist partners in the revolution and to con¬solidate power in the world's only modern theocracy.

Until his death, Khomeini served as a balance between the two camps, reining in whichever side went too far, and always counselling unity; after he died, the division became a fact of life, though not of official debate. The Ira¬nian government still deplores the terms "factions," "hard-liners," and "moderates," and officials regularly denounce them as "arrogant" and "spiteful" foreign propaganda, as if by denying the words they could deny the differences. "The preferred term for the factions is "tendencies," but they are effectively the embryos of new parties. In one of many signals that this year marks a turning point for Iran, both sides formally came out into the open for the Majlis election.

The split was visible even at Kho¬meini's tomb. On a pole in front of the complex, the Association of Combatant Clerics, or Majmae Ruhaniyoun-e Mobarez, had posted a large roster of its Teheran candidates, neatly written out in red, green, and white, the colors of the revolution and its flag. The Ruhaniyoun, as it is usually referred to, is made up of the hard-line mullahs and their supporters, who believe they most closely adhere to "the Imam's line." It includes many of the revolution's most controversial figures, among them Hojatoleslam Sadeq Khal¬khali, nicknamed "the hanging judge," for the death sentences he imposed after summary trials in the revolu¬tion's early years; Mohammad Ibrahim Asgharaadeh, the spokesman for the students who held the fifty-two American hostages between 1979 and 1981; Hojatoleslam Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha, the mullah who blessed the United States Embassy takeover; and Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mobtashami, the former Interior Minister and Ambassador to Syria. "The hardliners look to the past for ideas to use as the framework for modernization," an Iranian journalist told me. The Ruhaniyoun advertised at the tomb because its main constituency is the mostazafin, or "down¬trodden"—the poor and traditionally pious, many of whom live in the crowded suburbs closest to the tomb and still take the time to visit it.

With typical and confusing Iranian subtlety, the other "tendency" is called the Society of Radical Clergy, or Jameye Ruhaniyat-e Moharez. The society, however, is anything but radical. Its platform calls for measures to open up economic and foreign policy, including privatization, foreign investment, and stronger diplomatic ties with the out¬side world. Although President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is not offi¬cially allied with either group, the Ruhaniyat essentially backs him, and its agenda is built around his reformist five-year plan. "The Ruhaniyat is look¬ing more toward the future," the Ira¬nian journalist said. "It's trying to establish a state that is viable in a modern, interdependent world --even if this sometimes comes at the cost of the revolution." The Ruhaniyat is by no means abandoning Islam as the idiom of Iranian politics, nor is it any less reverent toward the Imam; many of its leading members were his students. But its ultimate goals are comparable, in an Iranian context, with the overhauls in Eastern Europe since the demise of Communism. I saw no Ruhaniyat campaign poster at Kho¬meini's tomb.

Although both sides would vehemently deny it, the core issue in Ira¬nian politics is really whether the post-Khomeini leadership should move beyond Khomeiniism. The shift would not mean abandoning the past or rejecting the Imam. "Iranians followed Khomeini not just for religious reasons," a Western diplomat who has long served in Teheran said to me. "Most of his support was based on nationalist feelings. He made it pos¬sible for Iranians to find, to retrieve, their identity. And he gave control of Iran back to the Iranians - something they haven't had for much of this century, because of the British and the Russians, and then the Americans. For that, he is still revered." But the shift would mean serious revisions, even reversals, in the revolu¬tion's future course, with a heavier emphasis on pragmatism than on piety. The sense of transition in Teheran, however, is the product of more than just the
Imam's passing; the domes tic debate over change isn't happening in isolation. Although Iran still has no formal peace treaty with Iraq, Operation Desert Storm provided at least a 'temporary' reprieve on its hostile western border and some friendlier faces among the Gulf Arabs who had sided with Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War. Relations with Saudi Arabia, broken off a year before Khomeini's death, were restored last year. Communism—more of an anathema than capitalism, because of its atheistic premise—is no longer a threat. The Russians are not even on Iran's north ern border anymore; the whole region has been reconfigured by the transfor mation of the former Soviet Central Asian republics—all predominantly Islamic—into independent states. And to the east the last vestiges of Afghanistan's Communist leadership have succumbed to the Mujahedin, ending a war that began the same year as Iran's revolution. Khomeini died just four months before the first cracks in the Berlin Wall marked the onset of a change in the global geostrategic balance. In the minds of many Iranians, his life is in creasingly associated with a bygone era.

Although Khomeini's picture is still omnipresent----in government offices,
shops, airports, and many homes—the huge paintings of the Imam on the sides of Teheran buildings were, sym bolically, fading fast this spring. Many of the graffiti quoting his public utter ances had become unintelligible; some had been removed as part of a cleanup campaign by Teheran's zealous new mayor. In the heart of the capital I could find only a single new tribute. Painted nearly the full height of a ten-story building, it pictured Khomeini against a blue backdrop, as if Heaven-bound, with the inscription "Dear Khomeini, We will never put down the flag that you have raised."

I asked the diplomat, who over the years has come to know virtually all the Islamic Republic's main players and a wide cross-section of the Iranian people, how prominent—on a scale of one to a hundred —the Imam was in the public consciousness three years after his death.

He thought for a moment. "I suppose Khomeini now comes only somewhere in the middle," he replied.

The Iranian journalist put it another way: "We have a Persian saying, `What goes out of your eyes also gradually leaves your heart.'"

The passions among Khomeini's flag-bearers ran deep during the spring campaign. On the first night of electioneering, I caught up with Abol¬qasem Sarhadizadeh, a Ruhaniyoun candidate, who was making a cam¬paign appearance at a mosque in Naziabad, one of Teheran's southern suburbs of old brick and cinder-block houses sun-bleached to a raw colorlessness. Sarhadizadeh became promi¬nent as a militant when he was the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, between 1984 and 1990. A tall, gaunt figure, he was dressed that evening in Army fatigue trousers and a black suit jacket; after he took off his shoes to enter the mosque, I saw that his socks were threadbare. He looked much older than his forty-four years: a stubble of beard was more gray than black, and his face was deeply lined. Sarhadizadeh's election poster noted that he was a high-school graduate. After the revo¬lution, he worked with the Revolu¬tionary Guards and eventually rose to head the council supervising Iran's prison system. As was true of many of the first generation of revolutionary officials, his main qualification for public office was time served in the Shah's jails—in his case, fourteen years. "I struggled for an Islamic government," he explained to me, as if no other credential mattered.

Sarhadizadeh sees himself as an advocate of "barefoot Islam"--a phrase Khomeini coined to describe the rev¬olution's devotion to the mostazafin, who suffered the most during the monarchy. “I support the workers in this country and all the programs to help them," he told me as we sat on one of the mosque's worn red carpets. "As Labor Minister, I introduced a new law to change unreasonable dis¬missals and to improve wages and health care." The Ruhaniyoun urges the harnessing of local manpower—in a country where the unemployment rate is at least twenty-five per cent—to accelerate development and postwar reconstruction, instead of relying on loans and foreign investment. One of the theocracy's proudest achievements—and a symbol of the country's post¬revolutionary independence—was pay¬ing off almost the entire foreign debt, of more than seven billion dollars, accumulated during the Shah's rule. But under Rafsanjani's five-year plan the Islamic Republic would again be¬come a debtor nation. Teheran has already borrowed seven billion dollars, and the plan calls for a total of twenty-seven billion dollars in foreign loans and credits, which, for the Ruhaniyoun, carries the threat of a renewed depen¬dence on outsiders.

"The opposition supports open doors in economic and foreign policy," Sar¬hadizadeh told me. "But most poor countries that use the open-door policy—like Bangladesh, and all the countries of Latin America—only get poorer. In foreign policy, I think we should con¬tinue to go on our own path. We shouldn't open our doors to foreign investment." He pointedly added, "I don't like American capitalism." In fact, Sarhadizadeh doesn't like America, period. lie was reported to be among the members of the Ruhaniyoun who advocated siding with Iraq, Iran's longtime enemy, against the United States during Operation Desert Storm. Many in the Ruhaniyoun also called for recognition of last summer's coup in Moscow. Xenophobia still runs deep among the hard-core revolutionaries, and "Neither East nor West" remains the basis of their foreign policy. The interview ended when the crowd began a chant from the Koran to open the campaign session. As I left, I counted about eighty people in attendance.

All across Teheran, the Ruhaniyoun candidates were running hard and an¬grily for office. In another southern suburb, Fakhreddin Hejazi, a fiery hard-liner who had called for Nuremberg- type trials of the hostages in 1980, warned against abandoning the revolution. "We are opposed to a state of laissez-faire," he told supporters gathered at the home of a war martyr. "We are opposed to trade without the Islamic government's control. If the curb on the private sector is lifted, we will have neither bread nor religion. The economy of an Islamic country must be regulated in such a way that there are neither poor nor rich people. The Imam says that the war between poverty and wealth is on, but a certain gentleman"—a none too subtle reference to President Rafsanjani—"says it is over." Negative campaigning in Iran only occasionally becomes personal, and even then the reference is usually indirect.

"The job of a member of parliament is not limited to the building of schools and motorways," Hejazi went on. "The very important point now is that the world is in an ideological deadlock. People in the Eastern bloc are disillu¬sioned by Communism as an ideology, and they are repelled by capitalism.... The West has realized, after Communism, that Islam is standing up to it. Should we therefore believe that Islam is simply a formality? Should we just say our prayers and have a comfortable life and go to Heaven? Or should our moves bear some relation to the entire world – declaring solidarity with the Myanmar Muslims, and the [Palestinian] intifada, and the youth of south Lebanon?" Exporting the revolution to other Islamic lands, both near and far, is still very much on the Ruhaniyoun agenda; several of its members were opposed to Iran's role in the release of the Western hostages in Beirut last year. In contrast, Hejazi noted with some disgust, the Ruhaniyat advocates "establishing relations with South Africa and the United States.

Both Sarhadizadelt and Hejazi were members of the last Majlis, in which the debate on Khomeiniism—though never so described—was most overt. Elected in 1988, it was the most militant of the parliaments since the revo¬lution. Khomeini had called on the faithful to elect advocates of barefoot Islam, and they did. The Imam's appeal, however, had some help from within the regime. In 1988, the election process was run by the Interior Ministry, which was then headed by Ali Akbar Mohtashami. A Khomeini protege who had joined the Imam in exile in the nineteen-sixties, Mohtashami was rewarded with the post in 1985, on his return from Damascus, where he had orchestrated the revolution's export—an assignment that ended when a book bomb blew off most of his hands. Back in Teheran, Mohtashami gained control of the candidate-registration process as well as of the actual polling. He also controlled the nationwide network of komitehs¬the neighborhood security-and-morals squads—and exercised considerable influence over provincial appointments. Tapping into his national power base, he was able to carry out the Imam's wishes almost to the letter in the last election. An Iranian political scien¬tist called his performance "a work of art."

After the Imam's death, the Islamic Republic went through a major shakeup in leadership, and the constitution was amended for the first time since 1979. The 1979 constitution had established the President as a figurehead of state, and the Prime Minister as the head of government. Amendments in July of 1989 abolished the Premiership and established the President as both head of state and head of government. After nationwide elections at the same time, Rafsanjani—the son of a wealthy pistachio farmer, and the former speaker of the Majlis – became Iran’s first executive President. Among subsequent changes were the removal of Mohtashami from the Interior Ministry and of Sarhadizadeh from the Labor Ministry. As Rafsanjani cleaned house, the Majlis became the last stronghold of Khomeini's flag-bearers; it grew even more militant after Mohtashami and Sarhadizadeli won vacated parliamen¬tary seats in 1990. In the Majlis, the Ruhaniyoun often had the last word—or, at least, enough words to filibuster approval of Rafsanjani's reforms for months.

In this spring's election, however, Rafsanjani had the last word. In the kind of masterly manipulation that has become his trademark, he engineered a new screening
process for the candidates. The twelve-man Council of Guardians, the fourth branch of Iran's government, was now empowered to determine who was quali¬fied to run, a move that effectively superseded the Interior Ministry. Al¬though the government denied it, Teheranis openly spoke of the screening process—gleefully or despondently, depending on their own "tendencies"—as the latest step in a deliberate strategy to eliminate the Ruhaniyoun as a major player.

Like virtually everyone else in the Middle East, Iranians love conspiracy theories, whether or not they bear any resemblance to reality. (Most ordinary Teheranis I have met over the years believe, to this day, that an all-powerful Central Intelligence Agency put Kho¬eini in power after the United States recognized that the Shah was no longer a viable leader. The facts--the Ameri¬can Embassy takeover, American economic sanctions, American aid to Iraq, American bombing of Iranian offshore oil platforms in 1988—do nothing to dissuade them.) In this vein, Teheranis whispered that the cunning Rafsanjani was moving to discredit, even humiliate, the Ruhani¬youn, despite his public embrace of its members as brothers and his ex¬pressions of astonishment at their complaints.

The latest speculations may be true, however, for a third of the Majlis candidates—or over a thousand of the more than three thousand who filed to run -were disqualified by the Council of Guardians. Among them were forty incumbents, some of whom had served in all three previous parliaments. To no one’s surprise, most of the diqualified incumbents belonged to the Ruhaniyoun, including Khalkhali, the hanging judge; Asgharzacleh, the spokesman at the occupied American Embassy; and two other
incumbents associated with the hostage episode. Teheran's rumor mill reported that nearly all the other notable bard-liners—among them Mohtashami—had also been barred, only to have their candidacies "recon sidered" at the last minute, after they threatened mass public strikes and a boycott of the election.

The reasons for disqualification were kept not only from the public but also, apparently, from some of the candidates. "To date, I have not even been given written notification of the rejection of my candidacy," an infuriated Khalkhali complained to the local media. "I learned from the press and radio that my name was not among those accepted.. . . The members of the Council of Guardians are not aware that by rejecting me they have, in a way, ridiculed the exhortations of the Imam.... Do the people not understand that there are hidden hands behind the scene? ... The idea behind all this—in the light of such blatant violations—was that the [Ru¬haniyoun] should not participate in the elections."

After Khalkhali's outburst, the Western diplomat remarked to me, "You have to play tricks here to survive. It was true in the Shah's era. It's true now. This is part of the Orient--part of the game. They just don't like it when it comes around full circle."

The disqualifications added consid¬erable tension to the election week and elicited some threats about the contest's outcome. "I notify our brothers at the top of government centers," Mohtashami declared. "Those who are striking us now will someday be struck by others. If we are not elected, the Western world should not believe that we will let the government of Iran spoil the heritage of the revolution."

Rafsanjani was prepared to risk the Ruhaniyoun's wrath because his concerns extended well beyond the election. Since Khomeini's death, the unique "government of God" the Imam created has become vulnerable. Heavily influenced by Plato's Republic, which he studied as a young theologian, Khomeini combined the concept of a philosopher king with the Shiite belief in the clergy’s authority to interpret God’s will for the faithful. The result was a new political structure, built around a Valiyat-e Faqih, or Supreme Jurisprudent. As Faqih, Khomeini was outside the daily government, yet when he chose, or other asked, he exercised the ultimate executive, legislative, and judicial authority. The Faqih is the only position for which there is no term length or limitation in Iran’s constitution.

The system had legitimacy as long as Khomeini was alive. He had the credentials and the public following to be a Faqih. But Iran’s theocracy has never had the full support of its clergy; the Shiite grand ayatollahs all disagreed with the Faqih concept. And Khomeini’s designated heir, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, was dismissed in March of 1989, for disagreeing with the Imam on a host of issues. Over tea, a political scientist in Teheran who has often been my guide through the labyrinth of Iranian politics explained the regime’s dilemma to me. “The government’s very legitimacy is based on its supreme religious authority,” he said. “The problem for the mullahs is that Khomeini is a hard man to replace. As they discovered, it’s virtually impossible. After the Imam died, there was no one of sufficient rank to succeed him who believed in the idea of Faqih. In the end, the Assembly of Experts had to turn to a hojatoleslam and hastily elevate him to ayatollah. Now the whole system is vulnerable.

The new Faqih is Ali Khameini, Rafsanjani’s predecessor as President. His former title of hojatoleslams – which is also Rafsanjani’s title – means “authority on Islam,” and Iran’s mosques and seminaries boast thousands of hojatoleslams; ayatollah, the next and highest rank, means “sign of God.” "We went through the rote of 'The Faqih is dead. Long live the Faqih,' " the political scientist continued. "But it wasn't the same. Khomeini could call for people to become martyrs in a long war, and a lot of them would go to their deaths smiling. Khamenei can't. Khomeini could say that economic times are difficult and we all have to sacrifice for the cause, and people would listen. Khamenei doesn't have that kind of power. That doesn't mean he isn't a good or respected mullah. Iranians listen to what he says, but they don't listen in the way. You don’t hear people calling him ‘Imam.’ I don’t think anyone would even consider it. Some people have even started turning to other religious leaders."

To prevent the erosion of the regime's legitimacy, Rafsanjani has been methodically working to fashion a durable Islamic state as the basis of authority and to make its survival less dependent on the standing of the Faqih. The creation of an executive Presidency was only the first step. With charm and personal attention, he has also expanded the regime's constitu¬ency beyond the hard-core Islamists, who now constitute less than ten per cent of the electorate. Many middle-and upper-class Teheranis who felt repressed by the revolution's social restrictions and infuriated by some of its tactics told me this spring that they supported Rafsanjani's efforts; no al¬ternative attracted them. Jews and Christians in Teheran told me they believed that Rafsanjani genuinely cared about the religious minorities and that they would be safe under his rule. Words of approval came even from a taxi-driver who had named his two young sons Mohammad and Reza, after the last Shah. "I don't like any of them," he grumbled. "But Rafsanjani's the best of a bad lot. Sometimes I forget that he's a mullah."

Also fundamental to the process is the elimination of revolutionary purists, who oppose any deviation from the strictest interpretation of the Imam's line. Several ministries have already undergone quiet leadership changes. The new Finance Minister earned his doctorate in economics at the University of California at Davis; the new Central Bank director studied economics at the New School for Social Research, in New York, and at the University of California at Los Angeles. To replace hard-liners in the parliament, the Ruhaniyat introduced a host of tech¬nocrats and new faces. High on the list of Majlis candidates was Mohammad Javad Larijani, a Berkeley-educated former Deputy Foreign Minister.

On the opening night of the cam¬paign, after talking with Sarhadizadeh, I went to see Larijani at a mosque in southern Teheran. Bearded and bespectacled, Larijani is an affable fellow, with a wry sense of humor. After leaving the Foreign Ministry, where I last interviewed him, he had gone back to teaching at Teheran’s Institute of Applied Mathematics, and training new diplomats. Larijani was sitting on the floor of the mosque taking written questions when I arrived. I was in time to hear him answer a query about the disqualified candidates. "I have no special position," he said, with diplo¬matic aplomb. "These candidates will probably be employed in other sectors of government in the future." Indeed, there were reports that the regime would not cast the disqualified candidates totally adrift, in part to prevent them from more open opposition or from going underground.

After the session, Larijani stayed to chat. "The type of question indicates the depth of political thinking among the people," he told me. "They are not naive. It also shows the maturity of the revolution—that the system is work¬ing. There's no need for a coup d'etat." I was surprised at his candid allusion to the potential election backlash. He also said that the election would be a watershed, explaining, "It will con¬solidate the power of the President. Now he'll have the majority backing him up."

George Bush might be envious, I said. He smiled. I asked him about charges that the Ruhaniyat was aban¬doning barefoot Islam.

"We've begun liberalization, opening a free market, boosting production," he replied. "But that doesn't mean we've forgotten the needy in society. Which way is better to help them—to put them on welfare or to boost the economy? The welfare system is not an answer. It brings only minor and transient results."
I asked Larijani if anyone had ever called him a Republican.

He smiled again. "At least, I'm not a hawkish Republican," he said.

THE Teheran Stock Exchange opened in 1966, as one of the monarchy's economic reforms. After the revolution, almost half the hundred and five companies listed on the ex¬change were nationalized, and it sank into disuse. Now, however, the ex¬change is one of the prime vehicles for the privatization of state companies, and a centerpiece of the theocracy's reform program. One morning, I visited its headquarters, in a drab office block on Saadi Avenue, a main artery in the capital's business district. "You've come a bit too early," a manager's assistant said as we began a tour of the facility. "The real activity usually takes place in the last hour of trading before we close at noon. It also may be a little slow today, because people are waiting to see what will happen with the elections."

By the standards of other world markets, the floor of the exchange could best be described as orderly. There were no bells, no shouting, no crowds; activity was limited to a low, polite murmur. Thirty-four brokers, all of them men, were registered to trade; most were sitting behind brass nameplates around long black wooden tables arranged in a rectangle; custom¬ers came to counters behind them to buy and sell. All transactions were written out by hand. On the mezza¬nine overlooking the floor, sharehold¬ers could monitor the trading—also handwritten, on big blackboards that hung from the balcony—if they could see around the potted palms, the exchange's principal decorating motif.

"You should buy some shares," the assistant said to me as we watched the trading. "You know, this is the one stock market in the world where val¬ues only go up."

I asked if foreigners were allowed to trade on the exchange.
"Of course," he said, looking at me with a puzzled expression. "Haven't you read about our new foreign investment?"

One of the cornerstones of Iran's 1979 constitution was Article 81, which stipulated, "Granting concessions to foreigners for establishing corporations and firms dealing with commercial, industrial, agricultural, mineral affairs, and services is absolutely prohibited." The revolutionaries were determined to prevent foreign profiteering and exploitation of Iran's assets. But among the economic reforms after Khomeini's death was a new investment law. Resurrected from the monarchy and then revised, it allowed foreigners to control forty-nine per cent of joint business ventures with Iran; it also allowed them to take their share of the profits out of the country. Passage of the law had broadly altered public attitudes toward the role of foreigners in the Islamic Republic.

In view of the enthusiasm of his sales pitch, I asked the assistant whether he had bought any shares.

"I didn't want to," he replied, grinning sheepishly. "But my wife insisted."
After the tour, I visited Allah Verdi Rajaee-Salmassi (the first two names mean "given by God"), the exchange's secretary-general, in his office, off the mezzanine. Seated at a desk under a large photograph of Khomeini, he was cheerfully optimistic about the future of the exchange. "The stock market is the symbol of change in Iran," he told me. "We now have more companies listed than before the revolution. We're up to a hundred and twenty-nine, and over the next two years we'll reach three hundred and ninety. Between ten and fifteen percent of all the companies in Iran will join the ex¬change." The percentage would he so low, he explained, in large part be¬cause the government would retain control of strategic industries and oil; the petroleum industry was national¬ized in 1951, and it accounts for the biggest share of Iran's businesses.

I asked Rajaee-Salmassi if it was true that the stocks on the Teheran exchange never went down.

He laughed. "It's not forbidden for them to go down, but the vast majority do go up," he replied. Indeed, the value of the stocks sold in the first six months of 1991 was more than double that in all of 1990 and fifteen times that in all of 1989. "We started up the exchange again only after the government initiated the privatization pro¬gram under its new five-year plan, and our goals are still modest," he said. "We were originally modelled on the Belgian stock exchange. Someday, maybe in another five years, we hope to be a middle-level market, maybe like Johannesburg."

In May, the exchange went high-tech when it moved to new premises. The chrome-glass-and-marble offices, on Hafez Avenue, are furnished with locally made furniture—one of Iran's new boom industries—and I.B.M. computers, bought in Holland. (The ex¬change's index is in English, since no software package has yet been trans¬lated into Farsi.) Soon, the exchange is planning to admit its first female broker.

Shortly before my visit, the exchange had overcome a major hurdle on the road to full acceptance. As one of the directors showed me through the new premises, he told me jubilantly, "About three months ago, we invited the mullahs to see the exchange, and twelve came to check it out. Then they went to Ayatollah Meshkini"— the head of the Assembly of Experts, which elects the Faqih --"and explained it to him. He said it was O.K., and the mullahs came hack and told us that there was no religious conflict. We know it's true, because then they bought some shares!"

In the light of Iran's recent past, some of the government's other innovations are equally striking. After the American hostages were seized, in 1979, Iran scoffed at international economic sanctions. Now it is working with the International Monetary Fund, and on the I.M.F’s advice has sharply reduced the national deficit, from fifty per cent of the budget in 1988 to just over ten per cent in 1991--a feat achieved, some say, with the help of accounting sleight of hand. During Iran's first revolutionary decade, the government had heavily subsidized basic commodities to help the mostazafin. Now the mullahs have introduced an Iranian version of shock therapy, to galvanize the stagnant economy and make it more competitive internation¬ally. Subsidies for meat, chicken, sugar, and a host of other basic foodstuffs have been reduced, and the currency, which was artificially pegged through¬out the eighties at sixty-seven rials to the dollar, is floating at various rates, up to fourteen hundred rials to the dollar, The old isolation has been replaced by three free-trade zones-- two islands in the Persian Gulf and the port of Chahbar, on the Gulf of Oman—offering tax and customs exemptions to encourage foreign invest¬ment and trade.

Change is reshaping and redefining Teheran. At what had been abandoned building sites, I saw swarms of workers erecting new housing projects, private homes, government facilities, office blocks, and shopping malls. On the capital's motorways, I noticed sporty new Jaguars, Mitsubishi sedans, lots of Nissan four-wheel-drive jeeps, and even one or two 1992 Caprices—all highly conspicuous next to the small, boxy Iranian-made Paykans. Almost daily, the government announced a new trade deal or diplomatic tie: Iran Air added Kenya to its international routes (it now flies to more than twenty countries); a commercial pact to sell oil to Ukraine was concluded; new envoys to Mongolia presented their creden¬tials; and plans were announced for the construction of a railway linking Iran and the former Soviet Central Asian republics – a project that could make Teheran a transportation hub in the region. Billboard space that had for years extolled the revolution or con¬demned the Greater and Lesser Satans was now advertising Dole fruits and Japanese electronics. Banners at Te¬heran's Great Bazaar announced, in English, a coming "I nternational Exhibition of Finest Persian Carpets," and local newspapers advised American and European buyers where to go to pick up visas. Lotteries, which, like casinos, had been banned after the revolution, were coming hack. Banks this spring were conducting a nation¬wide sweepstakes: anyone who made a new deposit of twenty thousand rials was eligible. New cars would go to the twenty winners; losers would get their money back, but without "dividends"— the term that Islamic banks use to avoid the prohibition on usury.

Even the revolution's Islamic essence is mellowing. At Teheran's City Theatre, I attended a rehearsal of Chekhov's "Uncle Vanya," which included a drinking scene. Recent movies made in Iran feature love stories and other non-Islamic themes; a couple of films about the war with Iraq have plots with endings far short of total victory. Even Islamic fashion has become an industry. To replace the drab black cotton roupoosh—a kind of housecoat that is an alternative to the all-enveloping chador—that I had worn on several previous trips, I bought a double-breasted roupoosh of black crepe, with shoulder pads, epaulets, and raglan sleeves. I purchased it from an Iranian woman, who told me that she was glad to sell it. "That model's at least a year old," she said. I saw several women riding on the backs of motorcycles, their roupooshes occasion¬ally flapping illicitly in the wind, and among the devout, who still wear the chador, I noticed a preference for Ree¬boks and other brand-name sneakers.

Many of the most vivid images of my previous trip had disappeared. The sandbags and crisscrossed tape put up to protect shop fronts and the windows of homes and office buildings were gone. The only troops I saw, from any military branch, were a few Revolutionary Guards posted at Khomeini's tomb and outside his house, in Jamaran, one of Teheran's wealthy northern suburbs. The endless run of TV documentaries on the valiant war effort had been replaced by Western films and television series. One of my colleagues remarked on how odd it was to hear a Mississippi riverboat captain speaking Farsi.)

The sole visible trace of the war was at Behesht-e Zahra, where I encountered mothers and widows making weekend trips to tend their men's graves.
In many ways, the Iranian capital is cleaner and more orderly than it has been at any time since the revolution. Since 1991, when the draconian komitehs were merged with the police force, the random roadblocks to check for illegal alcohol consumption or unmarried couples have disappeared. Gardens have been planted along the boulevards, anti the powerful fragrance of violet, red, and white shaboo¬hyacinth-like flowers whose name means "night smell" often manages to cut through the city's air pollution. Drab, ill-tended parks have been re¬vitalized with swings, slides, rocking horses, and sometimes small Ferris wheels and giant climbing toys, like a "Mother Goose" shoe. Sections of the sprawling capital have been color-coded: all the corrugated-metal doors and trim in one district were bright yellow, in another pale blue. Rocky stretches along the highways in the north and on the desert border in the south have been planted with saplings. Most of the political graffiti on the sides of build¬ings have been replaced with picturesque murals in bright colors, each bearing the slogan "Our City Is Our House."

The most extraordinary innovation, however, may well be Iran's heavily funded birth-control program, which ranks as one of the most successful in the Third World. Throughout the revolution's early years, and especially during the war, the leadership called on the faithful to breed a new Islamic generation. The population not only soared but almost doubled. From 1976 to 1986, the population growth rate rose from 2.7 per cent to 3.9 per cent—one of the highest in the world. Then the mullahs reversed course. An Iranian importer of pharmaceuticals explained the change to me. "It was a simple matter of arithmethic," he said. "The year before the revolution, the population was thirty-four million, and income from oil was about twenty billion dollars. Today, the population is almost sixty million, and income from oil is only sixteen billion to eighteen billion dollars. The government finally began to understand that there were not enough pieces of the pie for all the people we were breeding." The Health Ministry launched a nation¬wide campaign, and a prominent aya¬tollah issued a fa two, or religious edict, advocating family planning. But the program languished, in part because the Prime Minister, a supporter of the nascent Ruhaniyoun, didn't back it. His post was eliminated in the 1989 government shakeup.

Dr. Mohsen Naghavi, a tall, slen¬der general practitioner with a neat mustache, took me on a tour of the Badr Health Clinic, a pristine two-story facility in southern Teheran. "Sev¬enty per cent of Iranian women now use contraceptives," he told me. "The pill, I.U.D.s, condoms, tubal ligations, vasectomies—everything is free. We don't teach rhythm, because it's not sure enough." The Badr Clinic's motto is "Fewer children, better life." To promote birth control, it last year be¬gan mobilizing a corps of women volun¬teers to go house-to-house in poor neighborhoods, where families tend to have the most children.

"We try to teach them, not preach to them," Dr. Naghavi told me. "We say that birth control is not mandatory. But we try to show them, in different ways, the importance of limiting popu¬lation growth. We explain that it's better to have one healthy, educated Muslim than a hundred unhealthy, uneducated Muslims. Then we explain the possible harm of having a baby before the age of fifteen and after the age of thirty-five, and that it's better for the health of the baby and the mother to have a gap of three years between children. We also explain the economics. We have to import food and be dependent on other countries. And we also talk about defense. We explain that Iran is in a geostrategic zone. The country must pay a lot of money for defense, because of super¬powers like the United States, who look at us with interest. We need a large military. But the larger the population, the more we have to spend on babies instead of on defense." According to Dr. Naghavi, the results of the birth-control program have surpassed the government's early projections, but he conceded that Iran still has a long way to go. "It took fifteen years, in the United States, to persuade people not to eat fats and oily foods," he said. "How can anyone expect us to solve this problem in a short time?” Nevertheless, in mid-April the Minister of Health made the astonishing claim that the population growth rate had been brought back down to 2.7 per cent; the new target is 2.3 per cent by the end of the century.

With Dr. Naghavi and two female doctors, I visited a class of the volunteers, who come to the clinic for weekly updates and to compare notes. The women, who were all dressed in either chadors or roupooshes, talked freely to me about their work: the initial hurdles, the problems of persuading men to limit family growth, their own early reluctance to practice birth control, the impact of the program on general family health care, and, not least, the new opportunities that birth control provided women for bettering their own lives. I could sense the beginnings of a women's-liberation movement in the room. One middle-aged woman told me, "This offers us a chance to partici¬pate in society, to get out of our houses, and to improve our personalities."

FOR all the changes in Iran, however, this spring few Teheranis were revelling in profit-taking, or enjoying the hope of the new season. A couple of days before the Majlis election, I joined a line of women and restless children outside the Qods Department Store, on Vali-e Asr Avenue, a tree-lined boulevard that cuts through the capital from the Elbourz foothills in the north to the edge of the southern desert. The line stretched around the corner and well down a side street; several of the women com¬plained that they had been waiting for up to four hours. They had all come to Qods to buy chicken; since the reduction of government subsidies, the price of chicken has increased at least twelve hundred per cent, but because the store is subsidized by a national charity the price was almost a thousand rials less than at free-market stores. After the wait, however, each customer could take away only two frozen chickens, in small packages with pink labels, imported from Bulgaria.

"I can't afford twenty-three hundred rials for chicken," a middle-aged widow named Esmat said when I asked people why they were waiting. "Beef, lamb, chicken, eggs --every¬thing has doubled over the last month. And that's on top of the increases the month before. But our salaries are fixed. So, either you wait in line at places like this or you eat less." A small crowd formed around me as other shoppers reeled off complaints about the price hikes.

I asked the women how they felt about the coming election. A thirty¬nine-year-old mother of two told me that she didn't plan to vote. "The election has no influence in my life," she said. "It won't make any difference." A teacher next to her chimed in, rather loudly, "They are lying to the people, so why should we go vote for them?" When I asked if she wasn't worried that someone might hear her, she responded, again loudly, "I don't care anymore. In fact, I wish they'd listen to what we have to say more often." A third woman made her way through the crowd to tell me, "We've waited thirteen years for something to happen. We expected so much, but now the revolution is failing us." She added softly, "We can't go on like this. We're tired of this life."

For more than a decade, the Qods Department Store has been one of my barometers of Iran's economic health. The last time I visited it, at the end of the war years, the shelves in the basement, where food is sold, had been pitifully bare—lots of ketchup, canned beans, and cheap plastic kitchen uten¬sils, but little of substance. This spring, I was surprised to find the basement shelves jammed with packages of pasta and rice, cream-filled pastries, colorful spices, and row after row of canned fruits and vegetables; the quantity and choice hadn't been this good since before the revolution. The upper floors, too, had a wide selection of consumer goods: clothing, from girls' frilly frocks to jeans for all ages; bright silk flowers; rouge, lipstick, and eyeshadow; and toys galore. In one corner, big black¬and-white stuffed pandas were stacked in a pyramid five feet high. I remarked on the abundance to one of the shoppers. "You don't understand," she replied, with the same irritation expressed by the women waiting in line for chicken. "Who can afford this stuff? Only the very wealthy. And I hear it's not so easy for them anymore, either."

A European envoy with long experience in Iran later remarked to me, "The kind of hardships here would cause envy in Russia and Africa. In Moscow, complaining about the price of tangerines would be a luxury." Nonetheless, the economic transition is painful. In 1991, per-capita income was estimated to be fourteen hundred dollars—less than half what it was on the eve of the revolution. This year, several economists told me, it has decreased further. As subsidies recede and prices shoot up, most civil ser¬ants, despite having received raises of as much as twenty-five per cent, find they are living below the poverty line.

Even the cost of making the hajj has gone up, and so has the amount of what is locally known as "blood money"-the compensation that drivers must pay if they kill or injure someone in a traffic accident. During election week, Iran's Supreme Judicial Council raised the price of compensation for loss of life in a traffic accident from six million to seventy million rials—almost fifty thousand dollars at the prevalent floating rate, but more than a million dollars at the old rate of sixty-seven rials, at which most people are still paid. Blood money for injuries or disability was also increased, to thirty million rials. The ruling caused a sensation in the desperately over¬crowded capital, where the traffic can best be described as rhythmic chaos. The taxi-driver who took me from Teheran's international airport to my hotel ran thirteen red lights almost as if he hadn't seen them. "DRIVE SLOWLY. SEVENTY-MILLION-RIAL MEN ARE RUSHING ABOUT IN THE STREETS," a recent headline in one of the local newspapers warned. The day after the ruling, Teheran bus drivers refused to work until they were assured that blood money would be paid by the bus company.

It was not the first Iranian economic protest. Price hikes across the board have caused hundreds of slowdowns and small strikes nationwide as work¬ers demand higher wages. Individu¬ally, these actions have been largely insignificant; collectively, they mark the beginning of a challenge potentially more serious than any political opposition. The key questions for the post-Khomeini leadership as it works toward both political and economic change are how far to move and how fast. The last Shah was forced to abandon the Peacock Throne in part because his attempts at modernization, the so-called White Revolution, imposed disruptive changes— about which ordinary Iranians had virtually no say—at an unacceptable pace. Now that the mullahs are coming to grips with many of the same modernization issues, they arc facing many of the same problems. The pace and scope of change are particularly troublesome for Rafsan¬jani, whose first four-year term expires next year. He faces reelection in July, 1993, for the second—and last—Presidential term allowed by the constitution.

When I left the department store, I stopped in at a bookstore whose proprietor is known as a thoughtful pundit on local affairs. I explained what I had just seen and heard.

"Ah, yes—don't I know," the pro¬prietor responded. "People are more depressed now than during the war. The economic situation affects us in more ways. We had expected that when the war ended things would be better, but instead they're worse. You feel it in every aspect of life. This is a society that has always loved jokes. Through most of the revolution and the war years, people still told wonder¬ful stories. In the end, we could laugh at our troubles. But I don't know how long it's been since I heard a new joke, or reheard an old one. Even parties are boring, because all that people can talk about is the economy. I'm the same way. Do you know that a set of tires now costs almost as much as you would have paid for a new car before the revolution? Chicken now is the same price as in Germany, but we're paid Third World salaries. And cars arc more expensive than in Europe."

As a result, the long-standing tradition of petty bribery has become a mainstay of the economy. "We call it oiling the mustache," the bookstore owner explained. "This morning, I had to go to a notary public to get certification that I'd paid off a loan. He told me that I didn't have the right documents, and that I had to go hack to the bank. So I did. But the bank official laughed at me and said I must be new at business, because I did have the right papers. He said the notary just wanted a bribe. By the time it was over, we did a lot of oiling. It's not an uncommon practice, but before the revolution you paid a little and you paid once. Now you have to pay a lot and to several people. Sometimes you can't blame them, because their salaries are so low. But it tells you a lot about the system."

I was indeed struck by the human hardship. On earlier visits, I had often seen men selling odds and ends on street corners, and occasionally I had seen beggars, hut this time I saw young girls brave onrushing traffic on the main thoroughfares to peddle wind¬shield wipers or chewing gum. Several of my old friends had taken second jobs, now almost a necessity among the middle and lower classes. A young teacher I met told me that she called in sick whenever she got a free-lance translation job—work that she needed in order to survive, even though she was living with her parents. A Jewish carpet dealer told me that he was very worried about his situation in Iran. I asked if he was referring to possible difficulties for Iranian Jews, some thirty thousand of whom are estimated to be living in the Islamic state. "No," he said, laughing. "This is my country, and I'm here to stay, as are most of the Jews I know. We're free to practice our faith at synagogues, in our schools, at our clubs. There are still plenty of kosher butchers, and the best health care is at the Jewish hospital. No, it's the economy that's killing me. I haven't had a sale in weeks."

After the blood-money ruling, several Teheranis I met predicted, seriously, that the poor would soon be flinging themselves into the traffic to win blood-money compensation -- preferably for injuries rather than death. Throughout the campaign, the Ruhaniyoun played to the widening social gap, calling for "vigilance" to prevent "society from being split into a well-off minority and a culturally and ma¬terially poor majority."

I asked the bookstore proprietor what all this meant for the revolution. "I don't know whether the revolu¬tion has failed" was the reply. "But it certainly hasn't succeeded yet."

DURING election week, a Mid-eastern diplomat in Teheran re called one of the post-Khomeini sig¬nals of change in Iranian foreign policy. Not long ago, he had noticed that the lights behind a large anti-American sign outside the old Hilton Hotel—now called the Esteglal, or Independence—were out. On his next visit, he noticed that the whole sign was gone. At the former American Embassy compound, now a school for Revolutionary Guards, I found a similar shift—this one among ordinary Iranians. Revolutionary slogans, including “America is Very Dangerous for Islam,” were still on the compound wall, but in the compound's guestbook some of the latest entries were markedly different from the congratulatory messages of past years. "Why?' one visitor had written. "Why in the name of the God of the poor and the powerless, why have they thanked you so much?' Another entry read, "History will judge that these students were like a dam in the way of progress." During a morning I spent talking about the impending election with four carpet merchants at the Great Bazaar, I mentioned the "Alarg bar ilmrika" ("Death to America") chants that have echoed through the revolutionary era. "Achhh," one of the bazaaris said angrily. "That saying cost us a lot. It cost us everything. We should forget it forever." But the signals were often contradictory. The former Intercontinental Hotel (now called the Tulip), where I was staying, still had "Down with U.S.A." emblazoned on a wall of the lobby. And at Friday prayer services at Te¬heran University, Iranians were still shouting "Alarg bar Jtnrikar like the "Hallelujah" chorus.

"Oh, you Americans— you're so di¬rect," an American-educated Iranian businessman said, with a laugh, when I asked him about the inconsistency. "Everything always has to be black and white. Here we're more subtle. Here everything is colored in various shades of gray. Yes, of course, every¬one's talking about relations with the United States again. It's one of the implicit issues in the election. But relations are not going to be established overnight. It will come gradually, in stages. And it won't be the same as before. Even those of us who don't like the revolution want the United States to know that we intend to keep the independence we've achieved."

To better understand Iran's foreign policy, I stopped in at the Institute for Political and International Studies, the Foreign Ministry's think tank. It is located within walking distance of the Shah's old palace, and has recently been equipped to receive CNN. One of several senior analysts I spoke with was particularly candid about Iran's strategy in the post-Khomeini era. "Among our main goals is the normalization of relations with all countries -- in the Gulf, Asia, Europe," he said.

“We are now attempting to resolve those points which we consider obstacles with Western countries. We're pursuing them in line with economic reconstruction. If the election goes as expected, these goals and policies will be pursued with less domestic resis¬tance. We should expect everything to speed up."

I asked him whether the release last year of American and British hostages in Lebanon marked a new direction in Iranian foreign policy.

"Is this era over?" he said. "This question is never going to have an answer. There's nothing that Iran can promise to the world. First, no country
should even give an answer. Israel doesn't. The United States doesn't. Every country does what is in its national interests. Besides, you should he able to tell from our attitude and our actions whether or not there's change. Second, you'd never get an honest answer even if there was one. No government anywhere is going to give a guarantee, unless, like Iraq, it's been demolished—and even Iraq didn't tell the truth. Third, if a man was honest, it would destroy his domestic political base. Do you expect the President to get up and say, 'Yes, I'm sorry. It's over'? Why push to have an answer when you know it would never help?"

I then asked about the death sentence that. Khomeini had pronounced on the British author Salman Rushdie, whom the Imam accused of blaspheming Islam in his novel "The Satanic Verses." The edict, which was proclaimed less than four months before Khomeini's death, is still in force, and its repercussions include the
murder of the book's Japanese translator and the stabbing of its Italian translator. The edict remains a major barrier to the opening of normal relations with the West. Ironically, "The Satanic Verses" is not a hot issue in Teheran. (Almost everyone I spoke to was snore angered by "Not Without My Daughter," Betty Mahmoody's book, which recounts the ordeal of an American woman, married to an Iranian, as she attempts to escape from Iran with their young daughter. Teheranis unani mously claimed that both the book and the film made from it grossly mispor trayed Iranian culture and attitudes.) "I think the Imam's fatwa is taken more seriously in Egypt," the Iranian journalist, who had recently been in Cairo, told me. “Copies of Rushdie’s book have been smuggled into Iran, but basically no one here gives a damn about Rushdie. Rafsanjani would like to resolve this issue, but it's like going against the Pope on abortion."

Indeed, most Iranians accept the fatwa as a product of domestic rather than Islamic politics. It was pronounced at a time of mounting challenges. After the war with Iraq ended, in August of 1988, economic and political tensions grew worse rather than better. By February of 1989, when Iran marked the tenth anniversary of Khomeini's return from exile, revolutionary fervor was definitely flagging. To rally public sup¬port, the mullahs have often used crises and, in some cases, even created them. The furor over "The Satanic Verses" in Muslim communities in Asia, Europe, and Africa emboldened the mullahs to use it as a diversion from frustration and malaise at home. The book also offered a pretext for correcting the pragmatic postwar course being charted by Rafsanjani. Several Iranian officials admitted to me this spring that the Ayatollah had never read Rushdie's book; its contents had instead been summarized for him. But trying to revoke the edict would be costly. "Any Iranian leader who said 'Forget the fatwa' would risk his political--even his physical—survival," a prominent European am¬bassador told me. Like all the other diplomats I met this spring, he be¬lieved that the edict was an embarrass¬ment to the current government, even though the new Faqili had on several occasions reaffirmed it.

The ambassador also told me that there had been attempts to find a way around the fatwa without appearing to defy Khomeini. "The basic idea was to get Iran to formally accept the rules of international law," he explained. "Rafsanjani said it first in a speech—although it was virtually hidden in the text." Then, he continued, in 1990 an Iranian delegation reached a compromise during talks with European Com¬munity representatives in Dublin, and agreed to sign a joint communique. "Iran said that it would respect the rules of international law, especially in the internal affairs of other countries," the ambassador continued. "By this it was understood that Teheran would not send anyone to London to kill a British citizen. That has helped Iran in its relations with the European Community. We both want to get rid of the problem. I've since been told several times by Iranian officials, 'We will never send someone to kill Rushdie.' "

I asked the ambassador if he felt that the agreement and the verbal reassurances were sufficient to remove the concern of European governments about violence stemming from the fatua. "Probably not," he replied.

The analyst at the Foreign Ministry's think tank seemed to understand that the international objections to Khomeini's edict were still very strong. He, too, mentioned the agreement with the Europeans in Dublin, and then said, "We're still working on the problem. At the moment, there's some new thinking going on. The reasoning—the new justification—is that Khomeini acted for religious reasons, and not on behalf of the state. Khomeini declared the punishment for what Rushdie did, based on existing law. I'm very bad at religious studies--but it was not a fatwa, it was a verdict. Khomeini did it apart from the government. He did it in a religious capacity, not as the head of state. If he had really wanted the government to
kill Rushdie, why would he just de clare the obvious verdict? He could have ordered a unit of Iran's Revolu tionary Guards to carry it out. I'm not trying to defend him. But he was not thinking of killing Rushdie; he was trying to make a point, to defend a principle. He saw Rushdie's book as a threat to Islam, and he wanted to defend the Islamic state and stop the trend of attacking Islam and its essence. And he was damned successful at that! But he didn't really want to kill a man. Ile had nothing against Rushdie personally. One of Rushdie's earlier books won a prize here, just six or seven months before the verdict. If we want to find the real intention of the Imam, then we must reduce the issue to reality. This is something we will have to work out--like the hostages here and in Lebanon. I don't have the solution, but we have to work on it."

I remarked that Iran's claims of foreign-policy changes had credibility problems on several counts, including the assassination in Paris last year of Shahpour Bakhtiar, who had become Iran's Prime Minister in 1979 as part of the deal to get the Shah to leave the country. Bakhtiar's government lasted only thirty-nine days, and then he fled in exile to France. The Iranian government has repeatedly claimed that it is innocent of his murder. But American and British officials told me they had evidence that the assassins were Iranian—and not Iranian hard-liners out to discredit Rafsanjani and prevent rapprochement with France. "We've traced the assassination right up to the highest levels of government," an American official told me. In Teheran, another diplomat closely familiar with the case commented, "They consider knocking off a few opposition figures to be an internal affair. They're keen not to get caught, but they haven't changed their spots."

I repeated this to the Foreign Ministry analyst, and he reflected for a inute. "When I put all the data into my mind, I can't find a single rationale—at least, in terms of what we've been trying to do for the last three years," he said. "The experience of the first ten years is behind us. We were on the verge of full, normal diplomatic and economic relations with France. Mitterrand was scheduled to visit just two months later, and that was a very important step for this government. It was a signal of the extent to which we are changing. So Mitterrand delayed his trip, which was embarrassing for us. Bakhtiar's death is more of a threat than he was in life. So who had the motive? We're not idiots sitting at this table. I can't believe that we had a role in Bakhtiar's death."

I asked him about the bombing this year at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires—an action that the Islamic Jihad, followers of the Iranian-backed Hez¬bollah in Lebanon, claimed to have carried out.

"Ah," he replied. "Hezbollah and Buenos Aires is another story. There's a motive there, and a line that follows. The bombing came right after the Israelis murdered the I lezhollah leader. Hezbollah may have had some outside help--I'm not sure that Iran would have risked it. But that group has its own capabilities—from the war in Lebanon, and from help a long time ago."

Various diplomats and Iranian officials told me that Teheran has cut back significantly on its financial aid to Hezbollah. At the same time, however, the sources said, Imad Mughniyeh, the Lebanese Shiite responsible for the abduction of Terry Anderson, Thomas Sutherland, and several other American and British hostages, has been given refuge in Teheran, with a house not far from the old Hilton and a construction job.

Finally, I asked the analyst about Iran's official intentions toward the United States, and prospects for re¬newed diplomatic ties after the election. Envoys who have acted as intermediaries between Washington and Teheran over the years have concurred that it would be a risky step for Rafsanjani, who has long been seen as sympathetic to such a move. "It's not like Nixon going to China," one of the envoys told me. Since the arms-for-hostages swap — in which Rafsanjani is believed to have played the pivotal behind-the-scenes role, though he never met Oliver North or Robert McFarlane during their secret mission to Teheran in 1986--his intentions have been suspect.

"There's already movement," the analyst responded. He told me that Iranian imports from the United States had tripled last year—though, because of American sanctions, Iran is able to sell very little to the United States. "In economic terms, we've removed the barriers for importing American goods to Iran," he said. "The Americans haven't done the same for us yet." A State Department official later con¬firmed that United States exports to Iran increased from a hundred and sixty-seven million dollars' worth in 1990 to more than five hundred and twenty-seven million dollars' worth in 1991. Trade is still a long way from the twenty-six-billion-dollar market of the Shah's era, but it's already enough to rank Washington as Teheran's sixth-largest trading partner.

"But my personal view is that some¬thing else has happened to the issue of relations over the past thirteen years," the analyst went on. "I don't think we need the United States anymore. If I were Rafsanjani's adviser and he asked me if we should open relations again, I would say that he would do it at a high cost domestically. He might say that we'll lose only five to ten per cent of support—which is negligible. It's true: it will probably not threaten the revolution to have relations with the United States. The revolution is now more established than ever. That's not too much of an issue. But then I would say, 'Why do we need the Americans now?' When Iraq was the regional power, we could have used the Americans. During the war with Iraq, we needed American spare parts for air-planes, and American missiles. When we were negotiating an end to the war, we could have used American influence. But the situation is very different now. We're rebuilding our military with help from the Russians, the East Europeans, and others. The Asians are helping us with reconstruction. Some make an argument that we need relations because the United States has a monopoly on oil equipment. But the international market is now more so¬phisticated than that. If you can get arms on the black market—or all those chemicals that Iraq got from Western companies—then you can easily get oil equipment. The only issue is the cost of intermediaries. We can get it. That's not an issue anymore.

"And even if we did have relations with the United States now, we cer¬tainly couldn't expect to get help or aid from the United States. Look at the Soviet Union. Gorbachev got nothing. How much did Eastern Europe get? Not much from the United States. There's only one surplus country, and that's Japan. And we have better relations with Japan and Europe now. That doesn't mean we shouldn't eventually open relations with Washington. But in talking about relations I have one question: Can America and Iran open relations and have them be normal? It's like a man and woman who get married and then divorce. Can they have the same level of relations afterward?"

ELECTION DAY, April 10th, was a bright spring day that in Teheran spanned the seasons—from searing heat in the arid southern suburbs to a few snowflakes and drops of cold rain in the foothills of the Elbourz, where skiers still had several feet of good powder. Elections are held on Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. It's the one day of the week when Teheran is almost tranquil and it doesn't take hours to get from one side of the capital to the other. Most of the big names voted early. Ayatollah Khamenei called on Iranians to vote as an Islamic duty. A mass turnout, he said, "would punch the mouths of idle prattlers and en¬emies of Islam and Muslims."

President Rafsanjani told a press group assembled to watch him vote, "Never in the past have there been so many differences in points of view in our society. Now the competition and opposition are intense." Hojatoleslam Mehdi Karrubi, the Majlis speaker and a leader of the Ruhaniyoun, had to wait an hour to cast his ballot; he had forgotten to bring his identity card, and an aide had to fetch it for him. Karruhi's wife was also running for the Majlis; she had been hastily nomi¬nated as a replacement for one of the disqualified Ruhaniyoun candidates. Karrubi was clearly hitter about the actions of the Council of Guardians. "It would have been better if sincere forces and those committed to the Islamic Revolution had not been barred," he told reporters.

I spent the day making the rounds of polling stations. With a friend, I went into one station, at a mosque, where men and women were voting in separate sections, and watched as my friend wrote two names on her ballot. Candidates' names had to be filled in by hand; ballots were then deposited in a sealed box. Muslim Teheranis were allowed to vote for as many as thirty of the hundred and sixty-six candidates in the capital—that is, their full quota of representation. A candidate needed to get thirty per cent of the vote to win; any seats that remained unfilled would he decided in a runoff. None of the voters I talked with, however, had voted for more than twenty-eight people, and most had voted for only a handful. The common refrain was "I don't know anything about the others."

In a country where half the adult population is illiterate, voters are per¬mitted to have help. I saw several women conferring among themselves, nodding, then sitting down together to write out their votes. 1 later heard a story about a woman with a bouffant hairdo under a loosely tied scarf who was approached at a polling station by another female voter in similar dress. "You look like someone I'd agree with," the second woman was reported to have said. "Can you help me decide whom to vote for?" Not everyone voted for candidates. Several people reported that they had written down only one name: "Allah." With great glee, an ice-cream merchant told me that he'd written down two names: "Meat" and "Chicken."

Throughout the day, voters trickled through the polling stations. The largest crowd I saw was at the Armenian cathedral, where the line of people waiting to vote curved all the way around a large courtyard. At the Jewish Sports Club, I asked the supervisor why so many Jews were voting, when the candidate for the community's single seat in the Majlis was running unopposed. Sitting under pictures of Moses, Abraham, and Khomeini, he replied, "We want a large turnout, to be able to say that our representative has strong backing from the community." All over Teheran 1 saw banners declaring "It Is the Duty of Everyone to Vote to Fight the Enemy." But the turnout appeared to me to be low – an assessment shared by other members of the foreign press and by a wide assortment of diplomats who had conducted tours of polling stations.

I spent the morning in Shahpour, poor southern suburb. One of the centers of activity there was a food bazaar; little stalls lined both sides of a central square. A dingy alley with more shops ran off to one side. In the alley, I asked an old vender, who was selling some potatoes he had piled on plastic bags on the ground, if he knew of a family that might be home.

"There's a very poor family there," he said, pointing to a large hole in the alley wall.

As I ducked through the doorway, I almost tripped over a small cross-eyed boy with a drooling grin, who was rocking back and forth on his knees. His mother introduced herself as Zohreh and invited me in. Zohreh, who is thirty, lives with her husband and six children -four boys and two girls, aged five to fifteen—in two small rooms, with no furniture except an old television set. The apartment's walls, painted bright green and blue, were decorated with tinted family photo¬graphs. The single tap, cold water only, was outside. The apartment has no heat during the hitter Teheran winters and no cooling system during the steamy summers. I asked how all eight managed to sleep there. At night, Zohreh explained, they spread eight mats across the floor; they can fit, because two of the children are still small.

Two of Zohreh's teen-age boys are severely handicapped, mentally and physically. "We tried to get them into state institutions, but they wouldn't take them, because the children have two parents," she said. As we talked, the boys, thirteen and fourteen, crawled around in the next room; one had his trousers and underpants pulled down to his knees.

I asked Zohreh how she felt about the revolution. With a certain awe, she told me that she had seen Khomeini once, shortly after his return to Iran, when he visited her suburb. But she added that her life hadn't improved since 1979. On Election Day, she was worrying about finding a new place to live. "We have to move this summer," she explained. "They're going to tear down this building and put up a new apartment block. We pay ten thousand rials for rent, and we can’t afford any more. I have no idea where we’ll go.” She said that her husband, a former construction worker, had become too frail to do heavy labor.

I asked her what he did now.

"Didn't you see him?" she asked. "He sells fruits and vegetables at the corner." The potato vender I had talked to was her husband; he looked at least seventy, but she told me that he was fifty-five.

On specific aspects of the revolution Zohreh deferred to her eldest son, fifteen-year-old Emran. Because the family has been so hard hit by the economic shock therapy, Emran, a lanky youth with the first dark hairs of a mustache above his lip, now sells vegetables along with his father. "He doesn't have enough time to study anymore," his mother said. "If lie doesn't make it, then there's no hope for the rest of us." Like his siblings, Emran does not remember the monarchy. The majority of Iran's popula¬tion is now under sixteen. Iran's baby-boom generation will, over the next two decades, become the largest bloc of voters. "The revolution has brought some good things and some bad," Emran told me, considering his words seriously. "No other country owns us anymore. But there aren't enough facilities for children to study, and there's not enough help with housing. We're going to be abandoned soon, because it's O.K. for people to make money and exploit the poor again"... a reference, apparently, to the private building boom going on throughout Teheran. "The revolution promised to take care of us," he concluded plaintively.

Indeed, despite the revolution's ini¬tial pledge to care for the inosicznfin, resentment, particularly over housing shortages, is becoming visible among the poor. The theocracy's urban-renewal programs have targeted the illegal squatter settlements ringing several of Iran's largest cities—a product of the population boom, rural migration, and the influx of refugees from border areas during the war. The country's urban population has roughly doubled since the revolution; many cities can no longer cope with the numbers. Around the time of the election, at least three cities witnessed confrontations between municipal workers assigned to raze shantytowns and the poor who lived in them. In May, riots erupted in Mashhad, one of Iran’s biggest cities and the site of its holiest shrine. To protest the evictions, the squat¬ters— mainly unskilled workers em¬ployed in nearby factories—went on a rampage, burning automobiles, attack¬ing banks, and looting government facilities. At least six were reported to have been killed and hundreds injured in the largest anti-government demon¬stration since the revolution.

Before leaving the tiny apartment, I asked Zohreh whom she favored in the election. She had kind words for Rafsanjani, but she said she hoped the Ruhaniyoun would win. Then I asked if she had voted. She said no. Zohreh's reaction reminded me of what an Iranian businessman had told me earlier. "Ten years ago, people were political," he said. "Now they don't have time for politics. They're just trying to survive."

After the polls closed, election officials reported that almost nineteen million Iranians, or sixty-five per cent of the eligible voters, had cast their ballots; the government had said that it would be satisfied if eighteen million turned out. In the first round, just over half the Majlis seats were decided; the runoff election was held on May 8th. To practically no one's surprise, the Ruhaniyat swept both rounds. Teheran's press referred to the results as a "landslide."

The biggest casualties among the Ruhaniyoun were Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha, who had blessed the American Embassy seizure; former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohta¬shami; and Speaker Mehdi Karrubi. Abolgasem Sarhadizadeh and Fakhreddin Hejazi also lost their seats. Among the winners were Mohammad Javad Larijani and nine women—more than twice the number in the previous parliament, and more than four times the number in the United States Senate. In the end, President Rafsanjani's supporters won seventy per cent of the seats in the new Majlis – a clear mandate to speed up reforms.

Iran’s post-Khomeini leadership had seemingly been confident of victory. Even before the final votes were cast, the government announced changes in one of its newest laws. To fulfill loan conditions set by the I.M.F. and the World Bank, the government lifted the forty-nine-per-cent restriction on foreign investment. Outsiders may now put into Iran and take out of Iran as much as they want—an investment law even more liberal than those of the Shah's era.

ONE of the last polling stations I visited during the April vote was set up at the husseiniyeh next to Khomeini's house, in Jamaran, in the scenic Elbourz foothills. A husseiniyeh is a traditional Shiite social and mourn¬ing center, named after the seventh-century martyr Hussein. The Ayatol¬lah made many of his most important speeches from a specially built balcony at the husseiniyeh.

Since shortly after the revolution, the main road into Jamaran has been well marked by a ten-foot model of Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock, the site, according to legend, of the Prophet Muhammad's ascent into Heaven. While Khomeini was alive, the road was cordoned off by Revolutionary Guards, and Jamaran residents often complained of having to go through car, body, and parcel searches every time they came home. Now the road is open, but several blocks surrounding Khomeini's house are still cordoned off, because many of the mullahs, both Ruhaniyat and Ruhaniyoun, have built large houses nearby. So I walked the last few blocks, along a street named for one of the war's martyrs; the air was crisply cool and refreshing after the heat in Shahpour.

Along the way, I saw two young men talking outside one of the houses. I stopped to ask directions, and they invited me in for tea. It was a big house, filled with overstuffed sofas and other expensive-looking furniture; they put a tape of American rock music on a cassette player. One of the young men told me that he was a chemistry student, and that his friend, a mechanical engineer, had become a furniture salesman, because engineers' salaries were too low. Both were in their mid-twenties. I asked them what they thought of the revolution, and they immediately changed the subject to the economy. “I’ll have a university degree soon, but I don’t have any possibilities for a job," the chemistry student said. "I'll probably end up selling cigarettes on the corner. You have to have at least three hundred million rials just to get a small house now. You have to find thirty thousand rials just to die. Both of us will end up living with our parents forever."

He also had no use for the mullahs. "All of them—they're corrupt," he said. "They tell people to live simply, but look at the houses around here. They live like kings." Resentment against the so-called Mercedes mul¬lahs—those who have profited finan¬cially as well as politically during the theocratic rule—was a recurrent theme this spring.

I asked the two whom they favored in the election. Both said they would prefer the Ruhaniyat. I asked if they had voted yet. Both said no.

When I finally made my way up to the husseiniyeh, I found only a couple of people voting; the area looked almost deserted. From the street, I could see the roof of Khomeini's house behind a high metal gate. On an impulse, I asked one of the Revolutionary Guards if I might go inside. He hesitated, then shrugged and went to get the keys.

In stark contrast to the mansions in Jamaran, the Imam's home is small and simple—rather unimpressive. The exterior is of rough brick and has an unfinished look. The main salon, at¬tached by a walkway to the husseiniyeb, contained only a couch, an ottoman, and an end table. Through most of his life, Khomeini preferred to sit on the floor; only in his later years did he need the support of a chair. On a small porch outside the salon was a five-foot-high black-and-white photograph of Khomeini. A vase of spring flowers was on the end table.

I remarked to the guard that I had been to the Ayatollah's tomb, but that I felt his empty home somehow had more finality to it.

"Yes," the guard replied. "And Iran will never be the same."